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India’s economic development was given a huge boost by the growth acceleration that 
began roughly in the 1980s. Coming at precisely the time when India’s planning 
institutions were coming apart, the coincidence was seen by many economists as a 
vindication of the benefits of liberalization. Greater market access and access to 
foreign technologies and capital markets did indeed have a role to play in sustaining 
three decades of high growth in India, but the drivers of the growth acceleration are 
more complex than a simple liberalization model suggests with significant 
implications for the policy challenges facing India today. This analysis uses the 
analytical framework of ‘political settlements’ (in Khan 2010a) to look at the interface 
between politics, economics and the enforcement of the institutional framework to 
look at the technology acquisition processes that have been driving growth. 
 
It shows that the institutional framework for technology acquisition in the period 
before 1980 did achieve significant successes in building up Indian technological 
capability in a few sectors and these capabilities played a significant role in driving 
the growth acceleration after 1980. However, the Indian political settlement at that 
time did not allow an effective enforcement of the institutions that would have 
allowed licensing and planning to achieve global competitiveness for India’s 
emerging modern sectors. A significant amount of ‘learning’ took place but high 
levels of effort could not be enforced and as a result global competitiveness was by 
and large not achieved even in the high-capability sectors.  
 
The shift to a more open economy was driven primarily by an evolution in India’s 
political settlement that predates the formal liberalization that happened in the 1990s. 
India’s political settlement changed in the mid- to late-1970s as the number and 
organizational strength of political organizations increased over the 1960s. This 
eventually led to a transition from a ‘dominant party’ system to one that can be 
described as ‘competitive clientelism’. The new political settlement allowed direct 
and ad hoc links between economic sectors close to the frontier and the political 
leadership. Direct and indirect financial support was provided through a number of 
different instruments to sectors near the global competitiveness frontier to engage in a 
second phase of learning that moved them to the frontier. An analytical model of 
catching up is used to show the importance of incentivizing ‘effort’ during any 
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process of learning-by-doing financed by external financing. The important change in 
the new political settlement was that in a number of sectors the design of the 
financing instruments in this second phase of learning ensured high levels of effort in 
the context of the new political settlement. Case studies of the automobile and 
pharmaceutical industries are used to explore the processes through which the 
movement to the frontier happened. 
 
The analysis based on political settlements and the catching up process can explain 
important features of the growth process since the 1980s. Growth in India’s economy 
has been driven by a relatively small number of sectors where growth has been very 
high and it has also been regionally concentrated. Moreover, growth has not created 
the vast numbers of jobs that India requires and has been based on skill-intensive 
industries. These features of the growth process are entirely consistent with an 
analysis that focuses on capability development. The ‘planning’ period was only 
partially successful in creating pockets of almost-frontier capabilities. It could not be 
applied effectively to create broad-based capabilities that were sufficiently diversified 
across sectors and regions. The second phase of learning after 1980 upgraded some of 
these sectors to the frontier using sector-specific strategies of state support and these 
sectors subsequently drove the growth process through market competition. 
 
There are important implications for sustainability and for policy. The spread of 
growth to new sectors, more labour-intensive sectors and across regions is not likely 
to happen fast enough simply through market processes of diffusion. An analysis of 
the capability constraint suggests that labour market liberalization (the preferred 
policy priority of many market economists) is likely to have negligible effects in 
solving the sustainability problem. Neither the licensing strategy of the 1950s nor the 
business-government links that emerged in the 1980s offer a sufficient developmental 
model for India, but understanding the challenges analytically and politically can help 
a discussion about policy options. Secondly, as the sectors that were close enough to 
the frontier to benefit from sector-specific support to reach the frontier have already 
done so, it has become more difficult to use business-government links for productive 
purposes. Business-politics links have therefore increasingly been used to drive 
unproductive rent capture strategies as politicians continue to require off-budget 
financing for operating the political system. This has resulted in a growing critique of 
political corruption and demands for more constraints on politicians and more 
redistribution to the poor. However, in the absence of a growth strategy these 
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India’s growth acceleration in the 1980s was of great interest to many observers for a 
number of reasons. For a start, its growth acceleration of around two per cent in the 
1980s had not been anticipated or expected and indeed the country was going through 
a period of considerable political uncertainty. It had just come out of Indira Gandhi’s 
Emergency and Indian politics was headed towards greater party fragmentation and 
weaker rule at the centre. As one of the few long-standing democracies in the 
developing world (apart from the brief interlude of the Emergency), India was an 
attractive model of growth for all those who were looking for an example of rapid 
growth in a large developing country with democracy. India’s political leaders were 
also distancing themselves, at least in their rhetoric, from the ‘license raj’ of planning 
that many orthodox economists argued was responsible for India’s poor performance 
since its independence in 1947. This was attractive to economists who had long said 
that India would perform much better if only it liberalized and got rid of its restrictive 
economic controls. In its international political alliances too, India was rapidly 
moving towards the West in general and the United States in particular, and this 
further increased the attractiveness of the Indian growth model in many sections of 
the western media.  
 
On the other hand, many aspects of the Indian takeoff did not fit with the expectations 
of analytical models coming from mainstream economics and political economy. To 
begin with, the growth takeoff did not just happen in India but in all three major 
economies of the Indian subcontinent: India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, whose 
trajectories towards democratization and liberalization were somewhat different from 
India’s. Secondly, the growth takeoff in India happened a full decade before any 
substantial liberalization took place, though a pro-business rhetoric and a new set of 
policies supporting business emerged in the late 1970s. Thirdly, India’s democracy 
had more in common with the models of patron-client democracy that were supposed 
to block growth than the models of democracies in Weberian states that could drive 
efficient public good provision and ensure the protection of property rights. The 
1980s were also a decade of political instability, with outbreaks of regional, caste and 
communal violence, the rise of a divisive and often violent political Hinduism and 
high and growing levels of corruption. Fourthly, even when moves towards a more 
liberal economy began in the 1990s, labour intensive sectors did not start to grow as 
economic theory predicted. Rather, Indian growth was driven by capital-intensive and 
skill-intensive sectors like automobiles, pharmaceuticals, and information 
technologies. Not surprisingly, most of the population were left out of the direct 
effects of employment and wage growth in these sectors. The Arjun Sengupta 
Commission appointed by the government reported in 2006 that 77% of the Indian 
population had a per capita daily consumption of less than Rs 20 (around 50 US 
cents). Fifthly, contrary to the predictions of economic theory, rich and poor states did 
not begin to converge as a result of the movements of capital or labour between them 
but began to rapidly diverge in their per capita incomes. Instead of convergence, 
richer states like Gujarat, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu drove the growth. Large poor 
states like Uttar Pradesh and Bihar fell rapidly behind. And yet for all these problems, 
India’s overall growth was sustained over three decades, and crept up further in the 
1990s. We use the framework of political settlements to identify the factors driving 




1. Introduction  
The analytical framework of political settlements allows us to develop an interrelated 
analysis of features of Indian economic and political development over the last three 
decades. A political settlement is defined as a reproducible combination of institutions 
and a distribution of power between organizations that achieves the minimum 
economic and political viability conditions of society (Khan 2010a). This framework 
makes explicit the interdependence of economic development and political stability 
working through the institutional framework. In developing countries informal 
institutions and informality in the operation of formal institutions play an important 
role for structural reasons to do with the nature of these economies. Economic 
organizations in developing countries operate in contexts where many formal 
institutions like property rights are not appropriate for sustaining development and 
formal institutions cannot in any case be properly enforced given the limited resource 
base of enforcement agencies. Even legitimate firms do not therefore rely entirely on 
formal institutions and well-working markets to solve their resource allocation 
problems. Their growth and prosperity depends on formal and informal arrangements 
that sometimes work and sometimes do not. Similarly, politics has a significant 
informal component because resources available from the formal sector are 
insufficient to ensure political stability. These features of the economy and polity 
mean that substantial informality marks the operations of institutions in developing 
countries. However, outcomes can vary significantly depending on the configuration 
of institutions and organizations: with a fortunate configuration economic 
development can be rapid with tolerable political stability. With a less fortuitous 
configuration development can be blocked and political stability can be poor.  
 
The political settlement framework allows us to address and explain important 
features of economic and political developments in India. In terms of this analytical 
framework, outlined in Khan (2010a), the distribution of power between political 
organizations within India immediately after its independence in 1947 allowed the 
construction of a dominant party ruled state. The economic and political evolution of 
the country in the next two decades led to the emergence of new political 
organizations and movements based on regional, caste and class mobilizations. A 
significant shift in the political settlement happened around the mid- to late-1970s as 
the new distribution of organizational power could not be accommodated within the 
dominant party system. By the 1980s, the distribution of organizational power took 
the form of competitive clientelism and the political system reflected this with the end 
of the dominant role of the Congress Party. Less inclusive national parties ruled at the 
centre and the Congress too no longer included enough coalitions to be able to rule on 
its own. The ruling coalition was now based on a coalition between parties rather than 
coalitions within parties. The apparent paradox is that the economic takeoff in India 
coincided with this change towards greater vulnerability and uncertainty. The political 
settlement framework allows us to see why this was not really a paradox at all.  
 
The economic takeoff was driven by a small number of high technology sectors and 
this too does not make sense in terms of liberal market theory. However, we can 
explain what happened by looking at capability development in a number of critical 
sectors driven by formal and informal institutional arrangements that were effective 
given the political settlement of the time. The critical transition of the 1980s and 
1990s was based on building on capabilities that had already been developed by the 
industrial policy of the 1950s and 1960s. Earlier strategies of capacity building in 
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India during the 1950s and 1960s therefore need to be evaluated in a somewhat 
different light. They were critical for building productive capabilities in a number of 
sectors and regions and these sectors and regions subsequently drove growth in later 
decades. The earlier strategies did not fully succeed partly because the institutional 
and policy framework at that time was attempting to develop specific sectors and 
technologies through targeted licensing policies. This strategy required a high degree 
of enforcement and withdrawal of support if effort by infant industries was low, but 
the political settlement of that time did not allow an effective disciplining of subsidy 
recipients. The supported sectors did not in most cases reach the international frontier 
in terms of a competitive price-quality mix. Nevertheless, some of these sectors and 
firms moved relatively close to the competitive frontier. 
 
The opening up that gradually happened in the 1980s and 1990s was very fortuitous 
because a new set of policies and a new political settlement emerged that allowed a 
few of these close-to-the-frontier sectors to actually reach the frontier and become 
globally competitive. The political settlement in India changed after the mid-1970s as 
the number of social movements and mobilizations expanded in a way that could no 
longer be accommodated within the dominant Congress Party. The fragmentation of 
the party marked a significant change in the political settlement as the ruling coalition 
could no longer hope to direct and micro-manage sectors of learning and investment 
in the way that the licensing strategy of the past had attempted. At the same time, the 
fragmentation of a single ruling party also made it more difficult for anti-business 
coalitions within the party to block big business interests even if this was now 
happening in explicit and relatively unconditional ways. Paradoxically, this allowed 
pro-business policies to emerge explicitly and without significant opposition in the 
1980s, long before liberalization (Kohli 2006a, 2006b). The transition to a set of 
policies that further supported business (pro-business strategies) before a transition to 
gradual liberalization is well known in the Indian literature. But why this led to an 
acceleration of growth and the limitations of the growth strategy are more contested. 
 
The political settlement approach can explain both why such a shift in policy could 
happen but also why it was significant in driving growth at that time. The earlier 
strategies had created the capabilities that positioned some business groups close to 
the frontier. The political settlement of the 1950s and 1960s did not give the Indian 
state the disciplining capacity to push the targeted strategy of catching up any further. 
But the subsequent strategy of unconditional support to well-connected business 
houses and high capability sectors from the late-1970s onwards allowed some of these 
sectors to make their way to the frontier. In fact, if liberalization had happened before 
these sectors had achieved competitiveness, this would have made their catching up 
much more difficult. Nor would the pro-business policies of the 1980s have worked if 
some Indian businesses were not close to the frontier and could not therefore see the 
advantages in using political support to achieve competitiveness. If all Indian 
businesses were far from the frontier, it would not have been rational for them to use 
politically generated rents to invest in catching up. Competitive firms clearly do not 
need politically-generated rents, but in the context of competitive clientelism and 
short time horizons of political organizations, only firms that are relatively close to 
the competitiveness frontier are likely to benefit from and therefore to us political 
connections to create rents that then allow them to invest in learning-by-doing that 
can take them to the frontier. Paradoxically, as firms and sectors close to the frontier 
become competitive, the firms and sectors that remain are eventually further and 
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further away from the frontier. As this happens, a pro-business strategy of links 
between political and economic organizations in the context of competitive 
clientelism can stop being socially desirable. This is indeed what began to happen in 
India by the end of the decade of the 2000s. Competitive sectors and firms drove 
growth but politically created rents failed to generate new competitive sectors and 
firms as the ones that were not at the frontier already were too far away to perceive 
competitive catching up as a viable strategy. Business-government relationships 
began to result in speculative investments, cornering of markets, price-setting deals 
and so on that were much less likely to drive growth. A better understanding of the 
technological transition in the successful growth-driving sectors in the context of an 
evolving political settlement can then help to identify future challenges.  
 
The framework also allows us to examine the developmental implications of different 
patterns of political organization across Indian states and over time. As in other 
developing countries, India’s central and state governments are organized around 
different variants of patron-client politics. This type of politics uses off-budget 
resources (like informally organized resource allocations, political corruption, 
employment and contract allocation on informal principles) to a significant extent in 
building political coalitions. By definition, patron-client politics cannot be entirely 
rule-following and many of its resource allocations are unlikely to have a legal status 
or be enforceable in law. Thus, patron-client politics is both ‘personalized’ and likely 
to involve large elements of political corruption. In India, as in other developing 
countries, the vast majority of political movements are also led and dominated by the 
intermediate classes. The typical political organization mobilizes wider social groups 
who may benefit to varying extents from the rents created, allocated or captured by 
the organization. A characteristic problem of this type of politics is that the 
competition between patron-client organizations can intensify over time. The greater 
the number and bargaining power of political organizations demanding rents, the 
more likely it is that the creation and allocation of value-reducing rents will increase. 
More seriously, if the ruling coalition is attempting to enforce industrial policies that 
involve the withdrawal of support from some firms or sectors, the presence of many 
relatively powerful organizations seeking rents gives threatened firms and sectors 
greater opportunities of buying protection at a price. The capacity of the ruling 
coalition to enforce other types of formal institutions can also be adversely affected.  
 
A significant change in the political settlement in India came about as a result of the 
growing diversity and intensity of political mobilizations within India since the 1960s. 
By the late 1970s these mobilizations had become so complex that they could not be 
accommodated within a single dominant party. Indeed, by the late 1970s the 
dominance of the Congress Party had come to an end. The political fragmentation and 
multi-party coalitions that became necessary thereafter made formal interventionist 
policies even more difficult to formulate and enforce. However, both formal and 
informal business-government relationships remained strong and became stronger. In 
the initial political settlement when the Congress Party included the vast majority of 
social interests within it, an explicit support to promote business and industry was part 
of a complex contract and was offered with many conditions. These conditions 
included not only strategies for adopting and learning specific technologies by 
licensing investments in particular sectors, but also reserving some sectors for small-
scale firms, attempting regional equity in development and protecting labour in 
protected sectors. Licensing created rents for licensed sectors by controlling entry and 
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access to foreign exchange for purchasing machinery. These targeted strategies could 
have led to rapid learning and capability development in these sectors but only if the 
support and protection was conditional. But the enforcement capabilities of the Indian 
state were not adequate and protected sectors generally did not make it to the global 
competitiveness frontier. By the late 1970s, the licensing system and other aspects of 
the planning system were ineffective in practice and businesses were adept at working 
their way around many of the restrictions. Nevertheless, planning and licensing 
helped accumulation and technology acquisition in a few sectors and states. It was at 
this conjuncture that further changes in the political settlement made it both easy to 
abandon the licensing structure with its complex social contract and to move towards 
a more explicit support for business without interests opposed to business being able 
to organize easily and effectively against this.  
 
By locating technological changes in the context of the interface between policies and 
political settlements we can see that the declining ability of Indian states (as in 
provinces) to support early-stage catching up strategies for new sectors was a serious 
constraint for spreading growth to new regions and sectors and creating new jobs. 
This has problematic implications for sustaining growth in a country where large 
segments of the population lack the capability to engage in any competitive activities. 
At the same time, the fragmentation of political organizations that is a feature of the 
new political settlement has meant that more and more resources are needed to build 
coalitions at the centre and in the states. Traditional strategies of building political 
coalitions through job-creation for supporters, granting preferential access to contracts 
and licenses, and other mechanisms that sufficed in the past are no longer sufficient. 
Consequently, mega-political corruption has been growing, with billions of dollars 
being generated for politicians through their informal links with business houses. 
Some of these links have clearly gone beyond the limits of functional necessity and 
the scale of predatory corruption that has emerged is not sustainable. At the same 
time, the inability of the economic system to deliver to the vast numbers of the poor 
continues to allow intermediate class political entrepreneurs to construct new political 
movements for inclusion whose main beneficiaries are often the organizers who can 
enhance their own bargaining power within the patron-client structures in this way. 
Thus, while the urban middle classes are mobilizing against corruption, the very 
processes of popular mobilization in the context of patron-client politics continues to 
create strong drivers for increased political corruption.  
 
The trends in the evolution of politics have varied greatly across Indian states. But in 
all states, informal and frequently rule-violating politics with high levels of political 
corruption have continued to dominate as we would expect in political systems based 
on patron-client politics. If anything, political corruption became more intense over 
time. In 2010 and 2011 the ruling UPA coalition at the centre was almost brought 
down by repeated corruption scandals with the office of the Comptroller and Auditor 
General (CAG) estimating the magnitude of misappropriated resources in just a few 
public transactions to be many tens of billions of dollars. Corruption has generated 
significant popular mobilizations against political corruption. The puritanical but 
populist social movements of maverick civil society activists like Anna Hazare in 
2011 captured the mood of a large section of the middle classes who were 
increasingly disenchanted with the obscene fortunes that were being made by those 
with political power. Anna Hazare’s demand that the government set up an all-
powerful ombudsman who can hold any politician (including the prime minister) to 
8 
 
account at any time has to be understood in this context. The demand was both 
popular and impractical given the dominance of patron-client politics and the fiscal 
unlikelihood of a social democratic state emerging in the near future. The middle class 
demand for low corruption, low taxation and economic growth in a very poor 
economy may be impossible to deliver, with or without an ombudsman.  
 
Corruption has many causes but one important driver is that the political system has to 
have access to off-budget resources to construct coalitions. To that extent political 
corruption is integrally implicated in the politics of coalition building and political 
stabilization in clientelist polities but processes of political corruption can exceed the 
bounds of functional political requirements and the tolerance of the middle class. The 
difficulty is to regulate this informal rent allocation so that it succeeds in maintaining 
political stability and a social order without descending into predatory practices and 
the looting of public resources which it can easily do. Nevertheless, any solution that 
is based on the assumption that a zero tolerance of political corruption can be 
implemented in the near future is unrealistic. This is one reason why greater public 
awareness and huge democratic pressure on political representatives alone has not 
achieved a rule-following and accountable democracy in India or in other developing 
countries. Ultimately, the formal sector is still far too small for its taxes to be 
sufficient to deal with demands for social inclusion coming from a vast variety of 
social movements. In this context, the ruling coalition is constructed using significant 
levels of off-budget resources (Khan 2005a, 2010a). Political stability depends on the 
ruling coalition having the capacity to deliver off-budget resources where required but 
not being so greedy that the ruling coalition become intolerable. In the meantime, 
growing anti-corruption movements are simply likely to add to the list of aspirations 
that cannot be met.  
 
The tension between economic and political strategies as they have evolved in India 
represents a race between economics and politics that will determine the viability of 
the Indian growth model. On the economic front, growth is now driven by those who 
already have productive capabilities and capital. Some of these economic 
organizations have now acquired the strength to demand significant rent opportunities 
for themselves. Moreover, they can offer to share significant rents with politicians 
who appear to need vast off-budget resources to pursue their political agendas. The 
evolution of these formal and informal arrangements allows the most competitive and 
capable economic organizations to continue to build their capabilities but the system 
can also construct significant obstacles in the path of attempts to build new 
capabilities and sectors. There is also a significant danger that the access to politically 
generated rents and the difficulty of competitors to break in can lead to monopolistic 
practices emerging within the dominant economic organizations. On the political 
front, without strategies for broad-based employment generation, it will be difficult to 
meet the political demands of the excluded and their intermediate class political 
leaders. Attempting to meet or manage these demands using traditional patron-client 
politics requires political corruption and monopolistic deals for the most powerful 
economic organizations. Alternatively, attempting to meet growing demands for 
redistribution through budgetary transfers also has its limits given the relatively 
narrow tax base and the possibility that corporate taxes and taxes on the incomes of 




2. The Limitations of the ‘Liberalization’ Story 
The explanations attributing India’s growth takeoff largely to liberalization and 
opening up after the 1980s can be evaluated in a number of ways. First, there is the 
problem that has been often identified in the Indian literature that the growth takeoff 
that began in the 1980s and possibly even in the latter half of the 1970s predates 
liberalization in the 1990s by at least a decade (Rodrik and Subramanian 2005; Kohli 
2006a, 2006b). More sophisticated supporters of the liberal economic model have 
argued that while growth did indeed take off in the 1980s, it would not have been 
sustainable without the reforms of the 1990s (Panagariya 2004, 2005a). But to 
understand the problems that liberalization solved and those that it could not we need 
to compare the effects of liberalization in the post-1980 period as a whole, which we 
will call the second phase of liberalization with the liberalization that resulted in a 
truly open economy in India in the last century of British colonial rule.  
 
India, like other colonies where white colonists did not directly settle in large 
numbers, adopted free trade policies in the ‘high’ colonial period from the late 
nineteenth to the early twentieth century. But that experience was associated with low 
growth, particularly in industry and other modern sectors. Indeed, so bad was this 
experience that the post-colonial strategies in all newly independent South Asian 
countries were deliberately statist and interventionist as a result of that memory. The 
Bombay Plan of 1944 hammered out between the Congress Party and its supporters in 
big business like the Tatas and the Birlas made an implicit pact with the state, 
ratifying its political concerns with income distribution and retaining public control 
over ‘basic’ industries and in return getting a political commitment for support for the 
private sector for industrialization. The instruments that the Bombay Plan identified to 
deliver this social contract included price controls, limits on dividends and profits, 
minimum wages, government directors on boards of companies and licensing.  
 
These instruments were already in place because of the wartime control structure set 
up by the British, the Congress simply wanted to take this over and apply it for 
industrialization. The Licensing Framework was formalized under the Industries 
Development and Regulation Act 1951. New capacity in industry had to be licensed 
by the state which would then allocate foreign exchange to import the capital 
equipment and raw materials required for production. The rents that were implicitly 
created for the private sector through this mechanism, and through the provision of 
public sector outputs that the private sector would use as intermediate products 
allowed infant industries to be set up and embark on learning-by-doing. State 
intervention to promote industry was therefore strongly supported by Indian industrial 
interests, both in India and in the new state of Pakistan. Policy-makers, business 
leaders and economists of all political opinions in the 1950s supported state 
intervention to promote industries and accelerate the adoption of modern 
technologies. The distributive limits agreed between business and the state were 
politically necessary to sell this social contract to the wider nation, in exactly the same 
way that industrial policy in East Asia set limits on the freedoms of capitalists to 
export capital or to have excessive living standards.  
 
We will see that while South Asian catching-up strategies were not as successful as 
those in East Asia, the growth takeoffs in South Asia in the 1980s cannot be 
understood without accounting for the emergence of the technological and 
entrepreneurial capabilities that were developed as a result of the strategies adopted in 
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the decades prior to 1980. This perspective on the second liberalization and its 
governance and policy challenges is significantly different from that coming from 
mainstream economics where the focus is mainly on how to deepen liberalization as a 
strategy for sustaining growth. While opening up has obviously been important in 
obvious ways for creating opportunities for trade and accessing global finance and 
technology, liberalization by itself would not have been effective in the absence of 
(even partially successful) strategies that built capabilities of competitive production 
in a few sectors. By systematically ignoring the conditions that allowed opening up to 
be so beneficial in the South Asian economies, contemporary policy-makers have 
given insufficient attention to developing policies that could contribute to developing 
new capabilities beyond the ones that drove growth in the 1980s and 1990s in a few 
sectors and regions. This in turn has resulted in unbalanced growth in terms of its 
regional distribution, rapidly worsening income distribution as a result of slow 
employment generation and sectoral specialization in a few sectors. If growth is to be 
sustained and extended to a wider population, strategies for developing new 
productive capabilities have to be reconstructed and improved. This requires an 
understanding of why India’s political settlement prevented fully effective 
implementation of industrial policies in the past, but even more so, the implications of 
changes in the political settlement in recent years.  
 
The implementation of formal industrial policies had always been weaker in South 
Asia compared to East Asia. Industrial policies required support for firms involved in 
adopting new technologies and processes that required a period of learning-by-doing. 
The learning-by-doing in developing countries is risky because relatively small over-
runs in the time taken to achieve competitiveness can financially cripple investors and 
entrepreneurs. On the one hand, external support to assist learning-by-doing can also 
fail if it dampens the incentives to put in high levels of effort into the learning-by-
doing exercise. Ensuring high levels of effort requires that any state support is 
conditional on meeting agreed performance targets, and this in turn requires 
enforcement capabilities on the part of the state. In the Indian subcontinent firms 
could protect themselves from threats by the state to withdraw their support because 
they could make effective coalitions with powerful organizations that could protect 
the support they received. This meant that the effort put in by firms was less and 
capability development slower than in East Asia. Moreover, the evolution of the 
political settlement in South Asia in the direction of the central political leadership 
becoming weaker relative to lower level political organizations within the ruling 
coalition meant that it became progressively easier for firms to buy themselves 
protection and to protect their rents and indeed to claim increasing rents over time.  
 
By the 1980s the implementation of formal industrial policies became virtually 
impossible in the context of these gradual shifts in the relative power of organizations 
within and outside the ruling coalition. It was in this context that the ‘opening up’ 
happened, an opening up that was driven largely by powerful business groups 
beginning to drive their own accumulation and technology strategies within the 
framework of support that already existed. The growing political power of business in 
some sectors and regions and close ties to sections of the political and bureaucratic 
machinery allowed them to demand greater freedoms in resource allocation decisions 
and drove the opening up that happened in the 1980s. Economic orthodoxy and 
formal liberalization played a relatively small role, as virtually all commentators now 
recognize. Paradoxically, the collapse of the centralized political structure that had 
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ineffectually implemented industrial policy created new and even stronger 
compulsions for firms, sectors and regions that already had some productive 
capabilities to push their competitiveness to the global frontier. The entrepreneurs and 
sectors at the forefront of the economy in the 1980s could see that they were within 
striking distance of becoming globally competitive and they could also see that 
permanent protection was no longer on the cards and in any case, they did not want to 
remain limited by the ‘license raj’. This combination of factors led to a successful 
breaking out of a number of sectors in the 1980s. But the conjuncture of factors that 
allowed this was very specific and cannot be reduced to ‘liberalization’. 
Understanding what happened has substantial policy significance in terms of future 
policies in India and elsewhere that can replicate these early successes to develop 
entirely new sectors and industries.  
 
The scale of this acceleration is shown in Table 1, which also shows that the growth 
acceleration of the 1980s was not limited to India. All the three large South Asian 
economies enjoyed growth accelerations at about the same time. In India and 
Bangladesh the accelerations in GDP and per capita GDP growth rates were around 
2% per annum in the 1980s compared to the decades from 1960-80. In Pakistan, the 
acceleration was somewhat less at around 1% in per capita terms and 0.5% in GDP 
growth rates. In Bangladesh and India, both GDP and per capita GDP growth rates 
crept up further over the 1990s and beyond. In Pakistan the acceleration collapses in 
the 1990s partly because its economy was exposed to shocks from the worsening 
situation in Afghanistan. Growth begins to recover in Pakistan in the 2000s but faced 
new challenges in 2007-08 in the context of a difficult transition to democracy and a 
global financial crisis. If we focus on the 1980s, it is clear that all South Asian 
countries enjoyed accelerations in their growth rates at about the same time. In the 
intense analytical and policy debate about the factors that triggered India’s growth 
acceleration, the comparative regional data are often ignored. Looking at the region 
forces us to look for explanatory factors that are consistent with a simultaneous 
acceleration in the three South Asian countries given that the content and sequencing 
of their gradual moves towards liberalization were very different.  
 
Table 1 The South Asian Growth Acceleration in the 1980s 
 
                Source: Based on data from World Bank (2008) 
 
The simultaneous growth accelerations, at a time when global growth was slowing 
down, tell us we should look for common features across these economies that could 
Growth Rates % India Pakistan Bangladesh
GDP
1960-80 3.5 5.5 1.7
1980-90 5.6 6.1 3.6
1990-00 5.8 3.7 4.7
2000-05 6.7 4.9 5.3
1960-80 1.2 2.6 -0.8
1980-90 3.4 3.5 1.2
1990-00 4.0 1.2 2.6




have contributed to the acceleration. The common feature could not be their adoption 
of liberalization strategies at around the same time. Indeed, formal policies of 
liberalization were not adopted by India till the 1990s. Instead, what we find is a 
rather curious pattern in the political evolution of these countries from the mid-1970s 
onwards. From their independence in 1947, competing political factions had been 
growing in strength and numbers as emerging political entrepreneurs organized new 
movements and political groups, largely based on caste, regional and linguistic 
identities. Till the mid-1970s in India competing political factions had been 
successfully managed and accommodated within the Congress Party which won 
successive elections to form the government at the centre. Resources, privileges and 
rent capture opportunities were allocated through the party to different factions in 
calibrated ways to keep the coalition together and to provide the ruling faction with 
the political power to enforce a particular social order. In Pakistan and later in 
Bangladesh, rent allocation to political factions was also centralized over this period, 
but through military governments. Pakistan’s military governments ruled through a 
combination of repression of powerful political organizations but also by selecting 
enough political factions to incorporate within the rent allocation system to give the 
ruling coalition enough political support to rule. When military governments 
collapsed in 1971, both Pakistan and Bangladesh made an immediate transition to 
Congress-style inclusive political parties in the form of the Pakistan People’s Party 
and the Awami League, which for a brief period calibrated and allocated rents to a 
large number of political factions within these parties in the same way as the Congress 
had been doing in India.  
 
However, in all these countries the underlying social organization was changing in 
terms of the number and strength of competing factions. Since the 1960s, the growing 
aspirations of upwardly mobile intermediate classes found expression in the 
organization of a growing number of new regional and national political movements 
in new parties, caste mobilizations and opposition coalitions. These processes made it 
more and more difficult for the Congress to impose internal order within the party as 
long as it tried to remain an inclusive dominant party. Disaffected factions and 
coalitions could threaten to leave the party as their threats to leave and join or become 
the opposition were becoming more credible. The growing fragmentation and 
competition between factions within the dominant ruling coalition across South Asia 
led to a series of authoritarian responses in the mid-1970s that were remarkably 
similar. In India, Indira Gandhi imposed her Emergency from 1975 to 1977, and at 
almost exactly the same time, Mujib in Bangladesh in 1975 attempted to set up a one-
party state that lasted less than a year. In Pakistan, Bhutto’s populist version of 
Islamic Socialism also took a turn towards authoritarianism with attacks on opposition 
politicians and the threatened use of force to maintain the control of the ruling party. 
But within a very short period all of these experiments had failed, signalling that the 
strength and diversity of political organizations across South Asia precluded the 
organization of order from above.  
 
In India, the Emergency could not silence an increasingly sophisticated and assertive 
political class. The 1977 election brought in the first non-Congress government and 
this was the beginning of a transition towards looser coalition governments at the 
centre. In Bangladesh and Pakistan the transition towards a weaker multi-party 
governance system took longer. The authoritarian populist experiments in these cases 
were not overthrown by a vote but by military coups that happened without social 
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opposition and with the tacit support of many political factions, including (certainly in 
the case of Bangladesh) factions within the ruling parties. The new military regimes 
that came in because political regimes failed to impose control on all political 
organizations from above were operating in a very different social context compared 
to that of the 1960s. From the outset they had to accommodate many powerful 
political organizations organized by intermediate class political entrepreneurs. They 
used clientelist strategies to buy in political support and could now rely much less on 
repression given the much greater power of political organizations in the new 
environment. Indeed by bringing in new political forces into the ruling coalition, the 
military governments helped to engineer the transition to multi-party democracy. 
 
Thus, despite their apparent differences, by the mid-to-late 1970s there were some 
significant similarities emerging in the political settlements across South Asia. The 
dominant single party and repressive authoritarian models were both ruled out by the 
burgeoning power and growing number of political organizations. Political 
organizations were mobilizing ever newer sections of the population, mainly with a 
view to capture rents for their political organizers, but also with significant rent 
distribution down new patron-client chains. By the late 1970s or early 1980s, a looser 
organization of political competition between competing political factions emerged 
across these countries, which we have described elsewhere as competitive clientelism 
(Khan 2010a). The change in the political settlement and the underlying distribution 
of power between political organizations meant that the Congress’s position as the 
dominant party was no longer sustainable. The Congress could no longer rule without 
making coalition agreements with other parties, and sometimes entirely different non-
Congress coalitions would have to be allowed to form the ruling coalition.  
 
These changes in the political settlement had significant implications. The 
implementation and enforcement of formal industrial policies became more difficult 
but the possibility of the ruling coalition making explicit pro-business deals with 
business organizations improved. Long before formal liberalization was adopted and 
began to be implemented in the 1990s, the declining enforcement capabilities of the 
central government in India and its neighbours had already had significant 
implications for the economic strategies and opportunities of economic organizations. 
The ability of these states to enforce the conditions that would make targeted 
industrial policies effective had always been poor but by the mid-1970s any pretence 
that these types of targeted industrial policies were effective could no longer be 
sustained. The enforcement problem for targeted industrial policy is that the market 
failures that prevent investments in learning in developing countries require state 
support to the sectors and firms to finance the loss-making period of learning-by-
doing. But the learning-by-doing is only likely to be successful if the firm-level 
participants put in high levels of effort in learning, and this in turn requires that the 
support can be withdrawn if performance is poor.  
 
The multiple power centres within the ruling Congress Party in India and the growing 
number of these competing power centres over time meant that the threat to withdraw 
support from non-performers (which had never been very credible) became even less 
credible over time. Firms and sectors threatened with subsidy withdrawal could in 
principle find backers who would be able to effectively block subsidy withdrawal or 
the imposition of other types of discipline on them for a price. If the political and 
bureaucratic leadership know this, they know the costs of trying to force through 
14 
 
subsidy withdrawal in such a context, and they are unlikely even to try and achieve 
subsidy withdrawal as a disciplining mechanism. It is not surprising that the sectors 
that were being assisted to achieve competitiveness did not do so, and as a result, the 
quantum of implicit subsidies was growing over time. While the targeting policy did 
undoubtedly raise technological capabilities in a few sectors, the absence of 
compulsions to take firms to the frontier had a number of consequences that 
eventually led powerful business coalitions themselves to push for the abandonment 
of the formal policy instruments like licenses. As time went on and the firms initially 
receiving support never graduated to self-sufficiency, firms that were not already on 
the gravy train had a steadily declining chance of getting support given the growing 
fiscal and other burdens associated with the permanent protection of earlier firms. At 
the same time, even the firms receiving support had growing reasons to fear that their 
support would decline over time as the fiscal and other costs of protection were 
becoming less politically defensible over time.  
 
It is in this context of a partial move of a few productive sectors towards the 
competitive frontier that the changes in the political settlement in the mid-1970s had 
significant effects. These changes happened at the right time for these sectors because 
the failure of the Emergency led to a recasting of the Congress Party as a party that 
could not hope to include and satisfy all political organizations within it. The most 
significant consequence of this was that the Party was now able to adopt pro-business 
policies with much fewer constraints than before. This in turn allowed business 
organizations that were already close to achieving global competitiveness to break out 
and reach the frontier. In the first place, the possibility of managing the detailed 
targeting attempted in the industrial policy system of the past became totally 
implausible in the face of the greater fragmentation and politicization of rent 
allocation within the ruling party. The formal structures of industrial policy were 
therefore gradually wound down, though in practice by the early 1980s they had 
already stopped being relevant in influencing investment decisions. But it was not 
before the 1990s that liberalization really began to have a significant effect on say 
average levels of tariffs or the number of sectors that were under licensing 
restrictions.  
 
Well before this, however, the other important change flowing from the change in the 
political settlement was that the leadership of the ruling party was gradually able to 
take pro-business policy positions in ways that were not possible before. The political 
inclusion of all political organizations and factions within a dominant party meant that 
many groups that actually had relatively limited bargaining power in society 
nevertheless could acquire the ability to influence rent-allocation decisions within the 
party because of their numbers and strategic party positions. Before the collapse of the 
dominant party system in the late-1970s, inclusive parties in South Asia like the 
Congress Party included many factions that could use an anti-business rhetoric to 
demand rents for themselves if the leadership needed to provide resources to business 
interests. In the more competitive political environment that emerged afterwards, no 
party could hope to accommodate and satisfy all relevant powerful political 
organizations and factions in the country. The strategy of competing parties shifted to 
one of absorbing political organizations on a selective basis depending on their 
holding power in real conflicts (which determined how useful they were to the party) 
and the price they demanded in terms of rent allocation. The consequence of this was 
that the bargaining power of business interests increased in relative terms because 
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they could offer significant rent-sharing opportunities for cash starved political 
parties, while the bargaining power of labour and of redistributive political 
organizations based on caste and other symbols began to suffer a relative decline, 
particularly in the 1990s. Labour in particular found it could no longer impose the 
same constraints on political decisions in most states. Political factions who sought to 
capture rents by opposing business interests became weaker as political parties 
competed actively to woo business interests to their side, offering explicit political 
support in exchange for the promise of kickbacks from business or the indirect 
benefits coming from job creation or tax revenues. This change had a significant 
positive effect on firms and sectors that were close to the frontier as they could now 
directly lobby for the support that was critical to drive their growth.  
 
Entrepreneurs could see that global competitiveness was achievable in a few sectors 
in India and that the rewards of achieving that would be high, as would be the 
penalties for failing to achieve it in an economy that was very gradually but inevitably 
going towards declining protection of its own industries. These incentives for 
achieving global competitiveness were important but on their own they may not have 
been sufficient. Firms needed policy support to engage in a second round of intensive 
learning-by-doing and this is where the changes in the political settlement in the late-
1970s come in to play a critical enabling role. The political leadership knew very well 
that the economy was not strong and it was in their own interest to try and assist 
growth by supporting business houses or sectors that appeared to have a chance to 
grow. It was in their interest because the political leadership would benefit directly or 
indirectly from growth. The leadership also found, as we have described, that they 
could now support explicit policies of support for business in general and for 
particular sectors of business in particular without an immediate political backlash 
that may require offsetting allocations of rents to other interests within the party. 
Beginning in the 1980s formal and informal policies began to emerge to provide a 
different kind of support for firms in a number of critical sectors. This support did not 
come through complex industrial licensing and planning structures with all the checks 
and balances that preserved the interests of other social constituencies. This kind of 
targeted support provided support for firms that could in principle be located far from 
the frontier and could only have worked in the presence of effective and credible 
disciplining. The new support came in the form of simpler and less conditional 
support and (initially at least) went to firms that were relatively close to the 
competitive frontier and therefore had strong incentives to reach the frontier with the 
assistance that they were receiving. 
 
The forms of support that were important in the new phase included explicit 
assistance to firms seeking to acquire land, the continuation of tariffs in critical 
sectors to assist important firms, or assisting firms in negotiating terms with foreign 
partners and setting domestic content requirements. These types of policies assisted 
domestic firms that were close to the frontier but which would not have achieved 
competitiveness given their existing capabilities. With the assistance they could start 
producing and engaging in learning-by-doing to reach the frontier. Given their strong 
incentives to reach the frontier, effective monitoring and disciplining was not required 
and in many cases Indian firms did indeed become globally competitive in a few 
important sectors in the 1980s and beyond. A focus on this combination of factors 
provides a better explanation of the growth acceleration that happened in the 1980s, 
particularly because a similar approach can also explain somewhat different growth 
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accelerations in Pakistan and Bangladesh (Khan 2010a). These factors include the 
existence of a few sectors that had productive capabilities close to the frontier as a 
result of previous industrial policies, changes in the political settlement that 
fragmented the opposition to pro-business policies within ruling parties, and the 
incentives for businesses in some of these sectors to use the additional support that 
was available to move to the competitive frontier.  
 
Thus, while it was true that growth in South Asia accelerated at a time when the 
industrial policy structures that had been established in the post-colonial period were 
collapsing, it would be partial and misleading to say that liberalization alone drove 
this growth. Industrial policies were unwinding in the context of a substantial 
entrepreneurial base with moderate productive capabilities, and many of these firms 
were driving the opening up in their own interest. Most significantly, the distance 
from the competitive frontier could not have been covered by these firms and sectors 
in the absence of a second round of ‘pro-business’ policies that emerged to provide 
privileged access to resources to favoured firms and sectors. But equally, these types 
of unconditional pro-business policies are unlikely to have worked in the absence of a 
number of sectors that had been pushed close to the frontier by earlier industrial 
policies. The latter observation has important implications for the continuation of a 
pro-business Indian policy regime in the absence of targeted policies that can create 
moderately effective capabilities in new sectors. Some of the damaging consequences 
of pro-business policies on their own began to emerge in the 2000s and beyond. Close 
partnerships between businesses and political entrepreneurs were increasingly used to 
engage in unproductive rent capture through land grabbing scams, price fixing and 
insider dealing. As the number of sectors that were close to the frontier was not 
growing, businesses that enjoyed government patronage sought to make money in 
other, more damaging ways. The literature on India recognizes that there was a shift 
towards ‘pro-business’ policies in the 1980s before liberalization became important in 
the 1990s. The debate has been over the content of the ‘pro-business attitudes’ and 
policies and why they had such a significant effect on growth (Acharya, et al. 2003; 
Panagariya 2004; Virmani 2004a; Rodrik and Subramanian 2005; Kohli 2006a, 
2006b; Basu and Maertens 2007). The focus on changes in the political settlement in 
this paper and its effects on the specific formal and informal policies that allowed a 
new round of capability-building in the 1980s adds to this debate and also helps to 
identify specific policy and political challenges for the future.  
 
3. The First Liberalization: growth with limited capabilities under colonialism 
The limited liberalization that happened in the 1980s and 1990s had radically different 
effects compared to the liberalization that was forced on India by colonial rule in the 
late nineteenth century primarily because the second liberalization happened when a 
number of important sectors had already come close to the global competitiveness 
frontier. The difference in the results achieved in the two periods is a dramatic 
illustration of the fact that free(r) markets are not likely to magically help an economy 
if that economy has nothing to sell and its productivity gap with market leaders in 
different sectors is so vast that even a significant wage gap does not help it to engage 
in production. This is true in general for most underdeveloped areas within India even 
today, which helps to explain a number of puzzles that we referred to earlier about the 
nature of the liberalization-driven growth in India. If capabilities are limited to a 
relatively small number of skilled individuals with high human-capital, and if these 
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individuals are located in richer states (which is why these states are rich), 
liberalization may sustain growth driven by these capabilities but is not likely on its 
own to bring about either a significant amount of new job creation or the equalization 
of regional inequalities. To meet these goals we need to understand the contracting 
failures and transaction costs that were preventing the development of productive 
capabilities in the first place, and ask if liberalization removes these problems 
entirely. If not, jumping the productivity gap in new sectors is likely to remain subject 
to significant market failures that can prevent capability development through market 
contracting.  
 
In the late nineteenth century, British colonial rule introduced virtual free markets for 
India (consisting then of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh). Free trade policies 
integrated India into global markets with almost no tariff protection for domestic 
industries. In addition, colonial rule effectively guaranteed the property rights of 
British metropolitan investors in India. Yet, despite free trade, low Indian wages, the 
effective protection of the property rights of British investors and the possibility of 
full repatriation of profits and capital, there was virtually no industrial investment in 
India from Britain. It is often argued that the non-industrialization or even 
deindustrialization of India under colonial rule is evidence of a deliberate intention to 
keep India underdeveloped, perhaps to retain it as a market for British products, 
perhaps to ensure that it was easier to control. An alternative explanation may be that 
the British simply did not face sufficient political pressure from within India to 
concede the types of policies like tariff protection that could have countered the 
market failures facing the financing of learning-by-doing. In either case, the outcome 
was just as bad. Most foreign investments over this period were in plantations and low 
technology industry and even this was largely financed by the reinvestment of trading 
and other profits made in India (Ray 1979: 14; Rodrik and Subramanian 2005). 
British investment in industry was almost entirely concentrated in the jute industry 
where India had a global monopoly rather than in areas where competitiveness could 
be achieved through transferring technology and upgrading labour productivity. As a 
result, free trade did not result in the emergence of new modern domestic production 
capabilities. From 1860 to 1945, India’s per capita income grew at a derisory 0.5% 
per annum (Hicks, et al. 1989: 217). 
 
Indian merchant capital (dominated by the Marwari and Parsi communities) initially 
focused on trade and stayed away from industry. When the American Civil War 
disrupted supplies of cotton textiles in the late nineteenth century a cotton textile 
industry developed around Bombay (Ray 1979: 4). But by 1911, the industrial census 
recorded that there were only 7000 units throughout British India that employed more 
than 20 workers each, and more than a third of these did not use any mechanical 
power (Gadgil 1944: 121). A few major developments did of course take place. The 
giant Tata iron and steel plant at Jamshedpur was established and began production in 
1911, without any tariff protection, but not without critical government support that 
enabled production to commence. Given the reach of the Tata conglomerate today, 
with global stakes in iron and steel production, in the automotive sector and in 
software, it is interesting to recall how this Indian giant emerged to set up its first steel 
plant and almost became bankrupt in the process. In a context where there was no 
formal support to Indian capital, Tata’s relationship with the British Raj was an early 
example of how the political access of advanced sections of Indian capital even with a 
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colonial state could sometimes (with a bit of luck in the shape of the First World War) 
result in industrial development.  
 
While the Raj was not interested in tariff protection in colonies without significant 
numbers of white settlers, during the planning and construction phases, TISCO (the 
Tata Iron and Steel Company) did receive extensive government support in the form 
of geological surveys, reduced transport costs, access to land and water rights, 
simplified import arrangements for construction materials and an agreement that the 
government would buy 20,000 tons of steel rails annually for ten years at the landed 
import price (Morris 1983: 589). Clearly, the simple story that British colonial rule 
actively prevented every attempt at Indian industrial development is not borne out by 
the evidence, though examples to support a more malign interpretation of colonialism 
can be found particularly in the earlier period of British colonialism in India. Even 
with this government assistance, Tata faced crippling financial costs while setting up 
and learning to produce in Jamshedpur. The major costs were not the costs of plant, 
but the costs of setting it up and learning how to produce high quality steel at a 
competitive price. Tata did not have any sustained assistance in the form of tariff 
protection or other policy instruments that could support the longer-run costs of 
learning-by-doing in plants that were entirely new to India. But Tata’s diplomatic and 
cooperative relationship to the government, and in particular the fortuitous needs of 
the colonial government during World War I enabled Tata achieve competitiveness in 
steel production and eventually helped it to develop into a global giant (Ray 1979: 
27).  
 
The upfront government assistance, impressive as it was, may not have saved Tata 
from bankruptcy. As Rothermund (2000: 55-6, 68) points out, if it had not been for 
the war, the visionary strategy of Jamshedji Tata would probably have ended in 
failure and the man may well have been remembered as a reckless gambler. The war 
created the second and essential price margin that financed a further round of 
learning-by-doing that eventually took TISCO to the frontier. The role of the war was 
to create an additional demand for steel rails that were required to protect British 
interests in Mesopotamia and TISCO found itself in a seller’s market. The profits 
during this period allowed the learning-by-doing to be effective and by the end of the 
war, TISCO was a competitive or an almost competitive enterprise. Tata was in many 
ways unique for this period of Indian development in entering a relatively advanced 
sector on the basis of a personal vision (but one that almost did not pay off despite 
some government support). For the period as a whole, Bagchi (1972) provides 
estimates of private industrial investment in India from 1900-39 which show steady 
but not spectacular investment over this period, with little evidence of any 
acceleration. 
 
Although the state assistance that TISCO received was quite exceptional, for instance 
with land acquisition, geological surveys and through some assured government 
purchases, Indian industrial projects did not get long-term assistance for overcoming 
their initial productivity disadvantage. Thus, even if industrialization was not actively 
discouraged by the British, industrialization was also not one of the objectives of the 
early raj. Tariffs that had been allowed by British administrations in settler-dominated 
colonies like Canada, Australia and South Africa, and which played a crucial role in 
the development of industry in those countries, were expressly disallowed in non-
settler colonies like India on the grounds of the ‘Open Door’ policy. India was more 
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important as a market for British products and for the triangular commodity trade with 
China. In the 1880s Indian customs revenues were only 2.2 per cent of the trade 
turnover (a measure of the average tariff protection), compared to 21 per cent in 
Brazil at the same period (Maddison 1971: 57). However, from the early twentieth 
century onwards, and particularly after the First World War and the growing 
penetration of India by Japanese textiles, the pressures of expatriate British capitalist 
interests in India finally began to succeed in getting the state to begin to support 
industry. Assistance to Indian industry gradually grew in the form of slowly 
increasing tariff protection, state purchase contracts, preferential infrastructure 
provision and interventions in commodity and labour markets, without which Indian 
industry had no chance of taking off (Bagchi 1972: 420-43). Under growing pressure 
from Indian capitalists, by 1925, the average level of tariffs rose to around 14 per cent 
from a pre-war level of 5 per cent (Maddison 1971: 57). 
 
How should we assess the performance of India under British free market policies? It 
is unfair to compare growth in the early part of the twentieth century with growth 
today because compared to the late twentieth century the earlier period was one of 
relatively slow growth in the world economy. The appropriate comparison of India’s 
performance is therefore with other contemporary developing countries. The most 
obvious comparator is Japan, which entered manufacturing at around the same time as 
India, but with much stronger government support for industry following the Meiji 
reforms. A comparison with contemporary Japan shows that the real weakness in 
India’s industrialization was not so much the aggregate investment or growth in this 
early period, but how sustainable it was in terms of meeting Japanese competition and 
later the competition from other emerging competitors. Effectively, the sustainability 
of growth depends on investing in technologies that have the potential of achieving 
high rates of productivity growth, and then succeeding in actually raising productivity 
using these technologies. Here, comparative studies on the performance of Indian and 
Japanese cotton textiles show that while in 1906 India supplied three-quarters of the 
Chinese yarn market, by 1914 Japan had grabbed the biggest share, and in another ten 
years had reduced India’s share of the Chinese market to under a quarter (Koh 1966: 
148). This devastating defeat in the single major Indian-owned manufacturing sector 
had far-reaching consequences for India’s subsequent industrial development.  
 
Thus, despite a few significant success stories, the overall effect of free market 
policies imposed on India induced it to become in the main a provider of raw 
materials to the empire and a market for British manufactured products. The success 
stories emerged despite free trade and not because of it. In particular, the significant 
breakthrough in iron and steel would probably not have happened without the 
intervention of the First World War. India’s growth rates stayed well behind that of 
advanced countries resulting in divergence over this period, meaning that the gap 
between Indian per capita incomes and those of advanced countries increased. In 1873 
India’s per capita income was around 25% of US per capita income at that time. By 
1947, the very low growth rates in India had widened the gap and India’s per capita 
income was less than 10% of the US level (Clark and Wolcott 2002: Figure 1). 
 
4. ‘Dirigiste’ Policies and Capability Development 1947-1980 
The debate between Nehru and Gandhi represented two contrasting visions of the 
future India, but it was Nehru’s vision that decisively won. Gandhi’s vision of an 
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India based around its timeless villages and its indigenous technologies appealed to a 
populist mass audience but had few takers within India’s emerging elites. However, 
big business understood the importance of Gandhi’s political appeal and heavily 
financed his politics. Some of Gandhi’s biggest supporters were big capitalists like 
G.D. Birla, in whose house Gandhi was living when he was assassinated in 1948. 
How Gandhi’s relationship with big business would have evolved had he lived longer 
we do not know. But his death enabled Nehru’s vision to dominate with a few 
occasional concessions to the Gandhian philosophy. For Nehru, the future India 
would be a country with modern technology and industry and it would be 
development that would act as the cement binding together India’s diverse population. 
Development would modernize India’s mindset as well as its economy. Caste, 
religious and linguistic divisions would become less relevant (Khilnani 2003). 
Virtually all Indian anti-colonial leaders like their counterparts in other countries 
believed that freedom from colonial domination would be meaningless unless 
economic freedom could also be achieved. The experience of the colonial period 
made it clear that the market alone would not ensure this and hence Nehru’s interest 
in planning. His visit to the Soviet Union in 1927 left him impressed with the rapid 
industrialization that appeared to be possible with centralized planning. Under 
Nehru’s leadership, the National Planning Committee of the Congress, in which 
India’s emerging business leaders played an important role, adopted the broad 
features of early Indian planning as early as 1939. The instruments that were 
discussed in these early discussions included public ownership of large scale 
industries, the regulation of monopolies and licensing to implement an industrial 
policy that sought to accelerate industrialization.  
 
Licensing and public ownership were designed to accelerate the development of 
essential and basic industries, and to allocate scarce foreign exchange to maximize 
investment in critical sectors. India’s emerging capitalists would therefore be 
important players in the future planned economy and they participated in the 
discussions from the outset. Clearly, business leaders in India as elsewhere wanted 
government support without responsibility and with minimal state controls. The early 
discussions and debates reflect the tussles between different constituencies attempting 
to define the contours of post-independence industrial policy. Recognizing the 
pressures taking the political leadership in the direction of ‘socialism’, business 
leaders took the lead in defining the social contract that would fulfil their 
requirements as well as satisfying other constituencies in the country. Led by 
capitalists like Tata and Birla, a small group prepared an embryonic social contract 
setting out the terms of engagement that came to be known as the Bombay Plan of 
1944-5. The first part, published in 1944 was entitled A Brief Memorandum Outlining 
a Plan of Economic Development for India and set out the justification for the role of 
the state. India’s poverty could only be addressed by state action and planning. This 
was widely supported by the business community. The second part published in 1945 
set out the instruments of future policy. Industrialization was to be accelerated using 
protection, financing and public investments. The allocation of support would be 
based on the licensing of industries and the allocation of foreign exchange. As 
concessions to the social contract, regional equity and minimum wages were 
accepted. The quid pro quo was that the government would remain accountable and a 




There was much greater opposition from sections of the business community to the 
second part of the Bombay Plan because it implied that a permanent set of controls 
would be established on capitalists and there were also fears that the British would use 
this statement from business leaders to strengthen the wartime controls on Indian 
business that were already in place (Chibber 2003: 94-109). There followed a series of 
negotiations between business and the leadership of the Indian National Congress that 
continued after independence. Business leaders continued to demand maximum 
freedoms for themselves, such as the rolling back of plans for the public sector and 
demands to either not have licensing or have it only as a set of indicative guidelines. 
They made partial gains but eventually conceded the essential regulatory structure of 
licensing. The 1948 Industrial Policy Statement limited a monopoly for the public 
sector only in defence, railways and nuclear power, which did not yet exist. In a 
second area, primarily consisting of capital goods and infrastructure the public sector 
would take a lead but if the private sector had feasible projects they would not be 
blocked. In all other sectors the private sector would be free to invest subject to 
licensing.  
 
The Licensing Framework was finally formalized in the Industries Development and 
Regulation Act of 1951. Business demands for a purely indicative planning structure 
were not met. New industrial investments or capacity expansion above a certain size 
in a wide range of sectors had to be licensed by the state which would also allocate 
any foreign exchange required to import the capital equipment and raw materials 
necessary for production. Licensing provided the state with a powerful instrument to 
direct investments into particular sectors. On the other hand, it provided critical rents 
to the industrial investor on top of the protection provided by tariffs and other import 
controls. By limiting domestic entry, licensing provided a period of even higher 
domestic prices (in a context of tariff protection of the domestic economy) that could 
help to finance learning-by-doing in new sectors. It could also direct potentially 
significant rents to particular sectors by rationing scarce foreign exchange for the 
purchase of specific machinery and equipment. Nor did the business sector succeed in 
getting rid of provisions for disciplining firms that suffered from mismanagement or 
failed to make investments of the right quality and efficiency. However, business did 
succeed in diluting the directness with which disciplining could be applied to 
particular firms. A series of sectoral Development Councils were set up, staffed by 
industry representatives and technical staff. Complementing these was a Central 
Advisory Council for Industries that included all sectors and representatives of 
workers and consumers. It was only in consultation with these bodies that sanctions 
could be imposed on particular firms.  
 
The ‘license raj’ has been extensively blamed for India’s ‘hindu rate of growth’ which 
Virmani reclassifies later as India’s ‘socialist rate of growth’ (Virmani 2004a). If we 
look at the subcontinent as a whole over this period, both ‘socialist’ India and the 
‘capitalist’ Pakistan adopted very similar strategies of protecting domestic industries 
and attempted to build domestic technological capabilities. These policy choices can 
be easily understood if we remember the dismal experience with industrial growth and 
development under the colonial free trade regime. In fact, both countries achieved 
much better results in terms of growth and industrialization in the two decades after 




Table 2 Dirigiste Growth in India  
 1901-30 1931-47 1952-67 1968-81 1982-91 1992-2001 
Agriculture  0.5 0.2 1.8 3.3 3.5 2.7 
Industry  0.9 1.2 6.3 4.1 7.1 5.7 
Services  1.6 1.7 4.8 4.3 6.8 7.6 
GDP 0.8 0.8 3.4 3.8 5.6 5.6 
Per capita GDP 0.4 -0.5 1.4 1.5 3.4 3.5 
Source: Acharya et al. (2003) Table 2.1. The two shaded columns cover the dirigiste period.  
 
Table 2 shows the growth acceleration in India with the new policies that addressed 
some of the market failures that had constrained growth earlier. The growth of GDP 
was around 3 per cent higher in the three decades after independence compared to the 
previous fifty years. The jump in the growth rate of industry was even more marked. 
A very similar growth takeoff happened in Pakistan (which at the time included 
Bangladesh as East Pakistan) with policies that were substantially quite similar (Khan 
2011). To describe these outcomes as dismal failures that demonstrate the poverty of 
planning strategies is clearly wrong, though we shall see that problems were 
accumulating under these growth rates. Protection and subsidies proved to be 
extremely effective in driving investment in sectors that had previously been 
neglected. Import substitution as a method of developing new capabilities was 
initially extremely successful in both India and Pakistan. Table 3 shows the dramatic 
growth of production in sectors like machine tools and chemicals, with the share of 
imports dropping dramatically across industrial sectors. 
 
Table 3 Import Substitution under Licensing 
(Percentage of domestic market supplied by imports) 1951 1971 
Iron and Steel 25 13 
Aluminium 73 4 
Sugar Machinery  100 1 
Machine Tools 90 30 
Sewing Machines  41 <1  
Bicycles 65 <1 
Nitro-Fertilizers 84 37 
          Source: Datt and Sundharam (1991: 339) 
 
The statistician and economist, P.C. Mahalanobis, who headed the Indian Planning 
Commission in the 1950s formulated a growth strategy where savings were generated 
in the economy by prioritizing producer goods in the licensing strategy. The 
underlying logic of the model was that in a poor economy like India, savings and 
investment were too low. There are many ways of diverting consumption into 
investment (for instance by repressing wages, increasing the incentives for saving, 
expanding the banking system to encourage a wider population group to save), but the 
Mahalanobis model repressed consumption simply by changing the relative output of 
producer and consumer goods. This strategy, together with an expansion of the 
banking network did succeed in raising the share of investment in the economy. The 
share of gross fixed capital formation rose from 12.2% of GDP in 1951/52 to 17.5% 




Table 4 Slowdown of the Mid-1960s (net value added growth rates) 
           1955/6-         1965/6-         1975/6-        1980/1- 
           1965/6         1975/6               1980/1        1983/4 
 
Agriculture   0.9    3.9    1.0    3.5 
Industry   6.5    3.5    4.6    6.2 
Construction   6.2    2.5    3.8    1.8 
Railways   6.4    3.2    1.5    0.1 
Other Services   5.4    4.5    6.0    7.7 
TOTAL   3.2    3.9    3.4    5.3 
 
Source: (I. J. Ahluwalia 1985) 
 
While savings and investment remained on average stable through the 1960s, the 
growth rate began to slow down in the mid-1960s, particularly in the industrial sector 
and within that, in the heavy industrial sectors that had been particularly prioritized by 
the planners. Table 4 shows the slowdown in overall growth rates and Table 5 shows 
the more significant slowdown of the capital-intensive and producer goods sectors 
within industry. As these were the sectors where a greater part of the incentives were 
created through the licensing system, the slowdown was particularly significant. And 
most serious of all the statistics was the emerging recognition that productivity growth 
in Indian manufacturing was effectively not happening. Table 6 shows the negligible 
rates of productivity growth in Indian manufacturing from 1960 to 1980. The success 
of a strategy of catching up can be measured by the productivity growth achieved by 
firms and sectors receiving support. Their levels of productivity are initially low when 
they start production, but if they remain low, then support can never be viably 
removed. The figures in are not for individual firms, which is where the catching up is 
supposed to be happening, but even if some firms in some sectors were rapidly 
catching up, we would expect to see higher figures for TFP growth for the 
manufacturing sector over this period. The basic story is not changed if we look at 
figures for labour productivity instead of TFP (Rodrik and Subramanian 2004). 
     
Table 5 Deceleration in Industrial Sectors after 1965 
      1959/60-1965/6  1966/7-1978/9 
Basic Goods 
All Industry      8.8    6.5______________                            
(Cement, Fertilizer, 
Intermediate Goods 
Electricity, Metals etc)   12.2    7.2______________ 
(Spinning, Chemicals, 
Capital Goods 
Nuts and Bolts, etc)     9.4    6.1______________ 
Consumer Goods     5.9    6.2 
(Machinery)    15.8    7.3______________ 





Table 6 Total Factor Productivity Growth in Manufacturing 1960-80 





Source: (I. J. Ahluwalia 1991) 
 
Liberal economists like Ahluwalia (1985, 1991) who began to provide the statistical 
analysis of the slowdown saw the figures as a vindication of the inefficiencies of 
planning. A series of liberal economists, including Little, Skitovsky and Scott (1970) 
and Bhagwati and Desai (1970) had made the standard neoclassical argument that 
restrictions on markets are the source of inefficiency. Prices were distorted and as a 
result resources were inefficiently allocated. But the simple neoclassical argument did 
not answer many important questions. Why were growth rates high through the 1950s 
and early 1960s? Why did controls suddenly become a constraint in the mid-1960s? 
Moreover, market distortions should create static efficiency losses resulting in a one-
time loss of net social benefit and not necessarily a reduction in the growth rate. 
Unless controls were becoming more distortionary over time, the rate of growth 
should not have suddenly declined in terms of neoclassical theory.  
 
There was no question that licensing and the system of controls did create entry and 
exit barriers because that was the intention of these instruments (I. J. Ahluwalia 1985, 
1991). The question was whether the restrictions were being effectively applied to 
achieve the goal of accelerating industrial growth by creating incentives and 
opportunities for new technology adoption. It was clear to most observers that there 
were many instances of misuse where licenses had clearly been ‘captured’ but the 
licensing authorities appeared to have little capacity to respond. For instance, large 
business houses would often create excessive barriers to entry by securing more 
licenses than they needed (using deception or corruption) simply to keep potential 
competitors out. The licensing authorities also appeared to create protection for 
sectors where it would be difficult to make a case for protection in terms of 
technological catching up and learning. These included many relatively low 
technology engineering sectors that continued to get effective protection even though 
they appeared not to be approaching international competitiveness. The administrative 
hurdles and red tape in the management of the licensing system were also 
unnecessarily complex and open to abuse. There were clearly rent-seeking costs for 
firms attempting to acquire or retain licenses, taking the form not only of the time 
wasted but also of corruption.  
 
None of these are sufficient explanations for a slowdown in the growth rate even in 
terms of neoclassical theory unless there were reasons why the capabilities of the state 
in these respects were declining over time. But more fundamentally, the neoclassical 
analysis coming from the critics of industrial policy sees no role for policy in 
correcting failures of contracting. The market outcome in the absence of any 
intervention is theoretically the best one in the neoclassical framework and 
intervention only creates distortions and additional costs in the form of corruption and 
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rent seeking. The underlying model is flawed because the welfare-maximizing market 
outcome is a myth that exists only in textbooks. In a world where private contracting 
cannot solve all problems, intervention can be developmental, provided the benefits of 
intervention outweigh its costs (Khan 2000a, 2000b). Clearly, in the earlier period of 
industrial policy in India, up to around the mid-1960s, the particular types of 
interventions in place were generating growth outcomes that were significantly better 
than the previous free market outcomes during colonial rule. So the question is 
whether the planning system had begun to reach its limits, and if so why?  
 
Corruption and more generally rent seeking are both common in systems where there 
are interventions to correct market failures as intervention will always create rents. 
The question is whether the corruption results in a change in the allocation of support 
(for instance if inefficient recipients continue to receive support) or ‘only’ results in a 
sharing of the benefits of growth with public officials (for instance failing projects are 
not supported but successful ones are expected to share profits with public officials). 
In the former case, the corruption can have very damaging effects because it imposes 
not only direct costs (the loss of resources from potential investment) but it also wipes 
out the potential benefit of intervention by destroying the possibility of accelerated 
catching up. In the latter case, the corruption still has a direct cost and is in that sense 
undesirable but because it does not wipe out the benefit of intervention in the form of 
higher growth, this type of corruption can coexist with significant growth as in South 
Korea in the 1960s (Khan 1996a, 1996b, 2002). So if corruption and rent seeking had 
suddenly become more damaging for the Indian industrial policy system, we would 
want to know how the bargaining between business and government was changing 
over time. But this would take us beyond the neoclassical framework that Ahluwalia 
and other liberal economists were using to criticize the effects of corruption in the 
Indian industrial policy system.  
 
Finally, liberal economists argued that Indian industrial policy was also affected by 
the application of laws protecting other parts of the social contract. For instance, the 
protection of small-scale sectors was preventing the achievement of minimum 
efficient scale in some sectors such as textiles and garments. Optimum scale was also 
sometimes impeded by the application of the Monopoly and Restrictive Trade 
Practices Act of 1969 (MRTP) that was introduced by Indira Gandhi to control big 
business and as an apparent concession to populist sentiments. A particular target of 
liberal economists was the protection offered to workers as part of the industrial 
policy social contract. These included the provisions of the Companies Act of 1956 
and the Sick Industrial Companies Act of 1985 which established procedures for 
closing down companies and provided for additional compensation to workers 
depending on their length of service. Liberal economists argued that these provisions 
created very high barriers to exit that prevented entrepreneurs from entering many 
risky sectors in the first place, for fear of being trapped in case of financial 
difficulties. As labour market reforms remain an important plank for reformers, we 
will come back to this issue later. But to explain the slowdown, the restrictive 
legislation should have become more stringent in the mid-1960s. There is little 
evidence of this, and in any case the most stringent restriction on exit was not enacted 
till 1985! 
 
Was the Indian state at all aware that its industrial policy was facing problems and did 
the bureaucratic and political leadership intend to do anything about it? It turns out 
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that long before liberal economists were pointing out these problems and well before 
statist economists came up with lists of conditions under which industrial policies 
could be successful, Indian bureaucrats had pragmatically identified many of the most 
serious problems the licensing structure faced. The Industrial Licensing Policy 
Inquiry Committee known as the Dutt Committee was set up in the 1960s and reported 
in 1969 on the problems with the licensing system. It reported that there were a 
number of key problem areas, and these were not very dissimilar to the ones that 
economists would later be identifying. The first was a lack of clarity about priorities. 
The licensing system not only wanted to accelerate growth and development, but also 
intended to achieve multiple targets like regional equity and protection of small firms 
that often resulted in contrary incentives and outcomes. Secondly, the licensing 
authorities were failing to prevent the growth of non-essential capacity. This meant 
that firms were able to get allocations of licenses that were not planned. Since the 
bureaucrats knew this was happening, this was a failure of implementation and a 
failure to discipline businesses, rather than a failure due to information overload.  
 
Third, there was a failure to prevent increases in regional disparities. Regions were 
able to get allocations of licenses that were not planned. This too was clearly not an 
accident as the bureaucrats were aware of what was happening. Powerful politicians 
and factions could get more licenses for their home states. The pace of development 
of particular states therefore depended on the organization of factions within the 
Congress rather than efficiency or equity considerations. This was to have significant 
implications for determining the initial conditions of states in the 1980s when growth 
became more explicitly market-driven. Fourth, the Committee argued that despite 
licensing, capital goods were often over-imported. This resulted in excess capacity as 
multiple firms could not be prevented from importing the same capital goods. Indeed 
growing overcapacity in some sectors was an important feature of the slowdown of 
the mid-1960s. As rationing scarce foreign exchange was one of the key objectives of 
licensing, the failure to prevent over-capacity was a serious failure of implementation 
and again reflected the ability of firms to override the allocation of licenses set out in 
plan documents. Finally, the report argued that a disproportionate set of licenses went 
to large firms and large business houses, again pointing to the importance of power 
and influence in the allocation of licenses. The top 73 industrial houses accounted for 
56% of proposed private corporate investment in machinery and 60% of its 
investment in capital goods (including buildings) (Datt and Sundharam 1991: 142). 
 
The committee thus identified a series of serious problems in the power of the state to 
implement its own policies and this had significant implications for outcomes. Its 
recommendations were aimed at redressing the problem of weak implementation by 
changing the institutional structure and the scope of the policies. Most interestingly, 
the Committee wanted to see planning restricted to a few strategic sectors. By 
reducing the scope of the policy to a few sectors, this would strengthen the 
implementation capacity of the state in several ways. The limited state capacities of 
monitoring and enforcement could be allocated better, and by focusing on a few 
sectors, the political competition over rents would also be limited. Secondly, the 
committee recommended the immediate banning of investment in overcapacity areas. 
Thirdly, it recommended that market forces should be used more effectively in a large 
middle area which did not have strategic implications. Fourth and most important, it 
wanted to enforce sanctions for the non-implementation of conditions accompanying 
the granting of licenses and credit. Clearly, it was self-evident to pragmatic 
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bureaucrats that support to firms should be conditional on performance, and indeed 
this had been central to the discussions around the setting up the licensing system in 
1951. Finally, they recommended experimenting with joint public-private enterprises 
with properly trained public sector managers coming from a management cadre. 
 
This is exactly the kind of strategic and conditional structure of incentives which was 
later identified in Taiwan and South Korea in the work of Wade (1990) and Amsden 
(1989). Why, if Indian bureaucrats had identified the importance of conditional 
support for themselves, were they not implemented in India? Instead the Dutt 
committee’s report was quietly shelved and only the part of the report that criticized 
licensing was used much later in support of the transition towards liberalization. 
Clearly, there were impediments to the implementation of effective industrial policy 
in India. Political economy analysts have offered a number of different explanations 
for these constraints in India. A state’s strength or weakness in terms of its 
implementation capabilities cannot be assessed in abstract without reference to the 
organization of the society in which these enforcement organizations are operating. 
Bureaucrats and political leaders with very similar technocratic and bureaucratic 
capabilities may succeed in enforcement in one context but fail dismally in another if 
the second presents them with well-organized opposition coming from powerful 
groups in society. It is the political settlement as a whole and not just the capabilities 
of bureaucrats and policing forces that determines relative success in the enforcement 
of particular institutions and policies (Khan 2010a). Our analysis of the sources of 
weakness in the implementation of industrial policy will be better understood if we 
first examine the arguments of Atul Kohli and Vivek Chibber. 
 
Kohli (1994) opens up the discussion by introducing colonial history as a determinant 
of state performance in India. He does this by looking at the role of Japanese 
colonialism in explaining why the South Korean state was so strong in its ability to 
penetrate and control its society. Kohli argues that Japanese colonialism in Korea was 
brutal and interventionist, and sought to penetrate and control society from above. It 
could do this because of the demographic and military balance between the Japanese 
and Koreans allowed the Japanese to rule directly using their own officials and even 
in the economy they used their own entrepreneurs and landlords to a large extent. It 
had no need of domestic dominant classes and indeed did its best to destroy their 
power by confiscating their land and reserving senior and mid-level positions in the 
state for Japanese nationals. Modern enterprises were owned and operated by 
Japanese at all higher levels. Nevertheless, large numbers of Korean technicians, 
engineers and managers were trained, but in terms of decision-making, political or 
organizational power they remained in a very subordinate position. This 
interventionist history destroyed the power of domestic ruling classes and imposed the 
writ of the colonial state on other classes. Thus, Japanese social engineering changed 
the balance of power between state and society and gave the post-colonial South 
Korean state a free hand in imposing its own penetrative control over society. This 
was in stark contrast to India where the British did not have the numbers or the 
overwhelming military force to attempt such a degree of penetration and control. 
Instead, as is well known, the British ruled through intermediaries. The post-colonial 
states of the British Empire therefore faced much better organized and resistant 




Kohli’s most important contribution is to remind us that the relative organizational 
power of different groups in contemporary political settlements is likely to have roots 
in colonial history. Colonial powers used very specific strategies of social engineering 
to re-order the societies they were ruling to reinforce their rule. These strategies often 
changed the relative power and legitimacy of different groups and classes and their 
organizations with lasting implications for the organization of these societies. Kohli’s 
observations about the destructive nature of Japanese colonialism are relevant for 
understanding the fragmentation of political and social organizations in Korean 
society, and this took decades to recover. In contrast, British colonialism in India had 
almost the opposite effect on the strength and numbers of social organizations. As a 
tiny group of colonialists ruling a huge country, the British had to recruit many 
different indigenous groups in support of their rule and they had to ensure that these 
groups did not collectively organize against them. The logical outcome was the 
strategy of divide and rule that resulted in the sequential mobilization and 
organization of new groups to balance the demands and pretensions of previously 
mobilized and organized groups. Sequentially, the groups that were the most loyal at 
any point in time provided recruits for administering and managing the imperial 
project. The consequences were the reverse of those in Korea. The fragmentation of 
society into competing organizations based on different identities and interests was 
much further developed in British colonies than may have naturally occurred in the 
absence of colonialism. The relative strength and numbers of political organizations in 
the two societies are critical variables that can help to explain the success or failure of 
implementation of particular institutions. 
 
On the other hand, Kohli’s use of his social analysis is misleading because he argues 
that colonial history made the South Korean state strong vis-à-vis its society as a 
whole. This is used in the context of his implicit view that developmental states are 
autonomous and authoritarian entities and the power balance in South Korea gave its 
state these characteristics. This characterization of a developmental state is 
problematic. Kohli argues that these qualities are required to give a state the ability to 
restructure and reorganize society in a developmental direction. The South Korean 
state was not and could not be fully autonomous of all social forces, so the question is 
whether Kohli’s simplification is useful. I believe not. Kohli’s framework is less 
substantive than the developmental state framework of Evans (1989) who Kohli refers 
to. Evans argues that in a developmental state, autonomy has to be embedded in social 
and economic interests. This prevents the autonomous state from being predatory but 
by that very token its autonomy is also reduced. The rich political economy analysis 
of developmental states has established that the core characteristic of a developmental 
state is not that it can do anything it likes but rather that it has the capabilities to 
enforce developmental outcomes (and of course it must have incentives and social 
pressures to this). The important question is what constrains a particular state: what 
can it do and what is it weak at doing? And what factors can explain this? The 
simplification of developmental characteristics to a broadly defined capability to be 
autonomous and authoritarian vis-à-vis society diverts our attention from these critical 
questions and to that extent is not useful.  
 
The absence of a strong institutional and policy framework in Kohli’s analysis means 
that he does not specify in detail what the developmental state has to enforce when 
capitalists are being supported to accelerate technology acquisition. Instead, general 
characteristics of authoritarianism are cited, which may have played a minor role but 
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may not be the defining characteristic of South Korean success in implementing 
industrial policy. For instance, labour repression was not an essential part of South 
Korean industrial policy success and indeed working class organizational strength 
ensured that wages rose rapidly as its industrialization proceeded (Amsden 1989). 
However, a reading of Kohli’s paper may suggest that all types of authoritarian 
capabilities including labour repression are necessary functions of a developmental 
state. The most important areas where enforcement is actually required can only be 
identified in the context of a specific policy and institutional analysis because the 
necessary enforcement tasks of the state obviously depend on the contracting and 
other problems that are significant constraints on investment in particular sectors. We 
will discuss this in greater detail later, but one area where enforcement is critical for 
making targeted support effective is clearly to have the ability to allocate and 
withdraw support to firms. The possibility of imposing discipline on firms so that they 
put in high levels of effort in the learning exercise depends critically on the credible 
threat of withdrawal. This is a very specific ability which does not necessarily require 
an entirely autonomous state in the way defined by Kohli. Obviously, this is not the 
only enforcement requirement for a developmental state, but this is the dimension that 
developmental state theorists have focused on in the case of East Asia and it was also 
identified as one of the important limitations of Indian industrial policy by the Dutt 
Committee referred to earlier. 
 
Thus, while Kohli makes an important contribution by pointing out the likely colonial 
roots of important aspects of the distribution of organizational power in developing 
countries, his overall analysis can be challenged for the way in which the 
characteristics of a developmental state are defined. The Japanese impact in East Asia 
was exceptional and atomized social organizations to a very large extent. The 
successor states enjoyed a large element of autonomy as a result. But the distribution 
of power within South Korea was more complex than a weak-society strong-state 
binary divide. The South Korean state was constrained in important ways by 
organizational threats from within society and indeed within the state, which cannot 
be sharply divided from society in analytical terms (Khan 2010a). The collapse of the 
Syngman Rhee regime in 1960 was brought about by popular protests against election 
rigging and corruption and this was the context in which Park Chung Hee eventually 
assumed power in 1961. The urgency with which the new regime sought 
developmental success was driven by its need to sustain its legitimacy in the face of 
significant social mobilization. The repressive aspects of a developmental state are 
also over-stressed in Kohli’s account and the repression that takes place in non-
developmental states thereby under-stressed. Many Indians in many parts of India 
would probably find their state more repressive than many South Koreans did. 
Ultimately, while Kohli is right to look back to the colonial period to understand 
aspects of the contemporary distribution of power, we need to link this to the 
institutional and policy challenges facing states using particular industrial policy tools 
like targeted support to firms. Otherwise we can fall into the trap of explaining South 
Korean success in very general terms of authoritarianism and autonomy which does 
not do justice to the differences in institutional enforcement capacities of countries.  
 
Chibber (1999, 2003) explicitly analyses why the Indian state failed to enforce 
discipline on the capitalists it supported. His argument is that enforcement was poor 
because a) Indian business effectively opposed disciplinary planning; b) business had 
no interest in supporting disciplining because it was not rational to do so with import-
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substituting industrialization, in contrast to South Korea’s export-led industrialization; 
c) South Korea could do this because of favourable international conditions, in 
particular the alliance with Japanese capital which gave South Korea access to 
developed export markets; and d) by demobilizing organized labour, the Congress 
further weakened its own bargaining position with capital. As a description of what 
happened, Chibber cannot be faulted, but the causal links can be questioned. He 
provides a detailed documentation of the negotiations that resulted in the emergence 
of the industrial policy structure in India. In these negotiations, well-organized and 
intelligent business leaders typically took the initiative in defining the role of the state 
and then ensuring that support came with unenforceable strings attached. We saw this 
in the summary of the negotiations that led from the Bombay Plan of 1944 to the 
Industries Act of 1951.  
 
The documentation that Chibber provides also shows how these negotiations resulted 
in the emergence of a relatively powerless Planning Commission in 1950 with a 
largely advisory role. The Planning Commission could only work through advice and 
recommendations that ministries and powerful coalitions would have to accept in 
order to be implemented. The disciplining mechanism was also diluted from the very 
outset by involving the advisory role of the sectoral Development Councils and the 
industry-level Central Advisory Council for Industries as bodies that would mediate 
between the planning apparatus and individual firms before any measures could be 
imposed. The involvement of industry bodies in the planning process appeared to 
have ‘embedded’ India’s planning apparatus in the industrial sector. But unlike the 
sectoral councils and associations in South Korea and Taiwan, which generated 
Evan’s concept of embeddedness, the Indian councils were not representative bodies 
and their recommendations could easily be ignored by firms that had no interest in 
accepting them as legitimate. This structure, according to Chibber, was the result of 
intense and effective industry opposition to ensure that enforcement was deliberately 
undermined and easy to evade (Chibber 2003: 146-57).  
 
At the heart of Chibber’s argument is an economic thesis that is relatively weak. He 
argues that it was not rational for Indian business to support disciplining because the 
strategy of import-substituting industrialization did not require productivity growth 
whereas a strategy of export-led growth does. South Korea could attempt such an 
export-led growth strategy, because it had access to established export markets that 
Japanese capital was moving out of. Japanese capital was willing not only to provide 
the technology but also to help market South Korean products. In this context, South 
Korean businesses had an incentive to support disciplining because their own success 
depended on it. Not only did the individual South Korean firm need to continuously 
upgrade its efficiency to keep up in export markets, it also needed the state to 
coordinate and enhance the efficiency of all South Korean firms because the quality 
of inputs purchased from other South Korean firms determined the quality of the 
product of each firm. Firms in general had an interest in supporting the disciplining of 
the industrial sector as a whole because their individual performance depended on it. 
In contrast in the Indian import substituting model, firms knew that they were selling 
in protected domestic markets and licensing gave a few firms oligopolistic profits. 
There was no incentive to improve quality or reduce price and disciplining was 




The economic logic that Chibber invokes is weak because it does not identify the 
deeper factors of power and enforcement that made the South Korean industrial policy 
possible. He does recognize that there is a difference between South Korea’s export-
led strategy and export promotion strategies in other countries where the same pace of 
technology upgrading and movements up the value chain are not observed. Why did 
this happen in South Korea? Chibber’s answer is that South Korean capitalists were 
willing to be disciplined because they saw the benefits of it given the opportunities 
available as a result of the fortuitous Japanese willingness to transfer technologies and 
markets to a lower wage country just at that time. The implication is that if any 
neighbouring pro-western country (say the Philippines or Pakistan) had chosen an 
export-driven strategy at that time (as Pakistan did), and if the Japanese came with the 
same offer, the result would be a similar rational willingness of domestic capitalists to 
be disciplined and a similar set of industrial policy institutions and outcomes. 
Alternatively, one could ask: did South Korean capitalists rationally accept 
disciplining because the Japanese business alliance was available or did the Japanese 
get increasingly involved in South Korea because successful disciplining of its 
capitalists and their growing productivity allowed the Japanese to engage in a 
profitable partnership with that country?  
 
The uniqueness of South Korean industrial policy success despite a number of 
countries being similarly positioned at that time suggests that the second line of 
causality is more likely to have been the dominant one. There is also a deeper 
question here about the jump from collective to individual rationality in Chibber’s 
analysis. An individual capitalist will always prefer to get a subsidy and not put in the 
high levels of effort that will eventually make the subsidy unnecessary. If the reason 
why subsidies are necessary is that the initial productivity of a firm in a developing 
country is low (mainly because there is a lot of tacit knowledge involved in mastering 
how to produce products of a given price and quality), then the subsidy is what allows 
the firm to start producing and exporting. As long as the subsidy is there, the firm can 
keep on exporting. The collective interest obviously is that the firm should put in a 
high level of effort in its learning-by-doing activities so that the subsidy is no longer 
required. But once this happens and the subsidy disappears, the firm is not making 
greater profits, it is making normal profits. It is just that it can now survive without 
the subsidy. The benefit of its effort is a collective one, because now the subsidies are 
available for other sectors and firms. It is not clear how the collective benefit in this 
case solves the prisoner’s dilemma problem for the individual firm. It has no interest 
in putting in a high level of effort, the outcome of which will be to lose its subsidy 
and become reliant on market competition to survive. There is a long-term benefit to 
the individual firm too, because once it learns how to learn it can keep on increasing 
its productivity and thereby increase its profits over time, or at least learn how to 
survive without subsidies. If all firms put in high levels of effort and the economy 
grows faster, the individual firm will also benefit from the growth in quality and 
output across the economy. Improvements in the quality of the inputs it purchases 
from other firms and perhaps an increased demand for its own output will help it on 
both the demand and supply sides. But this long-term incentive to put in high levels of 
effort in the hope that everyone else will do the same would be true for all types of 
production strategies, not just export-led growth.   
 
Chibber’s logic therefore slides from a statement about the collective benefit from 
rapid learning in the export-led strategy to the claim that individual firms will 
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therefore have an individual benefit in supporting their own disciplining. This claim is 
weak in terms of an economic analysis of what subsidizing learning involves and 
what the benefit to the individual firm is in putting in high levels of effort in such a 
context. In principle, a firm can have a rational incentive to support in general the 
enforcement of rules that are of collective benefit and simultaneously also have 
rational incentives to free ride. It is exactly the same as saying that all drivers have a 
rational interest in supporting the enforcement of traffic rules, but each individual 
driver also has an individual interest to free ride whenever the opportunity arises. The 
general support for the enforcement of traffic rules that all drivers have does not mean 
that an individual driver has a rational incentive to support the enforcement of traffic 
rules on them. The difference in the adherence to traffic rules in London and Lagos 
cannot be explained by the individual interest of each driver to support the 
enforcement of traffic rules on themselves. Their support for the enforcement of 
traffic rules in general is exactly the same in the two contexts. What is missing is an 
analysis of what curbs the individual incentive to free ride. The difference is that the 
individual interest to free ride is successfully curbed by effective enforcement in 
London and less so in Lagos. Identifying the collective interest does not tell us why 
enforcement is more successful in one case compared to another.  
 
This is why the contrast between export-led and import substituting growth strategies 
is exaggerated. In principle the same logic could hold for a group of firms operating in 
an import substituting country. If all firms put in high levels of effort and raised the 
quality of their products and reduced prices rapidly, sales of each individual firm 
would increase from the growing demand, the extent of the market would increase, 
input quality for other firms would increase, and indeed after a while, export-led 
growth would become possible. A state playing an industrial policy game would 
simply have to change the terms of support a little. Instead of saying that firms would 
have to meet export growth targets, the state would have to set an equivalent set of 
domestic sales targets. If the domestic market really was very limited for some 
products, the target could be set as a declining schedule of tariff protection over a 
number of years, forcing the firm to achieve international competitiveness but 
operating initially in the domestic market. In exactly the same way, firms would 
collectively benefit from the growth in the economy, but they would individually have 
the same incentive to free ride. By comparing the individual incentive of Indian firms 
to free ride under import substitution and the collective interest of South Korean firms 
to enforce an export-led strategy, Chibber is not comparing like with like.  
 
At best, the opportunity of getting Japanese assistance to enter foreign markets 
significantly increased the collective benefit from sustaining productivity growth in 
South Korea. But the incentives for an individual firm would still suffer from a 
prisoner’s dilemma paradox. The individual firm would want other firms to put in 
effort and yet make excuses for its own poor performance because it could save its 
effort and minimize risks by retaining its current production processes. The firm 
would continue to make normal profits as long as an appropriate subsidy was 
forthcoming. Thus, there is no automatic incentive of an individual firm to support the 
enforcement of disciplining on itself, indeed if the firm had the incentive to put in 
high levels of effort anyway, disciplining would by unnecessary in the first place. 
Disciplining is necessary because it is impossible to say ex ante whether a firm will 
succeed in its learning effort or not. The threat of disciplining can increase the level of 
effort but does not necessarily ensure that the particular firm and its management will 
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be successful. Indeed very few of the dominant chaebols of the early 1960s remained 
in the top twenty by the 1980s. The effect of the successful enforcement of 
disciplining was clearly not beneficial for many individual firms but it enabled South 
Korea to graduate to an upper-income economy. Chibber does not see the 
enforcement problem as a free-riding problem at all. The prisoner’s dilemma problem 
is of course that in the absence of effective enforcement (which individual firms will 
resist) all firms are likely to do simultaneously free ride. This is after all what 
happened in many countries (including Pakistan in the 1960s) where export subsidies 
led to exports but did not result in successful disciplining or rapid productivity growth 
(Khan 1999). South Korea’s industrial policy enforcement success cannot therefore be 
explained by the rational incentives of its capitalists, at least not to a very large extent.  
 
Chibber hints that the rational interest of each firm in South Korea to support the 
principle of disciplining in general helped the state to impose discipline on each 
individual firm. But imagine what this means. Car drivers do not normally get out of 
their cars to help the police enforce the law against an individual driver who breaks 
the rules, even though they may support enforcement against others in general. A 
general support for enforcement is rarely translated into enforcement success in this 
way. Indeed, once the rules break down in a prisoner’s dilemma, almost everyone is 
free riding anyway, so it is not clear how any individual can help with enforcement. 
Similarly, firms are not likely to send delegations to help the state to enforce the rules 
on free riding firms, particularly when collective action has broken down and all or 
almost all firms are free riding. This is why the excellent documentation that Chibber 
provides of how the sectoral Development Councils in India appeared to be 
deliberately set up to allow individual firms to free ride while sectoral councils in 
South Korea appeared to have been set up so that individual firms could not, actually 
begs the question. Why did this happen? Clearly, the South Korean state was able to 
prevent individual business interests free riding when the institutions of industrial 
policy were being set up and was also able to prevent free riding afterwards, during 
the implementation of industrial policy. In India, big businesses succeeded in setting 
up rules that gave them wriggle room from the outset, and even these rules could not 
be successfully enforced afterwards as the Dutt Committee revealed. Where did the 
enforcement capacity of the South Korean state come from? Chibber’s appeal to the 
rational interest of South Korean firms to support the enforcement of discipline in an 
export-led growth strategy does not provide a satisfactory answer.  
 
Finally, Chibber argues (though this is not central to his argument) that the bargaining 
power of the state vis-à-vis capital was further reduced because the Congress helped 
to suppress the rights of the working class to mobilize, thereby further strengthening 
the power of the capitalists. Throughout the 1940s Gandhi opposed strike actions and 
insisted that unions should settle disputes through compulsory arbitration. The 1947 
Industrial Disputes Act gave unions the right to strike but only after a two-week 
notification. But it also gave state governments the right to declare any industry a 
public utility for a period of six months which automatically ensured compulsory 
arbitration. The effect of these and other laws effectively demobilized labour after 
1947. Incidentally, the ability of the Indian state to push through these changes also 
shows that it was more autonomous and authoritarian than Kohli suggests. But 
Chibber’s argument that weakening labour reduced the bargaining power of the state 
vis-à-vis business is not convincing. It assumes that the state could otherwise have 
unleashed labour mobilization on business if the latter opposed discipline and then 
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withdraw working class demands if business subjected itself to discipline. The 
alternative of strong unions, businesses and the state collectively reaching a social 
democratic contract is as Chibber admits, even less plausible as a counterfactual 
argument because there is no example of such a tripartite social contract driving 
industrial policy in a developing country.  
 
Political Settlements and the Enforcement of Industrial Policy  
The analytical framework of political settlements as a sustainable equilibrium of 
institutions and organizations offers an alternative explanation of differences in the 
capabilities of states in different countries to enforce specific institutions (Khan 
2010a). The ability of the state to enforce particular institutions depends on the 
relative power of enforcement agencies compared to the organizations subject to 
enforcement under the institutions in question. Even institutions that are collectively 
beneficial for a group of organizations can face significant free-riding violations from 
individual organizations. Some institutions can also impose unequal distributions of 
costs and benefits on a particular set of organizations. Adversely affected 
organizations are also likely to resist the enforcement of these institutions. The 
capability of organizations to resist depends of their holding power, which is a 
measure of how long they can hold out in contests or conflicts with other 
organizations or enforcement agencies, the costs they can inflict on other 
organizations and the pain they can absorb during these conflicts.  
 
The big business houses that were engaged in the negotiation of industrial policy 
institutions and became the primary beneficiaries of the support available under 
industrial policies in both South Korea and India do not appear to have had significant 
holding power on their own. In both cases, modern business houses were a tiny 
proportion of the economy, let alone of the population. The modern sectors were 
relatively underdeveloped in both countries, in a relative sense the modern sector in 
India in the 1940s was even less developed compared to South Korea in the 1960s. In 
terms of social legitimacy South Korean business leaders probably enjoyed lower 
social legitimacy than their Indian counterparts because many of them had been 
collaborators with the Japanese as managers and agents. But in India too, though big 
business was playing a part in the independence movement, the collective mood was 
for much greater social equity and opportunity after the departure of the British, a 
major role for the public sector and even for nationalization. Indeed, it was precisely 
because the wind was blowing against them that leading Indian industrialists took 
initiatives like the Bombay Plan to stave off even more ferocious attacks on their 
assets.  
 
So in terms of size, numbers and legitimacy, it is hard to argue that Indian capitalists 
were more powerful than their South Korean counterparts. This is of course why 
Chibber sought an answer in the differences in the incentives of the two groups of 
capitalists to support institutions that could enforce discipline and subsequently 
support the enforcement of these institutions. As his answer is at best very 
incomplete, we need to come back to the question of enforceability and relative 
power. Missing so far in our analysis has been an examination of the power of other 
organizations with which capitalists could align or make coalitions to increase their 
bargaining/holding power. There was a legitimate tradition of business funding for 
polices and politicians from the earliest days of the Indian national movement. The 
nationalist entrepreneur Dadabhai Naoroji backed Congress and Congress politicians 
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during the anti-colonial struggle and exemplified this trend. If capitalist firms can 
make these alliances and build long-term relationships with particular politicians and 
factions, their ability to influence policy and enforcement will depends not just on the 
economic resources and numbers of people it can directly mobilize but also on its 
alliances with political groups and organizations. The relative power of the latter, and 
the cost and probability of making these coalitions then becomes a critical 
determinant of the relative power of business organizations.  
 
Here the organizational structure of political organizations in the Indian subcontinent 
becomes the immediate subject of interest. How easy was it for Indian businesses to 
find political backers and champions who would protect the specific interests of that 
sector or business? How did this compare with South Korea or other countries where 
industrial policy was being attempted? Put this way, many of the puzzles about the 
negotiations about industrial policy and their subsequent implementation disappear. 
How were big business houses able to block attempts at setting up institutions that 
would expose them to disciplining? The blocking was happening because the big 
business interests had close political associates at the height of power and they 
effectively defended the rights of their business allies to have the freedom to select 
their own level of productivity and effort, while enjoying government subsidies and 
protection. G.D. Birla not only hosted and financed Gandhi; he was also associated 
with V.B. Patel, one of the senior leaders of the Congress Party and a rival of Nehru 
who became Deputy Prime Minister under him. In the discussions about the role of 
the Planning Commission, Patel blocked Nehru and represented the Birla position 
against a powerful Commission. Other capitalists had strong connections with 
different ministries and their political allies in the ministries took the position that a 
strong Planning Commission would be against the interests of departmental 
autonomy. The outcome was a toothless Planning Commission whose institutional 
capabilities were very different from the nodal role that was given to the Economic 
Planning Board (EPB) in South Korea. The concerted action by businesses worked, 
but only because individual business houses found political champions at the highest 
level to represent their interests. These facts are reported in passing by Chibber in his 
detailed documentation of the early negotiations but he does not draw the glaring 
analytical conclusions (Chibber 2003: 137-57).  
 
The EPB in South Korea emerged as a nodal agency for coordinating information that 
was used for enforcement because the President wanted such an agency. There were 
no political factions or organizations within his ruling coalition that could be 
approached by business interests to protect their interests in this way. Indian 
businesses were more powerful not because they had absolutely greater power but 
because they could find allies very easily who would ‘sell’ them bargaining power for 
a relatively cheap price. The price for finding allies and champions was relatively low 
because there were a large number of organizations and politicians competing for 
power and they needed off-budget resources desperately to finance their politics and 
their hold on their own clients and factions. This was as true for Gandhi and Patel and 
politicians at the leadership level as it was for politicians who were much lower down 
the patron-client chains of the Congress Party. From the very outset, big and small 
business cultivated political friends at levels appropriate for protecting their interest. 
Their champions protected their interests, both when institutions were being designed, 
and later on when institutions were enforced. This was as true of the inception phase 




Although the Dutt Committee did not explicitly spell out how it was that some 
business houses got excessive licenses to block the entry of others or some states got 
far too many licenses given the goal of regional equity, this was a undoubtedly the 
result of political connections. Business houses did not bargain openly for licenses in 
any formal process, nor was the misallocation of licenses to particular houses or states 
simply an accident. Business houses, particularly the ones who had first mover 
advantage from the 1940s, continued to cultivate and build alliances with politicians 
and one indication of their success was license allocation. This also meant that the 
states in which the well-connected houses were located or investing in would get 
license allocations entirely out of line with regional equity requirements or the 
intentions of the Planning Commission. For instance, Maharashtrian chief ministers 
like Vasant Dada Patil and later Sharad Pawar maintained close long-term 
relationships with particular business houses such as Bajaj and Ambani. These 
relationships with some of the biggest business houses with politicians who were 
powerful at the centre meant that Maharashtra and its business houses got a 
significant share of licenses. On the other hand, the electoral strategies of Congress 
leaders in Maharashtra could rely to a significant extent on donations from business 
houses. The political imperatives of maintaining these links meant that India’s 
politicians were quick to shelve the Dutt Committee report. When ‘liberalization’ 
came about, the formal and increasingly irrelevant structures of planning were 
abandoned, but not the close business-government relationships that characterized 
India’s industrial policy from the outset. 
 
An example of the effects of differential political connections between businesses and 
politicians can be seen by looking at the relative performance of Maharashtra and 
West Bengal. At the time of independence in 1947, Maharashtra and West Bengal 
were virtually level in terms of their presence in the manufacturing sector measured in 
terms of numbers of factories and workers, though Maharashtra was ahead in terms of 
value-added. This is shown in Table 7. In the subsequent period, Table 8 shows that 
Maharashtra’s performance in terms of getting industrial investment licenses far 
outstripped West Bengal and indeed all other Indian states. Many of the biggest 
business houses were headquartered in Bombay and their owners had close 
connections with Bombay politicians, who also played a critical role in central 
Congress politics. In contrast, the businesses located in West Bengal were not Bengali 
owned and typically had limited political connections with local politicians. As other 
states began to industrialize under industrial policy, the shares of the two early starters 
would inevitably have come down. Table 9 shows that the decline happens mostly for 
West Bengal, with Maharashtra’s share declining much less. Finally Table 10 shows 
the significant differences in underlying industrial growth rates between Maharashtra 
and West Bengal, partly as a result of the politically driven implementation of 




Table 7 Registered Factories in Major Indian Provinces 1946 










West Bengal 1218 509120 33.6 57.3 
Bombay 959 500267 33.0 87.7 
Madras 1244 144931 9.6 15.3 
UP 559 166763 11.0 21.7 
Bihar 316 93523 6.2 19.7 
Source: First Census of Manufacturing Industries in India, 1946, reported in Dasgupta (1998: 
Table 2). 
 




Applications  Licenses Issued 
Percentage of 
Licenses Issued 
Maharashtra 3645 25.9 2741 27.4 
West Bengal 2296 16.3 1649 16.5 
Madras 1263 9.0 970 4.7 
UP 1087 7.7 672 6.7 
Bihar 688 4.9 517 5.2 
Andhra Pradesh 487 3.5 332 3.3 
Mysore 420 3.0 327 3.3 
Source: Report of the Industrial Licensing Policy Inquiry Committee 1969, reported in 
Dasgupta (1998: Table 3) 
 
Table 9 Statewise Employment and Value Added 1959-1978 
 % of Total 
Employment 1959 
% of Total Value 
Added 1959 
% of Total 
Employment 1978 
% of Total Value 
Added 1978 
Maharashtra 21.2 26.6 17.8 25.0 
West Bengal 23.1 23.2 15.0 12.2 
Gujarat 10.3 9.7 8.3 10.0 
Source: Figures from Annual Survey of Industries, reported in Dasgupta (1998: Table 4 and 
Table 17). 
 
Table 10 Annual Growth Rates of Industry 1960-70 
 Basic Intermediate Capital Consumer 
Maharashtra 15.5 7.1 8.6 5.3 
West Bengal 0.9 3.8 1.2 2.3 
India 9.1 7.2 9.4 5.1 
Source: Based on Annual Survey of Industries, reported in Banerjee (1986: Table 2). In the 
Indian classification Basic Goods include the products of mining and quarrying industries, 
metals and chemicals and cement, Intermediate Products are products that are inputs into 
other industries, including yarns, jute sacking, tyres and leather.  
 
The deeper question is why political power was so fragmented in India that it was 
easy to protect individual interests and difficult to enforce rules in the collective 
interest. Here the social diversity, asset and income inequalities and the population 
density of the Indian subcontinent undoubtedly play an explanatory role, but so does 
the impact of colonial divide-and-rule strategies. Even without a colonial impact, 
Indian politics would undoubtedly be more complex than that of a relatively small 
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country like South Korea with a single language and no important religious conflicts. 
But the colonial impact on South Asia was to organize society along all its major 
cleavages. Upwardly mobile intermediate class activists could hope to capture rents 
for themselves by organizing new groups based on class, caste, religious or other 
identities. If the new mobilization proved useful to the Raj for balancing other groups 
or providing a new source of recruits for managing and administering Empire, the 
new group’s ‘demands’ would be accommodated. The result was an exceptionally 
high level of organizational development for ‘political’ groups of many different 
types. The presence of a large number of differentiated political organizations 
dramatically changed the potential power of business because political organizations 
needed cash and business needed champions. The very specific political settlement 
that independent India inherited from the British therefore had important implications 
for the effective enforcement of institutions that affected business interests. Individual 
businesses could easily purchase protection and this had seriously distortionary effects 
on the enforcement of rules that supported the collective interest.  
 
The nature of the Japanese impact on South Korea was important not because it 
decimated society and allowed the emergence of an authoritarian state, but rather 
because the Japanese did not need and therefore did not encourage the development of 
a large number of political organizations. This was to have significant effects of 
business bargaining power in the future. It is not easy to instantly create political 
organizations because there is a great deal of investment required to establish the 
patron-client networks through which such organizations operate to exercise their 
power. Individual South Korean businesses may have been desperate to have political 
champions with effective bargaining power when the industrial policy framework was 
being discussed and later implemented. But there were hardly any political 
organizations available that combined an ability to block other political leaders and if 
necessary the President at a price that business could afford. This was the source of 
the significant differences in the relative power of individual businesses in India (and 
the other countries of the Indian subcontinent) and South Korea (Khan 2000b).  
 
In the Indian subcontinent, institutions that threatened the interests of individual 
businesses could be blocked either at their inception, or later during their 
implementation. The political settlement operating through informal processes thus 
allowed a different set of formal institutions to emerge, and informal processes further 
ensured that their implementation and enforcement was partial. In contrast, the 
political settlement of South Korea, characterized by the absence of a large number of 
powerful political organizations and factions, enjoyed a very different outcome. The 
state found it much easier to institutionalize disciplining mechanisms that individual 
capitalists found hard to block, and subsequently the success of the state in effectively 
enforcing performance conditions could also not be easily blocked by the particular 
capitalists suffering disciplining.  
 
The interesting question is whether some other strategy may have been better for 
India given the specifics of the distribution of power across political organizations 
that it inherited. Nehru’s strategy was to construct the Congress as a centralized 
apparatus that could be used for enforcement. His desire for centralization led to the 
disaffection of the Muslim community in India who felt that the centralization of 
power in Delhi would make the important Muslim-majority provinces of Punjab and 
Bengal relatively powerless. Nehru’s unwillingness to concede any meaningful 
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devolution to the provinces contributed directly to the eventual partition of India and 
the emergence of Pakistan (Khan 2010b). But it was clear that despite being willing to 
pay a very high price, Nehru’s attempt at constructing a centralized Congress Party 
was doomed from the outset. The negotiations over industrial policy were just one 
manifestation of the limits of centralization given the distribution of organizational 
power in India. Ironically, the powerful business groups who were driving 
negotiations at the time also wanted to centralize planning at the centre and away 
from the provinces which had the jurisdiction to define industrial policy during British 
times. This was obviously because the powerful business houses wanted to dominate 
the entire country, and in this they were successful. For a time, the enormous 
legitimacy of the leaders of the independence movement allowed the Congress Party 
to retain a moderate level of internal cohesion by allowing internal rent allocation to 
different political leaders and factions proportionate to their importance within the 
party. But as time went on and new social groups, castes and regions began to 
mobilize in the 1960s, the centralized structure of the Congress Party faced growing 
stresses.  
 
It was in this context that Indira Gandhi eventually declared the Emergency in 1975 
that we referred to earlier and which marked the beginning of the end of the attempt to 
construct an inclusive and yet centrally controlled Congress Party. It is impossible to 
satisfactorily answer the counterfactual question: would India have been better off if 
this thirty year experiment with centralized political control not been attempted? It is 
possible to imagine both a better and a worse outcome. The worse outcome is the 
possibility that if concessions to political federalism and regional structures of 
planning had been conceded too early, India may have fragmented into a greater 
number of countries with consequences for violence and suffering. This would 
obviously be the response of supporters of Nehru and the Congress. But equally, if the 
federalism was moderated with central control over key aspects of integration like 
infrastructure, power and defence, an earlier devolution may have preserved India’s 
unity and allowed a more regionally equal development as alliances between local 
capitalists and politicians would have been easier. Nevertheless, the enforcement of 
industrial policy institutions may still have been far weaker than South Korea because 
regional capitalists would still be able to find champions amongst regional politicians.  
 
Another counterfactual is to ask if a narrower remit of industrial policy objectives, a 
smaller number of sectors, or a different set of instruments may have been more 
successful in terms of enforcement given the characteristics of the political settlement. 
Interestingly, some of the recommendations of the Dutt Committee were precisely to 
narrow the remit of industrial policy. It is very likely that a narrower remit would 
have been more effective. If the state’s industrial policy was focused on a regionally 
equitable infrastructure development programme combined with interventions to 
accelerate catching up in a very few sectors at a time, the outcome may have been far 
better. If the rents up for grabs at any moment were relatively limited, the attention of 
all the big business players would not have been attracted. If this was combined with a 
strategy of supporting middle sized firms and technologies where the number of 
players would be larger, this too could have reduced the ability of individual 
businesses to protect themselves through political alliances.  
 
Finally and before moving on to a discussion of the second liberalization we need to 
examine the question of growth and slowdown under dirigiste policies from the 
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perspective of this alternative political economy analysis. Neither Kohli nor Chibber 
offer an explanation for why growth accelerated and was initially quite high with all 
the limitations of the industrial policy regime, and then started to splutter in the mid-
1960s. The answer to this question is suggested by looking at the growth record in 
Pakistan which, despite its somewhat different strategy of protection, shows a similar 
pattern of initial growth and a slowdown in the 1960s. Like India, Pakistan too had a 
partial industrial policy regime where protection and support was offered to emerging 
capitalists but disciplining was low or non-existent. The theoretical expectation is that 
with this combination of incentives many new factories would be set up in protected 
sectors but productivity growth within each factory would be low as there would be 
limited incentives for managers to put in high levels of effort in raising productivity 
rapidly. In other words, we would expect to see rapid extensive or horizontal growth 
as capacity increased, but relatively low intensive growth, based on productivity 
growth or quality growth. This is exactly what the figures of high output growth and 
low productivity growth during this period confirm. 
 
But there are limits to growth based on an ever larger quantum of explicit and hidden 
subsidies being captured by a growing productive base that needs a subsidy for every 
unit of additional output. The limits to this growth strategy emerge when the growth 
of sectors is constrained by an absolute resource shortage that can in theory manifest 
itself in different ways. Foreign exchange or bank credit may begin to dry up if 
subsidies are largely granted through manipulating the exchange rate or interest rate. 
The ability to finance public sector losses may face fiscal constraints if subsidies are 
provided to the private sector by under-pricing public sector output particularly if the 
public sector is itself less than efficient. Slow productivity growth in the economy can 
limit the growth of domestic demand and constrain the growth of output from the 
demand side resulting in growing excess capacity. These symptoms did emerge in 
India and Pakistan in different combinations. In India fiscal constraints and excess 
capacity, in Pakistan a growing stress on bank balance sheets as non-performing loans 
increased. Both countries were also simultaneously hit by a parallel growth in the 
demand for rents coming from the mobilization of new political organizations and 
groups. This combination of rent demands coming from the failure of productivity 
growth to free up economic rents and growing demands for political-redistributive 
rents led to the political crisis of the 1970s. The similarity in the social organizations 
and patterns of social evolution of the political settlements in the two countries as well 
as their economic strategies of unconditional protection help to make sense of the 
surprising similarities in the timing of the economic slowdown and the types of 
political crisis they began to confront in the mid-1970s. 
 
The dirigiste period was nevertheless vitally important for understanding what 
happened next. While measures of productivity growth were low in aggregate, the 
long periods of learning-by-doing in a number of industries did create real capabilities 
over time. Even in the best performing firms and sectors these capabilities were for 
the most part not at the level where global competitiveness could be achieved, but 
they were significantly higher than the capabilities that existed in 1947. With support 
drying up because of the rent crisis there was a growing perception amongst 
businesses which had strong political links that they may do better in getting support 
outside the already creaking if not entirely defunct planning system. Breaking free of 
the formal planning system would also give some of them new opportunities for 
technology and financing partnerships with foreign capital. And some new capitalists 
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had emerged through trading and speculation largely outside the licensing system 
(like the Ambanis of Reliance) and these politically connected groups found it 
difficult to operate when many of their competitors enjoyed formal support in the 
form of licenses within the licensing system (Das Gupta 2007). This combination of 
incentives and calculations led to the growing calls from business for opening up, 
calls that their political allies would soon start taking up in earnest.  
 
5. The Second Liberalization and Capability Development after 1980  
The growth acceleration in the 1980s is both exciting and embarrassing for liberal 
economists. Exciting because it happened at a time when India was moving out of its 
planned economy, embarrassing because the growth happened before any formal 
liberalization took place. There has been an extensive debate in India about the causes 
of the growth acceleration. The problem was that the formal removal of rent-creating 
restrictions in the economy did not happen till the 1990s. Limited reforms began 
under Rajiv Gandhi in 1984 but it was mostly announcements of intentions with 
limited implementation. There was a reduction in marginal tax rates and a modest 
reduction in tariffs. But the duty collected as a share of import value actually 
increased from 30 to 45% in the 1980s. Formal licensing began this be removed 
slowly even though licensing was already ineffective in constraining investment 
decisions. By 1988 licensing was reduced from 77 to 27 industries but these 27 
industries constituted 60% of industry by value. This only began to come down in 
1991 after Prime Minister Rao began a more serious liberalization drive following the 
foreign exchange crisis of 1990.  
 
The foreign exchange crisis provided an excuse to the Congress Party leadership to 
carry out reforms that it was already minded to introduce (Jenkins 2000). Now the 
licensing system and the system of restrictions began to be wound down. The average 
tariff was reduced from 85% to 25%. The rupee was made increasingly convertible, 
allowing Indian firms to raise finance outside, and making foreign direct investments 
easier. A number of attempts have been made to make sense of the puzzle of growth 
preceding liberalization. Rodrik and Subramanian (2004, 2005) argue that the reforms 
of the 1980s triggered growth but they did so because they were pro-business rather 
than pro-market reforms, essentially signalling a shift in government ‘attitude’ rather 
than a shift in policy. This attitudinal shift was apparently significant enough to 
unleash the animal spirits of investors, and their investment drive spurred the growth 
acceleration. To make this claim more credible, they argue that India had a better set 
of good governance indicators than was warranted by its per capita income, a fact that 
was picked up by a negative coefficient for the India dummy in cross-country 
regressions of per capita income against governance indicators. In other words, India 
had unused growth potential that was lying dormant because investors lacked the 
confidence to invest. The pro-business announcements of Rajiv worked their magic 
by raising investor confidence, thereby driving the initial growth spurt. 
 
Rodrik and Subramaniam’s argument relies on the meaningfulness of growth 
regressions based and governance indicators. These regressions are suspect as the 
direction of causality cannot be established satisfactorily and the governance 
indicators suffer from significant variance and measurement errors (Khan 2005b, 
2007a, 2008). More plausible than untapped potential due to the governance 
environment is the possibility that entrepreneurial capacity developed during the 
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previous industrial policy was driving growth. Rodrik and Subramaniam refer to this 
when they point out that growth was driven by states where manufacturing sectors 
were already bigger. But their argument gets muddled because these states also tended 
to have Congress governments and they argue that because Congress was making the 
pro-business statements at the centre, confidence increased most in Congress-
governed states. A more likely possibility from a political economy perspective is that 
the good connections between big business and Congress politicians in more 
developed states was driving Congress politics towards opening up.  
 
A more convincing version of the pro-business shift argument comes from Kohli 
(2006a, 2006b). Here the focus is not just on an attitude shift in the 1980s but the 
actual emergence of pro-business policies. These are distinguished from liberalization 
policies because the latter are based on the absence of rents while pro-business 
policies are based on directing rents and resources towards existing businesses. In the 
1980s the government intervened to change laws that made it easier for business to 
raise money in the domestic capital market, the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade 
Practices Act was diluted to allow businesses to expand, and labour activism was 
restricted with laws that discouraged strikes. Kohli argues that within its limits the 
Indian state was now demonstrating aspects of a developmental state but his 
distinction of this from the ‘redistributive socialism’ of the previous period is not a 
satisfactory dichotomy. It flows from his earlier criticism of the dirigiste period as 
non-developmental in comparison to the South Korean state, an argument that we 
have discussed earlier. Despite these weaknesses the heterodox approaches of Rodrik 
and Subramaniam and Kohli establish that growth was associated not with 
liberalization but a series of more subtle changes.  
 
From our perspective the 1980s were associated with the evolution of a more explicit 
partnership between business interests and political allies. This transition did not 
mean the end of either redistributive rent creation for political clients of the political 
leaders nor did it end rent creation for business. The latter simply proceeded now on 
different principles. The mobilization and competition over redistributive rents 
steadily increased over this period resulting in a gradual increase in the intensity of 
political conflicts, political corruption and political violence across all South Asian 
countries. The eventual announcements of liberalization, for instance about removing 
licensing requirements, were in most cases a formal recognition of a reality where 
licensing had long since stopped being implementable. Hence it is not surprising that 
many of the effects of liberalization were observable long before the formal 
announcements, though the formal announcements did have additional effects in 
accelerating what was already happening.  
 
In contrast to these heterodox arguments, the mainstream consensus is that the 
acceleration in the 1980s actually began in earnest towards the end of the decade, that 
there was already some liberalization by that time, and that the growth spurt of the 
1980s would not have been sustained without the deeper liberalization of the 1990s 
(Panagariya 2004, 2005a; Virmani 2005; Kochchar, et al. 2006; Rajan 2006; Ahmed 
and Varshney 2008). The mainstream arguments are more concerned to fit the 
sequence of events into the expectations of the efficient market model. However, 
many mainstream economists also realize that liberalization would not have had any 
necessary positive effects if significant pockets of productive capabilities had not 
already emerged (Aghion, et al. 2005; Rodrik and Subramanian 2005; Kochchar, et al. 
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2006). However, the implications of the previous strategies of capacity development 
are often underestimated. It is clear that there is a strong relationship between the rent 
allocation strategies that created these pockets of capabilities and the success of the 
liberalization that followed. But if this is true, there are important implications for 
sustaining the growth that has been achieved over the three decades after 1980 and 
ensuring that this growth creates jobs for broader sections of the population and 
spreads to regions that have so far not participated in this growth.  
 
It is relevant that while the dominant entrepreneurs in every South Asian country had 
wanted protection and subsidies in the 1950s, by the late 1970s new classes of 
entrepreneurs had emerged who had accumulated enough and achieved sufficient 
productive capabilities to find the continuation of protection unnecessary and onerous. 
The regulatory structures were particularly onerous for productive entrepreneurs 
given the growing fragmentation of political clientelism in these countries and 
therefore the capture of more and more rents by all manner of unproductive coalitions. 
Thus, by the 1980s there were powerful coalitions of new capitalists in all these 
countries but particularly in India who were not only already operating outside the 
formal structures of rent creation that they no longer needed, but also felt positively 
hemmed in by rent-creating regulations that had become dysfunctional for them (Das 
Gupta 2007). These analysis allows us to explain why the sectors driving growth and 
the success of post-‘liberalization’ growth strategies have been very different across 
different parts of the Indian subcontinent and even within India. The specializations of 
regions after liberalization have been very strongly related to the prior development of 
technological and entrepreneurial capabilities and not very strongly related to the 
distribution of factor endowments as economic theory may have led us to expect.  
 
A number of features that we can observe in the growth stories in South Asia are 
consistent with an approach that focuses on the prior development of capabilities as a 
critical explanatory variable for the subsequent growth experience of the region. First, 
there are significant differences in growth rates across regions within the subcontinent 
and these differentials are widening, rapidly increasing the gap between richer and 
poorer regions and states. This is consistent with a capability approach because the 
development of capabilities in the period prior to liberalization was itself patchy and 
regionally concentrated. Governance capabilities in South Asia for growth-enhancing 
corrections to market failures were weak from the outset. Even before the 
liberalization of the 1980s, the biggest beneficiaries of rent-creation strategies to assist 
investment and capacity development were firms and entrepreneurs who had 
favourable political connections, were located in areas where the state was investing 
for political reasons, or who could leverage prior capabilities and capital.  
 
The link between capabilities and the regional and sectoral pattern of growth is 
however complex. Corporate conglomerates in India can obviously choose where they 
locate, particularly after the de-licensing of locational decisions. But the range of 
corporate capabilities and the labour skills they can draw on are limited. Therefore, 
with deregulation there was a considerable amount of relocation by corporates, 
typically favouring some southern and western states in India, but this was at the 
expense of the regions they moved out of or did not invest in. Many observers of this 
relocation (Besley and Burgess 2004; Aghion, et al. 2006) concluded that this was 
evidence of the importance of labour market regulations constraining manufacturing 
growth in India because the winners from deregulation were states with lower levels 
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of protection for labour. Even if this observation is true, the small differences in 
effective labour costs could hardly explain the huge gaps opening up in manufacturing 
growth across states. Moreover, the measurement of labour market restrictions by 
Besley and Burgess based on counting the number of pro-labour or anti-labour 
amendments to labour legislation in state legislatures is clearly very problematic 
(Bhattacharjea 2006). 
 
In contrast, a capabilities approach can explain the sectoral distribution of growth 
based on prior capabilities that were acquired in the past. The emerging 
specializations in countries like India have less to do with factor endowments and the 
efficient choice of technologies by markets. For instance, the importance of high 
value-adding services in India’s growth story is well known. The skills underpinning 
India’s excellent performance in global services were a by product of previous 
expenditures in technical education that were closely related to the broader context of 
technology and capability acquisition. Thus India’s most dramatic success stories 
could be said to be the direct result of ‘defective’ policies which created globally 
competitive capabilities in specific sectors (Basu 2003). In software, these defective 
policies included overinvesting in higher education and closing the economy to IBM 
and other multinationals in 1977, which allowed the development of skills in a public 
sector replacement to IBM. This public sector company, CMC, became an incubator 
of skills that later fed India’s software sector.  
 
Table 11 South Asian Growth Rates of Gross Domestic Product 1980-2003 
 1980-90 1990-2000 2000-03 
India Average  5.6 5.6 6.0 
Rich Indian States  5.7 5.8 5.9 
Poor Indian States 5.1 3.8 3.6 
Bangladesh  3.6 4.7 4.8 
Pakistan  6.1 3.7 3.3 
Source: EPW Research Foundation (2003, 2007), Ahmed and Varshney (2008: Table 3) 
Note: Rich Indian states in this table are Tamil Nadu, Gujarat, Haryana, Maharashtra and Punjab. Poor 
Indian states are Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan. Group growth rates for 
each period are weighed averages of state growth rates using state domestic products as weights. 
 
If growth in populous South Asian countries is driven by manufacturing and service 
sectors that one way or another were at or close to global competitiveness, this has 
important implications for the regional and sectoral patterns of growth. Not 
surprisingly, one of the features of this growth spurt across South Asia has been the 
rapid worsening of income distribution as growth accelerated, suggesting that growth 
was largely being driven by a relatively small number of individuals, regions and 
sectors that had the capability to benefit from market opportunities (ADB 2007a: 49-
59). These sectors greatly increased their incomes, leaving the rest rapidly behind. A 
striking demonstration of this is the growing gap in growth rates between rich and 
poor states in India. Table 11 shows the growth gap increased dramatically after 1980 
when growth began to be driven by firms and sectors already close to the frontier. In 
the 1990s poor Indian states performed worse than Bangladesh and only slightly 




Table 12 Divergence in South Asia 2000-2004 
Country  
Growth of Per Capita Income Per capita 
income in US$ 
2004/05 1980–90 1990–2000 2000–2004 
India National 
Average  3.3 4.1 4.4 653 
Rich Indian States 3.6 4.8 4.5 688 
Poor Indian states  2.6 1.8 1.8 280 
Bangladesh  2.2 2.7 3.7 436 
Sri Lanka  2.6 4.2 2.3 1031 
Pakistan  3.7 1.2 2.2 661 
Source: Purfield (2006: Table 2), ADB (2007a), (EPW Research Foundation 2003). Directorates of 
Economics and Statistics of Indian state governments, World Bank World Development Indicators.  
Note: Rich Indian states in this table are Tamil Nadu, Gujarat, Haryana, Maharashtra and Punjab. Poor 
Indian states are Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan. Indian data for first two 
periods are of 1981-91 and 1991-2001. Grouped per capita incomes are population weighted. The 
national per capita income for India reported by ADB and the World Bank appears to be somewhat 
greater than would be consistent with figures for state per capita incomes from state governments. 
 
The gap in living standards between rich and poor states is therefore also rapidly 
growing, in contrast to the expectation that market driven growth equalizes incomes 
in an integrated economic territory through the free movement of labour and capital. 
Studies of growth rates in rich versus poor states in India show that the divergence in 
their per capita incomes is steadily increasing (Sachs, et al. 2002). In 1970, the richest 
state in India had a per capita income around 3.4 times that of the poorest state. By 
2004 this ratio had grown to 4.5 and is growing all the time (Purfield 2006: 5). As 
Purfield (2006: 9) points out, India’s five poorest states account for 40 per cent of its 
population, while the five richest states are home to only a quarter of its population. If 
current trends in economic growth continue, as they are likely to in the absence of 
radically different economic strategies, political strains are likely to emerge between 
richer and poorer states over economic strategies, redistributive strategies, the use of 
tax revenues, and migration. 
 
Table 12 shows available data on per capita incomes and growth rates. This data is 
consistent with the data on aggregate GDP, showing that in the 1990s the dispersion 
of growth rates of per capita incomes within India was greater than the dispersion 
observed between the major countries of South Asia. It is important to remember that 
many low growth states within India like Bihar and Uttar Pradesh are the size of 
countries in their own right. Bangladesh, which is often considered to be a relatively 
poorly performing part of South Asia, was performing considerably better than some 
of the largest Indian states not only in terms of the level of per capita income but also 
in terms of the growth of per capita income in the 1990s and beyond. 
 
The rapid growth in the gap between rich and poor states within India is also shown 
graphically in Figure 1 for the 14 biggest states of India. The Gini coefficient is a 
measure of the degree of inequality in their per capita incomes. A higher value 
indicates more inequality. The figure shows graphically that the rapid growth in 
inequality appears to have begun in the 1980s at around the same time as the growth 
takeoff. These observations have policy significance from the perspective of current 
discussions about the types of economic integration that are appropriate for SAARC 
countries. Clearly being part of an integrated Indian union with ‘free trade’ as well as 
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formally unrestricted movement of labour did not ensure that high growth rates were 
spread evenly. Moreover, factor mobility and market forces did not ensure that these 
growth rates got equalized over time through the movement of labour and capital 
between states. If anything, Table 11 suggests that the gap in the growth rates between 
rich and poor Indian states has been widening over the 1990s.  
 
 
Figure 1 Degree of Interstate Inequality in India (14 Major States) 
Source: ADB (2007a: Table 5.4) based on Ahluwalia (2000: Table 3). 
 
The most serious implication of a capability driven approach to the analysis of growth 
is that it points out that for all its weaknesses some basic technological and 
entrepreneurial capabilities were developed during the dirigiste period. But these 
capabilities were developed in pockets and the number of beneficiaries given the size 
of the population was small. After liberalization these entrepreneurs have driven 
growth, drawing on pools of skills and capabilities in the labour market that were also 
the inherited human capital from the past. However, liberalization clearly did not 
result in the removal of all the relevant market failures. The entrepreneurs and regions 
driving growth had to develop new and evolving arrangements with politicians and 
bureaucrats to continue to address the market failures that affected them. The patterns 
of growth that ensued can be better understood by looking for these new and evolving 
arrangements and their implications.  
 
The fact that liberalization could not by itself remove potentially significant market 
failures that could slow down the acquisition and development of new skills has at 
least two types of implications. First, we would expect the ensuing growth to be 
driven by capabilities already developed, and therefore to be concentrated in regions, 
sectors and heavily dependent on high levels of human capital that relatively small 
sections of the population possess. But secondly, we would expect to see new and 
evolving strategies through which different pockets of growth deal with market 
failures. As a result, we would expect to see significant learning and skill 
development to be continuing within some of these pockets, particularly in firms with 
high technological capabilities and in firms with foreign technology partnerships. But 
we would expect the nature of this technology enhancement to benefit those who had 
already reached minimal levels of competitiveness and to be sensitive to the 
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continuing resolution of market failures through a variety of formal but now 
increasingly informal mechanisms.  
 
The implications of both sets of consequences are consistent with the observation that 
large sections of the population may have very slow benefits trickling down to them 
despite very high growth rates at an aggregate level. This proposition is supported by 
estimates for the persistence of poverty across the Indian subcontinent, even though 
absolute poverty may be declining through different trickle down mechanisms. The 
Arjun Sengupta Commission Report (National Commission for Enterprises in the 
Unorganized Sector 2007) outlined what researchers like Barbara Harriss-White 
(2003) had been saying for some time, namely that the informal/unorganized sector 
accounted for something like 92% of the Indian workforce. The commission also 
estimated that 77% of India’s workforce had a per capita daily consumption of less 
than 20 rupees (roughly 50 US cents). Clearly, the constraint on broad based growth 
in countries like India comes from the productivity of much of the workforce (and the 
market failures constraining improvements in this productivity) rather than the high 
costs of labour. Indeed, there are significant pockets of poverty even within high 
growth and high per capita income states like Maharashtra.  
 
Productivity Growth 
The growth acceleration of the 1980s was also associated with a productivity 
turnaround. Both the growth of labour productivity and of total factor productivity 
(TFP) displayed an improvement after 1980 compared to the previous decades. Table 
13 shows that most studies find roughly a 2 per cent increase in labour productivity 
growth and a 1.5 per cent increase in TFP growth rates after 1980. When labour 
productivity and even more so TFP growth rates are measured in a complex economy 
like India, changes in trends are likely to reflect the net effect of many different 
processes. Nevertheless, multiple concurrent measurements suggest significant 
changes in underlying processes in the Indian economy around 1980.  
 
Table 13 India’s Productivity Acceleration 
 
Sources: Acharya et al. (2003: Table 2.2), Bosworth et al. (2007: Table 3) and Virmani 
(2004b: Table 1) 
 
These observations are very likely to be the result of a combination of labour 
shakeouts in existing establishments (possibly rather limited), the closing down of 
some unprofitable companies, the relocation of some production to alternative 
locations to allow changes in factor proportions, improvements in X-efficiency in a 
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context of greater competition, better capacity utilization as a result of liberalized 
imports of spare parts and machinery, changes in product mixes, and the introduction 
and adoption of new and better technologies, sometimes through joint ventures and 
foreign direct investment. It is statistically very difficult to identify the importance of 
these various possibilities. Possibly all of these played a part to some extent. In our 
discussion of technology adoption we will see evidence of the last mechanism in 
operation after the 1980s. A number of sectors that were close to the global 
competitiveness frontier used rents in a more effective way to accelerate their 
transition to global competitiveness. They achieved this now because a) they had 
already moved close to the frontier despite the lack of hard compulsions in the past, 
simply through a long period of learning-by-doing and b) they now had strong 
internal compulsions to reach the frontier because the explicit support they could now 
negotiate using their political connections was unlikely to last forever. 
 
India also enjoyed a significant increase in FDI after liberalization. According to 
Reserve Bank of India figures, from a negligible base in 2000, FDI had increased to 
almost 20 billion dollars in 2007. At the same time, however, outward investment by 
Indian conglomerates like Tata also increased dramatically to over 11 billion dollars, 
implying a net inflow of around 10 billion dollars. Nevertheless, the potential benefits 
of FDI are not just net increases in investment, but also new technology acquisition 
that may not otherwise have happened. In 2007 A T Kearney’s business surveys 
ranked India second only after China as the most desirable location for FDI globally. 
What did this inflow indicate about Indian competitiveness and growth prospects?  
 
A number of studies on the effects of FDI in India support a capability-based analysis 
of the drivers of growth in post-liberalization developing countries. Siddhartan and 
Lal (2004) find that multinational investment had positive spillover effects on the 
value-added per unit labour cost in domestic firms, but only if the initial productivity 
gap between the domestic and foreign firms was small. Where the productivity gap 
was initially large, the value-added per unit labour cost of domestic firms either 
declined or did not increase in the presence of foreign investment. This is entirely 
consistent with our capability-based explanation of growth. Similar results are 
reported by Kathuria (2000) and Balasubramanyam and Mahambare (2003). These 
results are not at all surprising since we expect firms to absorb learning by observing 
and transacting with more advanced firms in their sector and then carrying out the 
appropriate investments in learning only if they already have significant technical and 
entrepreneurial capabilities. Balasubramanyam and Mahambare also point out that 
multinational investment in India has focused largely on sectors that already have 
significant technological capabilities, again as we would expect.  
 
Finally, although FDI in the late 1990s only accounted for 5% of gross domestic 
capital formation, the share of multinational affiliates in the sales of the organized 
private corporate sector in India is relatively high. At the end of the 1980s this share 
was estimated at around 23%. More recent estimates of the share of foreign affiliates 
over the period 1970-94 are between a third and a quarter of gross sales in India’s 
manufacturing sector (Balasubramanyam and Mahambare 2003: 51). The presence of 
multinational affiliates can be positive or negative for domestic capability 
development and much depends on the initial capabilities of domestic firms in the 




6. Catching up and Learning: An Analytical Model  
This section summarizes a model of learning and catching up developed in Khan 
(2009b) and applies it to understand the catching up process behind the success stories 
in India’s automobile and pharmaceutical sectors. The model enables us to capture the 
two stages in the transition to global competitiveness that characterizes India’s growth 
takeoff before and after 1980. The model and the two case studies show that a 
complex process of capability upgrading was involved in reaching the frontier. In the 
first phase ending in the 1980s, when licensing created targeted incentives for a wide 
range of firms in new sectors, basic productive and entrepreneurial capabilities were 
created through learning-by-doing. These capabilities did not exist in the pre-
intervention period, but the relatively low levels of effort put in by enterprises during 
this period meant that few firms or sectors approached very close to the frontier. In 
turn, this was related to the problems of enforcing discipline discussed earlier. After 
1980, the institutional framework and the political settlement in India both changed. 
The greater fragmentation of the ruling parties and the gradual emergence of coalition 
parties at the centre marked a transition from a dominant party system to competitive 
clientelism (Khan 2010a). The consequence of this was that the formal structure of 
industrial policy became even less credible and was eventually wound down. At the 
same time, the relatively high levels of productive capabilities in some sectors 
encouraged investors in these sectors to use their political links to solicit direct 
support. When support was forthcoming, this enabled a second phase of learning. This 
learning was more effective because some firms now had strong internal incentives to 
put in high levels of effort. Firms in a number of these sectors, like automobiles and 
pharmaceuticals succeeded in reaching the frontier through these strategies.  
 
First, we identify the contracting problem that intervention has to solve if the adoption 
of modern technologies is to be accelerated. Developing countries find it difficult to 
catch up despite their significantly low wages and large pools of underemployed 
labour, often with many unemployed workers having respectable levels of formal 
education. This paradox can be explained in terms of a simple catching up model. 
Competitiveness depends not just on wages but also on the productivity of labour, and 
its effectiveness in converting expensive (often imported) inputs into outputs. The 
productivity of labour and input use depend not just on the formal education of 
workers and managers, but more significantly on their tacit knowledge embodied in 
routines of production that can only be learnt through actual practice. Without periods 
spent in learning-by-doing, a developing country typically has productivity levels that 
are too low for it to competitively engage in production. This is even true for many 
relatively low quality and basic production processes. As a result, a new firm or even 
an entire country can find entry into even low-quality production blocked.  
 
Competitiveness depends on both price and quality. Developing countries are entering 
a global market where products have established price-quality combinations and for 
many products there are minimum product qualities below which it is not possible to 
find a market regardless of price. The simplest way to capture critical features of the 
problem is to define products as combinations of characteristics. Broad clusters of 
characteristics define a particular type of product, but any product also has detailed 
characteristics of reliability, performance, attractiveness, design and a range of other 
functions that can distinguish particular products within the broad group in terms of 
‘quality’ (Lancaster 1966; Sutton 2005, 2007). Products can therefore be indexed by 
quality, with higher quality cars (for instance) being (in general) more difficult and 
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more expensive to produce, but also attracting a higher price that is high enough to 
make it worthwhile for producers to always seek to improve product quality.  
 
Developing countries are generally not in the business of producing goods of higher 
quality than are being produced elsewhere. Developing new products is the process of 
product innovation that at best characterizes a small part of the productive sector even 
in middle income developing countries. Rather, their problem is to learn how to 
produce an increasing range chosen from the product qualities that already exist at a 
price that is equal to or lower than the ones already available. If it can produce an 
existing product of a particular quality at a price lower than that currently prevailing it 
has a chance of capturing markets from already established producers. At the very 
least, it has to be able to sell that product at the current global price for that quality. 
Lower quality products are generally easier to produce, but a minimum quality level 
usually exists for any product and if it fails to achieve this minimum quality, it will 
not be able to enter even with very low wages.  
 
Higher quality products have, by definition, a higher selling price, so in general they 
allow either a higher wage or a higher profit mark-up or both. Wage and profit growth 
is therefore likely to require movements up the quality ladder or shifting to other 
products where quality levels are higher. A further reason for aiming at higher quality 
is that lower quality products are or can become inferior goods and as world incomes 
increase, global consumers are likely to shift away from some goods of lower quality. 
Finally, lower quality products are more likely to be targeted as entry points by other 
poorer countries attempting to break into global production.  
 
The move up the technology ladder is not always a smooth and incremental process. 
Low and high quality products within the same product family are not necessarily 
closely linked technologically. A country that specializes in low quality garments or 
mid-technology motor cars is not necessarily in the same technological trajectory as 
other countries producing designer garments or hybrid ‘green’ cars. Moving up the 
quality ladder can therefore in some cases mean significant and discontinuous shifts in 
the technological trajectory from ‘mature’ to ‘evolving’ technologies that in turn has 
significant implications for future productivity growth and quality improvement 
potential (Perez and Soete 1988). The production of mature products only allows 
wage growth as long as improvements in labour and input productivity are taking the 
developing country towards the frontier established in more advanced countries. But 
sustained productivity growth is only likely in higher product qualities where 
innovations are still taking place in more advanced countries.  
 
It is therefore socially and privately desirable to produce the highest quality products 
that are feasible. Of course, for countries that do not yet have the technological 
capabilities to produce even basic lower quality products the challenge is to increase 
technological capabilities sufficiently to enter production at some acceptable level of 
quality. The catching up problem can therefore be defined as a) achieving the 
minimum quality that allows entry into globally competitive production for a variety 
of products even if the initial entry quality is low, b) spreading these basic 
manufacturing and productive capabilities broadly across the working population and 
c) systematically moving up the quality ladder across product categories. Many 
developing countries find it difficult to produce anything at a quality high enough to 
have a market, others produce a very limited range of items but of low quality and 
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find it difficult to move up the product and quality ladder, and the more advanced 
produce a range of products, some of higher quality, but face challenges in sustaining 
quality improvements and even more in entering into new products.  
 
To examine the implications of the quality and productivity problem in the simplest 
way, we use a simple mark-up pricing model that allows us to distinguish between the 
key variables that determine a country’s ability to produce competitive products. The 
current global price of a particular product of quality Q is set by its cost of production 

























= ∑ 1α  [1] 
 
To simplify the notation we do not denote products and the discussion at this stage 
refers to a particular product with varying quality indexed by Q, so Q+1 represents a 
higher quality of the product compared to Q. globalQP  is the international price of the 
product of quality Q. leaderQW is the wage level in the leading country in the industry 
producing the product of quality Q. leaderQΠ is the productivity of labour, measured by 
the output per person in this activity. There are also i other inputs used in the 
production of the product, and to simplify, we assume these inputs are globally traded, 
each with a global price of PQi. The efficiency with which inputs are used is measured 
by the productivity of input use (output per unit input). In the leader country, the input 
productivities of each of the i inputs are represented by leaderQiα . The price of the 
product is determined by the direct input costs per unit (of labour and the other i 
inputs) and the mark-up mQ.  
 
In the same way, the cost of production (in a common currency) in the developing 
























= ∑ 1α  [2] 
  
The developing country can only engage in market production if domesticQC ≤
global
QP . It 
may appear that it should easily be able to do this since its wage level is significantly 
lower: leaderQ
domestic
Q WW < . In fact generally it cannot break in because the developing 
country typically suffers from significant productivity disadvantages that more than 
negate its wage advantage. Output per person is generally lower, leaderQ
domestic
Q Π<Π , 
indeed so low that despite low wages, the developing country cannot enter the 
production of most products, particularly high quality products.  
 
In theory a low enough wage level could compensate for this, though in reality the 
required wage may be lower than is feasible even in the developing country. But 
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while a lower output per person could in theory be compensated by lower wages, low 
wages may even in theory be unable to compensate for a lower efficiency of input 
use. This is because inputs have a global price that has to be paid. If leaderQi
domestic
Qi αα < , 
and if we assume that both countries face the same globally traded input prices, PQi, 
differences in input efficiency can only be compensated by further falls in the 
domestic wage rate. In this case, a small efficiency disadvantage across a number of 
inputs could mean that even with zero wages, the cost of production in the developing 
country may be higher simply because of inefficient input use. In fact, the general 
problem of development is that the domestic cost of production of almost everything 
is higher than the globally competitive price so that globalQ
domestic
Q PC >  for most or even 
all products and product qualities.  
 
Why is developing country productivity so low? Output per person, QΠ , depends on 
both economy-wide and firm-level factors. Firm productivity can depend on public 
goods and utilities including the general level of education, infrastructure and the 
reliability of utility supplies. Firm productivity is also determined by firm-level 
variables like the capital equipment used by labour and the skill and experience of the 
workforce and management. In the same way, the efficiency of input use, Qiα  
depends on the same economy-level variables as well as firm-level variables like the 
type and sophistication of the capital equipment used and the skill and experience of 
the workforce using this equipment. The firm-level determinants of productivity 
describe the technological capability of the firm, its workers and its management. 
Understanding the factors that might determine technological capability is vital for 
understanding the catching-up problem faced by developing countries.  
 
If productivity were simply a function of the type of machinery used, developing 
countries could achieve global competitiveness by investing in the purchase of the 
appropriate machinery. This is why early development theory and practice put much 
emphasis on accumulation and machinery imports. We now know this is not sufficient 
and differences in labour and input productivity can persist even with identical 
machinery (Clark and Wolcott 2002; Sutton 2007). The effects of general 
infrastructural constraints on productivity are also well known. Developing countries 
have inadequate physical infrastructure and investments in education. But this is a 
chicken and egg problem because the resources for significant improvements in 
infrastructure or in utilities that enable reliable and competitively priced utility 
supplies can only come from sustained growth. In the meantime, significant shortfalls 
in infrastructural quality, education and in utility supplies are likely to persist. The 
only viable short term response is to provide temporary assistance to catching up 
sectors in the form of more focused infrastructure provision to industrial clusters 
and/or compensatory fiscal and other arrangements to offset their higher costs.  
 
While infrastructure constraints are widely recognized, the technological capabilities 
of workers and management are probably much more important in explaining why 
some countries take off when they do. The importance of technological capabilities as 
a constraint on technology acquisition is based on three interrelated observations. 
First, there is the observation that tacit knowledge is an important part of the skills and 
organizational capabilities that are necessary for the success of firms (Nelson and 
Winter 1982; Dosi 1988; Pelikan 1988; Perez and Soete 1988). Tacit knowledge is 
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knowledge that cannot be codified (Polanyi 1967). All human activity involves the 
use of a mix of formal or codifiable knowledge (knowledge that can be communicated 
in words or symbols) and a variable amount of uncodifiable ‘knowing-how-to’ 
knowledge that is embodied in unconscious and often complex routines. The process 
of learning these routines inevitably involves practice rather than simply someone 
explaining what to do or reading a manual. Buying the machines for a factory together 
with the operation manuals does not give the investor anything like the distribution of 
tacit knowledge across all segments of the firm required to achieve international 
competitiveness. Even relatively low-technology production of relatively low quality 
products like garments requires a huge amount of tacit knowledge embodied in 
hundreds of workers and managers if production is to proceed smoothly and 
effectively to produce internationally competitive products. The tacit knowledge 
involved in producing higher quality products is likely to be exponentially greater. 
 
Secondly and closely tied to the importance of tacit knowledge is the observation that 
learning-by-doing is critically important for acquiring tacit knowledge. This explains 
why developing countries can initially only achieve a level of productivity 
significantly lower than in more advanced countries. They also explain why the 
developing country can get stuck in a trap of low technology. Investments in new 
higher technology facilities would allow opportunities to engage in learning-by-doing 
that could eventually raise productivity enough to allow the competitive production of 
products adding greater value. But these investments will not be undertaken if 
entrepreneurs believe that at current levels of productivity the investment would not 
be competitive. In turn, the failure to invest prevents the acquisition of experience that 
may have raised productivity over time. This learning trap can only be feasibly 
overcome if production can be initiated through a period of ‘loss financing’. The 
question then becomes: why do private investors fail to treat this temporary loss 
financing as part of the overall investment cost of the project? 
 
This takes us to our third and final observation. Since the private financing of these 
loss-making periods is not sufficiently widespread, there must be significant market 
failures constraining the financing of learning. By market failures we refer to 
contracting failures that result in a failure to capture achievable improvements in net 
social benefits. If the financing of learning-by-doing would allow the firm and the 
country to achieve higher levels of wages and profits, the failure of private contracting 
to achieve this financing is by definition a market failure. The policy response 
depends on the type of contracting problem or market failure that we think is 
constraining investment in loss-financing the learning-by-doing period.  
 
The loss-financing required is described by considering a developing country facing a 




Q PC > . The loss financing that would allow production (and learning-by-
doing) to commence can be measured as a per unit ‘subsidy’, sQ, which brings the 
domestic cost of production domesticQC  into line with the global price 
global
QP . The 
‘subsidy’ is not necessarily a transfer from government and could be private loss 
financing in the form of investors accepting a lower mark-up or putting in additional 
cash to cover a period of loss-making. A public subsidy can also be delivered in a 
variety of ways, some explicit, others more subtle. The possibilities include export 
subsidies, import protection, subsidized interest rates, subsidized inputs or 
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infrastructure, or a cash subsidy. Contribution to loss-financing could also take the 
form of prioritized public spending on certain types of education or skills, or they may 
be implicit in the locational and pricing decisions of public infrastructure providers 
that reduce the costs of production of industries involved in learning. Thus a variety 
of loss financing schemes may enable learning-by-doing to commence, and in general 
we can describe these as providing ‘rents for learning’ (Khan 2000a).  
 
The essential features of the problem can be shown by focusing on the situation where 
the domestic firm can produce products of quality Q, but at a higher cost than the 
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Not surprisingly, the required rate of subsidy declines if the global price rises, or if 
domestic labour productivity or input productivity rise. It follows that the faster 
domestic labour and input productivity grows, the sooner the subsidy can be removed. 
The subsidy per unit required for entering production is also likely to differ depending 
on the quality level the developing country initially aims for. Lower and higher 
quality versions of the same product are indexed by Q and Q+1. Using [3], the per 






























Under plausible assumptions it is likely that sQ+1 > sQ implying that the rate of loss 
financing required for entering higher quality products is in general higher than that 
required for entering the production of lower quality products. The plausible 
assumption is that the productivity gap between the advanced country and the 
developing country is greater in the higher quality product than in the lower quality 
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product. Both the gap in labour productivity and gaps in input productivities are likely 
to be greater in higher quality products because the latter typically require greater 
labour skills and more sophisticated management of inputs. A greater labour and input 
productivity gap between the two countries in quality Q+1 compared to quality Q can 



































1  [7] 
  
Equations [1] and [2] show that costs of production in both countries are inversely 
proportional to productivities of labour and inputs in the respective countries. All i 
inputs may not be used in the production of both qualities of the product, but if some 


















1  [8] 
  
The inequality in [8] says that the cost of production in the developing country is 
greater (relative to the global price) for the higher quality product compared to the 
lower quality product. Using inequality [8] and comparing equations [5] and [6] it 
follows that a greater subsidy per unit will be required to achieve competitiveness in 
the higher quality product compared to the lower quality product. 
 
QQ ss >+1  [9] 
  
These results suggest two propositions. 
 
Proposition 1. The subsidy (loss-financing) required to enter production is in general 
higher the higher the quality of the product.  
 
Proposition 2. By moving down the quality ladder, it may be possible to find a product 
quality for which no subsidy is required, but this is not assured. 
 
A further proposition follows from the observations of technology trajectories in 
developing countries. Economics textbooks often show innovation and technical 
progress as the outward shift of the production function that a country faces. In 
reality, this is very misleading because improvements in technological capabilities are 
likely to be very localized to the learning and innovation that happens around specific 
technologies (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1969; Stiglitz 1987). As a result, the learning-by-
doing that results in productivity growth is likely to benefit technologies that are 
directly involved in the learning-by-doing and very closely associated technologies, 
rather than raising productivity across all technologies in use in the country. Learning-
by-doing in the motor car industry is likely to raise productivity there but is unlikely 
to have any effect on the productivity in the garment industry, let alone in agriculture. 
Thus, rather than the smooth improvement of productivities across the board over 
time that is suggested by an outward shift of a ‘production function’, we are likely to 
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see ‘bumpy’ improvements in productivity clustered around technologies that are 
actually being adopted and where learning-by-doing is successfully happening.  
 
Proposition 3. Potential productivity growth is likely to be localized around products 
and technologies involved in learning-by-doing, and productivity growth is likely to 
be higher in higher quality products that are likely to benefit from further innovation. 
 
We draw on these three propositions to construct Figure 2 which summarizes some of 
the fundamental issues facing catching up and technology acquisition in developing 
countries. The issues are presented in the figure in terms of ‘capability curves’ facing 
different developing countries across qualities of a particular product. However, the 
issues are of general applicability for understanding choices between sectors and 
technologies. The x-axis measures the quality of the product, and the y-axis the 
degree of competitiveness in producing that quality. Competitiveness in different 
qualities depends on the technological capabilities of firms in the country, and is 






. The higher this ratio, the more competitive the 
developing country, and when the ratio is equal to 1, it can competitively sell in 
global markets.  
 
 
Figure 2 Loss Financing and Learning-by-doing  
 
When the competitiveness ratio is less than 1, the developing country will either not 
enter production or will require (temporary) loss-financing from some source to allow 






−1  in eq. 
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[5], and is shown in Figure 2 as the gap between the unit competitiveness line and 
current competitiveness defined by the current technological capability curve.  
 
From proposition 1 we know that competitiveness is likely to be lower for higher 
quality products so the curve of current capabilities is likely to be downward sloping. 
The greater productivity gap in higher qualities will force market-reliant developing 
countries to specialize in low quality products. This may have nothing to do with the 
relative price of labour and capital as in standard neoclassical theory. While we have 
developed this argument for products with the same characteristics but of different 
‘qualities’ the capability curve can also be used to understand a range of related 
problems. For instance, we could see different ‘qualities’ as components of the same 
product in a vertically organized value chain. Low qualities would in this case be low 
value-added parts of the value chain (like packing and assembling), medium qualities 
would be producing the intermediate products going into the assembly and the higher 
qualities would be the design, product development and marketing parts of the value 
chain. In exactly the same way, the global ‘price’ of the low value added activities 
would be lower, and they would very likely be activities which require less tacit and 
formal knowledge and are therefore open to greater competition and lower mark-ups. 
To enter production at any point of the value chain a developing country would have 
to achieve a ‘competitiveness ratio’ of at least 1, so that its cost of production was no 
higher than the globally competitive level set by the global leader. At an even more 
general level, we could use the capability curve to think about choices across all 
products ranked by technological sophistication or ‘quality’.  
 
Consistent with proposition 2, it is easy to imagine a developing country like B in 
Figure 2 where current capabilities are so low that it cannot even produce the lowest 
quality of this product, and indeed may not find any globally traded products that it 
can competitively produce. Country B needs loss-financing of sBQ1 from the outset to 
even begin production of quality Q1 at point U. Higher capability countries (like A) 
may be able to competitively produce some lower quality products like Q1 at point V, 
without any loss-financing. But movements up the technology and quality ladder may 
again require loss-financing. If country A wants to begin production of quality Q2 at 
X, it will require temporary loss-financing of sAQ2. If the competitiveness measure 
became more than 1, the developing country could either earn a rent (a mark-up 
higher than mQ) by selling at the global price or it could bid down the global price in 
these qualities to below a price acceptable to the leader, thereby displacing the leader 
from these segments of the market and capturing much larger sales volumes. If the 
latter is the more profitable option, the developing country becomes one of the leaders 
for that quality and the global price is eventually defined by the cost of production 
and market power of the new leader.  
 
Finally, proposition 3 tells us that even if a competitive quality level exists, there is a 
further policy issue to be considered. If technological trajectories are localized around 
particular qualities and technologies, catching up can require programmes of 
assistance to improve quality to the points where innovation is happening faster in 
more advanced countries. In Figure 2 the potential productivity growth at quality Q1 is 
relatively low because the technology is already mature and no further product and 
process innovations are likely at this quality level. The challenge for country B is to 
go from point U to point V. While country A can produce unaided at V, progress up 
the productivity ladder at this quality may be limited to W. Thus, even for country A, 
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there may be a policy justification to assist learning-by-doing around quality Q2 by 
organizing temporary loss-financing of sAQ2. The challenge for A would be to go from 
point X to point Y to achieve competitiveness. The product and process innovations at 
this quality could take it to point Z over time.  
 
But if temporary loss-financing can always induce more rapid moves up the 
productivity and quality ladder, how high should a country aim in terms of its entry 
quality for a product? Proposition 1 tells us that given existing capabilities, the higher 
the quality level that the country tries to achieve, the greater the financing cost 
measured by sQ. Moreover, the greater the gap with leading countries at that quality, 
the longer is the catching up likely to take to reach break-even levels of 
competitiveness. As a result, trying to aim too high may involve excessively long 
periods of subsidy. Moreover, the competitiveness gap is only partially due to the 
absence of tacit knowledge. Some of the gap is also due levels of formal education 
and skills. If the initial gap is too big no amount of firm-level experience and 
learning-by-doing is likely to remove it entirely. As both the social time preference 
and the cost of finance in poor countries are likely to be high, there is a limit to how 
high up the quality ladder it is feasible to go. Moreover, the limited evidence of 
private investments in learning-by-doing suggests that market failures must be 
significant in preventing these investments.  
 
The private calculation would be of the following type. The private investor compares 







 >1 after n years. In principle a competitiveness ratio greater than one can 
be achieved through productivity growth towards the advanced country simply 
because the developing country wage level is significantly lower. As soon as these 
levels of productivity are achieved (by assumption after n years), the developing 
country can achieve a rent in the form of a higher mark-up of mQ' > mQ if it sells at the 
price set by the global leader. The firm also has an expectation that the rent mQ' – mQ 
will last for x years. Then the magnitudes of sQ, n, mQ' – mQ, x, and the discount rate 
or cost of finance of the entrepreneur will determine whether the investment in 
learning-by-doing is privately profitable. Both sQ and n are likely to be lower if the 
product quality aimed for is close to the capabilities that already exist in the firm. 
Given the vast pools of cheap underemployed labour in developing countries, 
including workers with formal education at different levels, and with an array of 
technologies freely available at low to medium quality levels, we would expect a wide 
range of sectors and product qualities where investments in learning-by-doing by 
private entrepreneurs should be profitable. But in fact we see very little private 
investment in learning-by-doing in developing countries.  
 
This suggests that the market failures that prevent private investors from contracting 
to achieve these investments may be important. In many developing countries it may 
appear that finance is not available for financing learning in the way we have 
described, but this may be because entrepreneurs do not believe that they can actually 
achieve the profits that are potentially available. Since the gains from successful 
catching up are potentially great, if these market failures could have been addressed, 
private financing alone may have allowed a significant increase in investments in 
learning. Thus, instead of attempting greater precision in determining the appropriate 
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level of investment, it may be more appropriate to focus on the governance 
capabilities that may allow the country to address these market failures. In either case, 
a greater range of learning-by-doing could then be profitably financed.  
 
Market Failures and the Need for Policy  
The temporary loss-financing required to acquire vital skills and capabilities 
necessary for global competitiveness is no different from any other investment 
required to increase future profitability. If these investments are not forthcoming, 
there are likely to be specific contracting problems preventing the investments, which 
we define as ‘market failures’. There are a number of possible market failures 
identified in the literature. These include the institutional difficulty of ensuring high 
levels of effort when learning is being subsidized, several different types of 
appropriability problems limiting the future profits of investors in the presence of 
externalities and the costs of coordinating complementary investments across sectors. 
In principle, several different market failures may be operating simultaneously, 
constraining investment in learning and technology acquisition, but some may be 
more important than others. Moreover, the governance requirements of addressing 
different market failures may be markedly different. If an important market failure 
cannot be addressed with existing governance capabilities, attempts to address parts of 
the problem are likely to result in unsatisfactory results. One reason why policies 
supporting learning and technology acquisition in the past often yielded poor results is 
that important sources of market failures were not properly understood. As a result, 
governance capabilities that were necessary to address them were not adequately 
developed.  
 
Our use of the term ‘market failure’ simply refers to a variety of reasons why 
voluntary private contracting can fail to exploit opportunities for increasing collective 
welfare. In using this terminology we do not presume that private contracting could 
have captured all these opportunities in a real market. For many market failures there 
is no feasible way in which private contracting could capture these potential gains, so 
some areas of necessary intervention remain even in societies where markets are very 
efficient. Nor do we use the general equilibrium benchmark as indicative of what 
markets could in theory achieve. If market failure is defined as a deviation from a 
welfare-maximizing general equilibrium, the usefulness of the concept can be 
justifiably questioned (Nelson 2008). Thinking of real economies as deviations from a 
general equilibrium can hinder rather than help the identification of policy because 
general equilibrium is not an achievable target and markets are systematically in 
disequilibrium (Scitovsky 1954; Kaldor 1972; Arndt 1988; Stiglitz 1996). Instead our 
definition of market failures simply refers to pragmatically identified potential 
improvement in net social benefits that are not being achieved because of various 
failures of contracting.  
 
If private investors are failing to invest in profitable opportunities, either they do not 
have good information or (more likely) enforcement agencies are weak and investors 
do not believe that their potential future profits will actually be realized. For instance, 
investments in learning require credible performance conditions agreed with the firm 
so that managers and workers put in high levels of effort. If the enforcement of these 
contracts is weak, discipline cannot be imposed on the firm and investors may lose 
their money simply because the firm could not be bothered. The existence of market 
failures can provide a justification for intervention (for instance in the form of public 
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financing of learning) but parallel governance capabilities are required to ensure that 
these interventions add net value. Without appropriate governance arrangements the 
intervention could result in an even worse outcome associated with governance 
failure. For instance, public resources could be spent and the technology could fail to 
be adopted. Governance failures are defined as government actions or inactions that 
reduce (or fail to raise) net social benefits (Krueger 1974; Toye 1987; Krueger 1990).  
 
 
Figure 3 Market Failures in Learning: Implications for Governance Capabilities  
 
The likely source of the government failure will depend on what was causing the 
market failure in the first place. For instance, if the market failure was primarily 
caused by the difficulty of compelling effort on the part of workers and managers, the 
reduction of government failure would have to ensure that the effort is forthcoming if 
learning is financed by public funding. In contrast, if the market failure was caused by 
a failure of the private sector to coordinate investments across complementary sectors, 
public policy would require governance capabilities for effective coordination of 
investments. Identifying the most important sources of market failures is therefore a 
critical part of developing appropriate growth-enhancing capabilities to ensure that 
public policy is effective and the possibility of government failure is minimized.  
 
Figure 3 outlines a number of critical market failures affecting learning and 
technology acquisition in developing countries. Most have been discussed extensively 
in the literature but the governance capabilities required to address each of them have 
not received sufficient attention. The market failures and governance requirements are 
discussed in full in Khan (2009b). In particular, we argue that an important cause of 
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inadequate investment in learning-by-doing comes from institutional failures to 
enforce effort and these can result in the failure of both public and private investments 
in new sectors. Without a strategy for enforcing effort, attempts to address other 
market failures are very likely to fail because missing tacit knowledge is a 
fundamental constraint that affects all modern activities in developing countries. One 
of the weaknesses of learning and technology policies in the past was that the full 
range of problems causing potential market failures were often not identified, so the 
most critical governance capabilities could not be identified.  
 
Institutional Problems of Ensuring Effort in Learning  
Effective learning clearly requires time, but it also requires significant effort if it is to 
be successful. Time and effort are inversely related: the lower the effort, the longer 
the learning takes. Since learning has to be financed, this has obvious implications for 
the investors financing learning, whether public or private. Thus, in Figure 2 firms in 
country B may not be able to begin production at point U without loss-financing, but 
the question from the perspective of the feasibility of the financing is how long the 
firm will take to go from U to V, or even whether V will ever be reached. The policy 
responses to all the other market failures discussed earlier assume that the problem of 
ensuring high levels of effort in the learning process has been solved. Otherwise 
individual firms will fail to raise their productivity and even if all the other market 
failures are addressed, the overall policy will fail. Unfortunately, disciplining is one of 
the most difficult problems to solve. Without appropriate incentives and compulsions, 
a production team can keep on repeating procedures without any improvement in its 
productivity. The ‘learning’ process can then continue indefinitely, as all countries 
with infant industries that refused to grow up have discovered. If the public or private 
principals who are thinking of investing suspect this in advance, they will not invest 
in the first place.  
 
The object of learning is to reach the breakeven point of competitiveness where loss-
financing is no longer required. If we define this length of time as the break-even 
time, Bt, we can see that this plausibly depends on a number of obvious variables. 
First, it must depend on the initial gap between the country and the global leader 
which we can measure by the initial competitiveness ratio. The gap between the actual 
competitiveness ratio and the competitiveness that is required to match the leader is 
measured by the loss-financing or subsidy sQ required to enter production at that level 
of quality. The greater the initial gap, the longer it will take to catch up and break 
even. The second variable determining the break-even time is most important for our 
analysis, and that is the level of effort the participants in the production process put in. 
Whatever the initial gap, a higher effort is likely to result in faster convergence 
towards the global standard. Effort can be measured by the intensity of application of 
workers and managers to continually improve productivity. This can be observed 
along various dimensions including the rate at which managers and workers 
experiment and adapt production processes to achieve improvements in productivity. 
As effort imposes costs on individuals and can also create differentiation between the 
more and less able, particularly at the level of management and supervision, higher 
levels of effort are more difficult to achieve, everything else being the same.   
 
Finally, the breakeven period can also depend on country and firm specific factors. 
Country specific factors refer to general levels of education, exposure to technology, 
prior history of production, infrastructural quality and so on. If a country is 
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significantly behind the technological capability required to produce a product of a 
particular quality, it may fail to approach required levels of competitiveness within 
any feasible time period. Firm level factors refer to idiosyncratic differences in the 
quality of entrepreneurship, the quality of technicians and managers inherited by a 
firm and so on. These variables are summarized in eq. [10]: 
 
( )FCesfB Qt ,,,=  [10] 
  
The break-even period Bt is likely to be longer the higher the initial gap in 
competitiveness measured by sQ, the lower the level of effort, e, and also on C and F, 
which describe country-specific and firm-specific factors respectively.  
 
 
Figure 4 Effort Levels and the Viability of the Learning Process  
 
Figure 4 focuses on the key role of differences in the level of effort keeping all other 
determinants constant, and focusing on catching up in the production of a specific 
product of quality Q. The figure tracks the achievement of competitiveness over time. 
Compared to Figure 2, the critical question we are now asking is the following: if 
country A began at point X, how long will it take to reach Y, or will it reach Y at all? 
The idea is that with any given level of loss-financing, the pace of achieving 
improvements in labour and input productivity, and therefore in achieving 
international competitiveness, depends on the level of effort put into learning. To 
simplify, we distinguish between two levels of effort, defined as high and low. 
 
At time t=1 country A’s competitiveness is too low for it to enter production at quality 
Q without loss-financing from some source. The initial loss finance is shown as sQ in 
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Figure 4, which allows the country to begin production and initiate the learning-by-
doing process. If effort levels are high, the breakeven period Bt = n periods. At that 
point, loss financing can be abandoned and indeed the country may even be in a 
position to earn rents in subsequent periods. Note that the firm will just have 
substituted market profits earned with effort for a subsidy that came for free. It is this 
incentive incompatibility that requires some form of external enforcement or 
disciplining for financing to work in these contexts. In contrast, if effort levels are 
low, international competitiveness may not be achieved even if there are some initial 
improvements in productivity. In the low effort scenario shown in Figure 4 Bt = ∞, 
which means convergence does not happen. After k periods a steady-state subsidy of 
sQL emerges which is indefinitely required for production to continue. Note that 
productivity growth is also happening in the leader country, so a constant sQL may 
emerge even with some domestic productivity growth. This is equivalent to the case 
of infant industries that failed to grow up. Eventually, loss-financed learning in these 
circumstances is very likely to be abandoned because the social cost grows over time. 
 
Clearly, financiers of learning would like the highest level of effort to be forthcoming 
so that not only is there convergence but also convergence in the shortest possible 
time. In contrast, workers and managers engaged in learning may have mixed 
motives. They may understand that jobs and perhaps income growth may eventually 
depend on productivity growth. But since learning is costly in terms of effort and may 
result in adverse outcomes for individuals who fail, workers and managers have an 
individual interest to free ride on the effort of others, which can lead them to distort 
true information about their own levels of effort. They may often also articulate a 
collective interest to pursue a less traumatic learning path without recognizing its 
long-run non-viability. These individual or collective strategies can extend the period 
of loss-financing much beyond what is acceptable to public or private financiers. In 
extreme cases, such as the low effort trajectory shown in Figure 4, the result may be 
that financiers are stuck in a situation of permanent loss-making and the project has to 
be eventually abandoned with significant losses. Alternatively, financiers may suspect 
that this will be the case and the investment will not be forthcoming in the first place. 
 
Since in the long run it is plausible to argue that high levels of effort would have 
potentially benefited all participants and society, there is a market failure here that can 
be described as a failure of credible ‘contracting’ between investors and the firm 
engaged in learning. The problem is therefore not one of an inadequate rule of law 
and the insufficient enforcement of formal contracts in courts, but broader political 
economy issues of achieving sufficiently high levels of compulsion for different sets 
of agents who are required to put in high levels of effort. The underlying institutional 
failure here is very similar to principal-agent problems that can in general result in 
breakdowns in team effort and in credit markets result in inadequate investment 
(Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Shleifer and Vishny 1997). 
However, the specific problems here refer to a much wider range of issues than the 
asymmetric information literature on monitoring or credit market failures normally 
addresses. In particular, we want to highlight the issues of enforcing discipline on the 
recipients of support in the context of particular political settlements. The broad 
‘variables’ that are likely to affect the level of effort are listed in eq. [11]:  
 




Effort e is defined as the intensity with which learning is carried out. The higher the 
level of effort, the faster the movement up the competitiveness ladder, as Figure 4 
shows. FI is the specific financing instrument through which the learning is being 
financed. Different financing instruments have design features that aim to compel 
high levels of effort through different mechanisms. We can think of financial 
instruments as ‘rules’ that define who contributes what and what the expectations are. 
GA are the governance agencies of different capability that monitor and enforce the 
financing instrument. The enforcement of the rules implicit in each instrument can 
vary widely depending on the formal and informal enforcement capabilities of the 
agencies responsible for enforcement. FS is the firm structure within which learning 
is being organized, referring to relevant characteristics of the firm(s) including size, 
age and internal organization, and the type of market in which it operates. PS is the 
political settlement which describes the bargaining power of the different types of 
agents involved in financing and participating in the learning process. The function f 
allows interactions between these variables so that the effect of any variable can 
depend on the ‘value’ of the other variables in a non-linear way. We first discuss the 
variables to see some of the interdependencies between them and then discuss the 
consequences of these non-linear relationships for learning and technology policy in 
the next section.  
 
Financing Instruments 
Learning can be financed through a wide range of arrangements that can be described 
as financing instruments. Each instrument implicitly defines rules of contribution and 
reward and therefore the incentives and responsibilities of the different participants in 
the learning process. Effort is likely to be maximized if the individuals putting in the 
effort gain significantly from their effort or suffer potential losses if they fail to put in 
effort. But effort will only be financed if the financiers also get a return. In team 
production where large numbers of people have to cooperate, sustaining high levels of 
effort is a challenge. Supervision and coordination at different levels become 
important because individuals can attempt to conceal their true levels of effort. 
Sustaining effort may now require supervision and incentives for those supervising 
the effort for instance by making them ‘residual claimants’ (Alchian and Demsetz 
1972). But even this may not be sufficient unless the residual claimants also have the 
effective authority to impose discipline on team members. The residual claimant 
model describes in a partial way the basic ‘capitalist’ firm and its underlying property 
rights. It is partial because it underplays the significance of the political power that 
gives owners the effective authority to carry out disciplining functions.  
 
In early developers, compulsions for high levels of effort and labour discipline were 
based on a configuration of property rights described as ‘capitalist’. Capitalist rights 
define a class of asset owners (residual claimants) and a class of property-less workers 
who are compelled to accept workplace discipline. This configuration of property 
rights was sufficient to ensure productivity growth in early developers who could 
grow through incremental innovations in products and processes. As technology 
leaders, the early capitalist developers had to innovate, but they did not have to 





The learning requirements of contemporary (late) development are different. Firms do 
not have to innovate to the same extent, but are faced with a massive gap between 
their initial technological capabilities and the minimum required to produce anything 
in global competition. An important consequence of the catching up problem is that 
‘capitalist’ property rights are no longer sufficient for ensuring effort. Contemporary 
late developers need to organize and finance learning-by-doing to learn to use 
technologies far in advance of their existing capabilities. This now requires loss 
financing for entry into new sectors and technologies, and often requires financing by 
outside investors including the state. More complex financing instruments and 
complementary governance structures need to emerge at a much earlier stage of 
development. It also follows that more complex systems of incentives and 
compulsions to ensure effort are also required at a much earlier stage. 
 
In theory, learning could still be financed by owner-entrepreneurs investing in their 
own firm. For instance, an owner-entrepreneur can accept a longer period of losses to 
set up in a higher quality sector. This is no different from any other investment, where 
the entrepreneur accepts temporarily low profits to achieve higher profits later. The 
only difference is that here the investment is in the acquisition of tacit knowledge. As 
the owner is the residual claimant, there are strong incentives to monitor effort to 
reduce the period of loss-making. This case is closest to the simple capitalist firm with 
its strong incentives and compulsions for sustaining effort. Whether high levels of 
effort can be sustained in this case is likely to depend on exogenous political factors 
that determine the extent to which owners can enforce discipline on their workforce, 
and social and political factors determining collective discipline, cooperation and trust 
(Leibenstein 1982).  
 
But owner-financed learning is likely to be relatively rare given the long periods of 
learning required and the uncertainty of ensuring effort in new products. The typical 
developing country entrepreneur lacks technological capabilities and the learning 
process therefore involves learning-by-doing by the entrepreneur. There is therefore a 
high degree of uncertainty in the success of the enterprise and in most cases the risk-
return profile is too adverse to attract the sole investor. There is also likely to be a 
significant gap between the resource base of the typical entrepreneur in a developing 
country and the investments required to acquire machinery and finance periods of 
loss-making of uncertain length. The risks and the financing may both be beyond the 
capacities of most individuals attempting to become entrepreneurs in a developing 
country. Therefore successful development is likely to be associated with more 
complex ‘financing instruments’ where the entrepreneur does not directly provide the 
entire finance but raises it in different ways.  
 
If the entrepreneur borrows from a bank with debt backed by collateral, the incentives 
could be quite similar to the first case. If the bank has the power to sell collateral in 
case of non-performance, the entrepreneur bears all the risk of learning. For large 
investments or new technologies, where there is a chance of failure despite the best 
effort of the entrepreneur, investment on these terms is unlikely. But banks in many 
developing countries are unlikely to have effective powers to realize collateral and the 
weak compulsions on the entrepreneur can result in low effort and potential losses for 
banks. If banks know this, they in turn may be unlikely to lend for new technologies 
or to new entrepreneurs. If the financing comes from equity investors or other 
investors outside the firm, standard principal-agent problems emerge. Will the 
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manager put in sufficient effort; will workers accept the discipline that managers try 
to impose on them under these circumstances?  
 
More complex issues arise when financing comes from the state. This can take 
various instrumental forms, ranging from tax breaks, low interest credit, subsidized 
inputs, subsidized utilities or infrastructure, export subsidies, or the protection of 
domestic markets. In theory, it should be possible to devise financing instruments that 
allow periods of learning to be financed with strong compulsions for rapid 
productivity growth. For instance, the instrument could be designed to progressively 
increase exposure to competitive international prices by announcing ex ante the rate at 
which the level of export subsidy or the level of protection of domestic markets will 
be reduced.  
 
Governance Agencies 
A financing instrument may make sense on paper in terms of compelling an 
appropriate level of discipline on the firm, but it requires monitoring and enforcement 
by governance agencies. The capabilities of agencies like central banks or planning 
commissions charged with monitoring and implementing particular programmes are 
therefore important, though these capabilities are not necessarily independent of the 
other variables. For instance, the announcement that export subsidies will be reduced 
over time is only credible if the agency responsible can actually do it without pressure 
from firms to change this policy in the future. The governance agency that is relevant 
depends on the financing instrument. For instance, if loss-financing is based on credit 
from industrial banks, the relevant agencies are the banks and other agencies they rely 
on for enforcement. Do they collectively have the capabilities to monitor loans 
effectively; do they have the power to withdraw loans if firms are failing? If the loss-
financing is organized through subsidies, the relevant agencies are those responsible 
for administering the subsidies. Do they have capabilities for monitoring performance 
and withdrawing the subsidies if necessary?  
 
If financing is internal to the firm, the enforcement of productivity growth is a 
struggle largely internal to the firm. Loss-financing could take the form of owners 
accepting a lower mark-up before the project becomes profitable. The enforcement of 
effort in this case is indistinguishable from ‘normal’ conflicts over discipline in a 
capitalist firm. The governance agencies relevant here would be formal and informal 
agencies regulating and enforcing labour contracts, or contracts between owners and 
firm managers. This is why in the ‘good governance’ literature, contract enforcement 
and the rule of law are considered to be necessary and sufficient capabilities for 
achieving growth (Acemoglu, et al. 2004; Khan 2007a). 
 
The credibility of an agency depends on how effectively the state will support its 
enforcement of rules. This in turn depends on the agency’s relationship with powerful 
constituencies and higher political authorities in the country. Industrial development 
banks are likely to have higher levels of credibility for enforcing their instruments if 
they are implementing an industrialization drive supported by a strong president, 
rather than if political authority is fragmented and banks can be influenced or 
prevented from acting by powerful political factions. Even in the case of private 
contracting, we know that contract enforcement and the rule of law are bound to be 
poor in developing countries (Carothers 2003; Khan 2007b). In fact, the effectiveness 
of private contractual arrangements always depends on the political context. The 
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‘private’ bargaining between employers and employees is never entirely private, and 
more so in a context where the overall rule of law and contract enforcement is 
structurally weak. In general, all sides to a conflict will attempt to mobilize broader 
social forces to support them. As a result, outcomes of labour-capital or investor-
manager conflicts are likely to depend on the political forces the different parties can 
mobilize to influence the effectiveness of enforcement of the relevant agencies.  
 
Firm Structure 
The degree to which effort can be enforced is also likely to depend on the internal 
organization of firms, and on the structure of the market. We have already seen that 
effort is more likely to be forthcoming in firms where owners are investors and they 
control the firm. This case comes closest to the classical model of a capitalist firm 
driving productivity growth. (Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Wood 2002). The ideal type 
of capitalist firm has a number of characteristics that ensure that it can mobilize high 
levels of effort. First, it has strong internal hierarchies and a workforce disciplined by 
a competitive labour market (possibly with a reserve army of unemployed labour 
creating a credible threat of replacement in case of low effort). Secondly, the 
theoretical capitalist firm has significant retained profits giving it the financial 
strength to invest in itself and the incentive to protect its own capital. Thirdly, the 
theoretical capitalist firm already has the capability to use its technology and is not 
facing an indeterminate learning period. Finally, the capitalist firm is not politically 
connected or powerful, though the class of capitalist firms may have significant 
holding power. This means that the textbook firm does not have the capacity to 
override contracts with external investors or the state using political connections and 
power. The real capitalist firm may significantly differ in some or all of these 
respects, particularly in developing countries, with significant implications for the 
effort expected after investments in learning.  
 
Internal hierarchies are likely to be strong in relatively few firms in developing 
countries. These are likely to be older more established firms where employees have 
large sunk investments in firm-specific career structures. These employees stand to 
lose their investments and their career prospects if the firm collapses, and they are 
likely to put in high levels of effort when called upon by the owners. Newer, startup 
firms are likely to face significant problems with their internal organization of effort, 
slowing down their learning process. Secondly, internal finance is also likely to be 
significant only in well-established and larger firms. The owners are likely to have a 
greater incentive in ensuring effort if they have committed more of their own money 
in internal financing. On the other hand, most firms in developing countries are likely 
to require significant outside finance, diluting the incentives of owners to put in high 
levels of effort in the absence of effective governance by external agencies.  
 
Thirdly, by definition, most firms in developing countries do not have high levels of 
technological and entrepreneurial capabilities. Most new firms have to spend a 
considerable amount of time to learn how to learn before they actually start learning 
(Stiglitz 1987). Finally, real world firms are likely to have strong political connections 
and indeed many firms may be set up by entrepreneurs closely connected to politics, 
particularly in developing countries. Alternatively, entrepreneurs are likely to 
patronize politicians, providing the owners with significant political power to resist or 
influence the enforcement activities of external agencies. Older, larger and well-
established firms are more likely to be well-connected to different political 
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organizations and it may be difficult to discipline them in a context where external 
loss-financing is coming from instruments controlled by the state.  
 
These considerations mean that external financiers of learning have to look at a 
complex range of issues in determining which types of firms are more likely to 
achieve competitiveness. Large firms may have greater technological capabilities, 
better internal discipline and are perhaps able to commit more of their own finances. 
But they may also have oligopolistic political power that makes it difficult to impose 
credible threats on them to enforce effort. Given the interdependence of political and 
technological factors determining effort and efficiency, it is not surprising that the 
characteristics of the efficient firm varies significantly across countries (Whitley 
1992).  
 
For instance, both Pakistan and South Korea in the 1960s financed large 
conglomerates to acquire new technologies and move into exports. However, effective 
compulsions for high levels of effort for firms of this type could not be achieved in 
Pakistan but were achieved in South Korea. To a significant extent this was because 
large conglomerates in Pakistan acquired the political capacity to protect their rents 
from threats of withdrawal in a way that South Korean chaebols could not. In Taiwan, 
a large firm strategy may also have failed because the immigrant political leadership 
of the KMT in the 1950s and 1960s may not have had the political authority to stand 
up to powerful locally owned conglomerates so early on in the development process. 
Fortunately for Taiwan, government strategies of technology acquisition focused on 
much smaller firms in high technology sectors, either by accident or design. As a 
result, the Taiwanese state’s ability to enforce discipline was not impaired. The 
interesting counterfactual is whether countries like Pakistan and India may have fared 
better if they had designed support schemes for smaller firms who may have found it 
much more difficult to capture policy in the way in which the ‘twenty-two families’ of 
Pakistan or the big business houses of India did (Wade 1988; Amsden 1989; Wade 
1990; Whitley 1992; Khan 1999; Khan and Blankenburg 2009).  
 
Of course, in many product and quality lines, scale economies mean that a 
competitive market structure is implausible. In these cases, the design of learning 
strategies has to be aware of the difficulties and take measures to strengthen 
governance agencies to prevent big players holding external financing to ransom. In 
some developing countries the answer may be to delegate the governance of the 
financing to independent and high quality external agencies like industrial banks. If 
the management of the industrial bank is perceived to be committed to 
competitiveness, and not accessible to political factions, the credibility of withdrawal 
may be high enough to enable learning to be financed in sectors with scale economies.  
 
The Political Settlement 
The political settlement describes the distribution of organizational and bargaining 
power between different social groups in a society (Khan 1995, 2010a). The relative 
power of different groups clearly determines the capability of the governance agency 
to enforce particular institutions including financing instruments. The configuration of 
power may also determine the design of the financing instrument in the first place. A 
financing arrangement that requires a high level of effort from agents who can 
mobilize powerful social forces to protect their interests is not likely to work. Threats 




Differences in underlying political settlements can explain why apparently similar 
governance agencies, firm structures and financing instruments have resulted in very 
different outcomes across countries. For instance, South Korea and Pakistan in the 
1960s both used fairly similar strategies of providing long-term bank credit to large 
conglomerates involved in capability development in export-oriented sectors. But the 
outcomes were significantly different because their political settlements were 
different and financing instruments could be enforced in one case but not in the other 
(Khan 1999).  
 
Equally, looking at the political settlement can help to explain why effective financing 
instruments and the governance agencies responsible for their enforcement have 
differed so significantly across successful catching-up countries. South Korea, 
Taiwan, China and Malaysia display significant differences in their catching up 
strategies across all these variables. Success required that the ensemble of variables 
determining effort in eq. [11] were consistent in terms of the political settlement so 
that the mechanisms for imposing compulsions required for high effort were credible 
and enforceable (Khan 2000b, 2008; Khan and Blankenburg 2009).  
 
Interdependencies Affecting Policies for Learning 
We have argued that effective learning strategies require as a precondition an 
ensemble of conditions to ensure high levels of effort. This is not always easy to 
achieve, and the failure to address or even understand these problems have been 
responsible for the abandonment of many learning and technology acquisition 
strategies across developing countries. An important reason why effective policies 
have been difficult to devise is because the variables in eq. [11] determining levels of 
effort are interdependent and so their effects are likely to be non-linear. This means 
that the best instrument for financing, for instance, may depend on the type of 
political settlement and firm structure that a country has inherited. As a result, there is 
no single set of financing and governance arrangements that characterize all 
successful catching up countries. It also follows that it is not possible to simply 
imitate the policy or governance structures of more successful developers.  
 
The likely interdependence between the variables affecting effort in eq. [11] is shown 
in Figure 5. From a policy perspective, it is important to distinguish between variables 
that are very difficult to change and which can therefore only be the targets of policy 
in the long term, and variables that are easier to change. The variables that are most 
difficult to change are ‘exogenous’ and policy is likely to have to accept them as 
‘given’ in the medium term. In Figure 5, the political settlement, PS, appears at the 
top as it is likely to be the ‘variable’ that is most difficult to change. However, even 
the political settlement can of course change, and it can change as a result of 
‘political’ policy, for instance through the organization of new political coalitions or 
movements. Indeed, if the political settlement is very unfavourable for organizing any 
serious process of learning, the only meaningful policy would be to begin the process 
of changing the political settlement. Of course, this is only a task that strong political 
organizations with legitimate leaderships can ever hope to achieve.  
 
Next in terms of difficulty of changing is the firm structure variable, FS. This can be 
affected by policy (by selecting particular groups of firms for support) but it may be 
difficult to change this rapidly. Finally, the variables that are usually the most direct 
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targets for policy appear at the bottom, the financing instruments, FI, and the 
associated governance agencies, GA, though governance agencies too may not 
necessarily be easy to set up or change. Our discussion suggests that the most 
appropriate financing instruments and associated governance agencies cannot be 
identified without at least identifying the constraints set by the other variables. In 
some cases the other variables may be such that policy has to address either or both of 
them as a medium or long-term goal. What is ruled out is the hope that these variables 
are ‘separable’, namely that ‘good financing instruments’ or ‘effective governance 
agencies’ can be identified independently of a political economy analysis of the 




Figure 5 The Interdependence of Variables Determining Effort 
 
The most important interdependencies between these variables are shown by the 
arrows between the variables in Figure 5. The political settlement describing the 
distribution of power (in this case between different groups of entrepreneurs and the 
state) defines the bargaining power of different types of firm vis-à-vis the state or 
private financiers. The political settlement also determines the likely enforceability of 
particular financing instruments and the credibility of the associated governance 
agencies. Combinations of financing instruments and governance agencies may be 
more or less enforceable and credible depending on the distribution of power defining 
the political settlement. Finally, financing instruments have to be appropriate for the 
financing needs of different types of firms and the learning problems they face. The 
problem of sustaining effort is therefore an iterative search across these variables to 
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find the combination that is both feasible for a country and likely to achieve moderate 
to high levels of effort, even if in a restricted subset of firms and sectors. We will see 
later that some of these interdependencies can explain why particular types of learning 
processes worked in particular contexts or were less dramatic in others.  
 
Given these interdependence, there are likely to be non-linearities in the relationships 
between these variables and effort. A financing arrangement that would result in an 
acceleration of learning in a particular political settlement and with a particular 
structure of firms may have a different effect in another political settlement or applied 
to a different structure of firms. For instance, historical evidence shows that financing 
learning-by-doing through conditional export subsidies to large firms may work very 
well if the political relationship between firms and governments allows an accurate 
observation of performance and if subsidy withdrawal is credible. But export 
subsidies to large firms may be a poor way of delivering financing if large firms have 
powerful political friends who can protect them from state attempts at subsidy 
withdrawal.  
 
This means that the effects of institutions and governance arrangements on the pace of 
learning in particular countries can only be identified by looking at possible 
interactions between (at least) the variables identified in Figure 5. Historical case 
studies support this argument by demonstrating that the efficacy of particular 
instruments and governance arrangements have varied across countries according to 
their underlying political settlements (Khan 1999, 2000b; Khan and Blankenburg 
2009). While almost every developing country attempted some form of state-led 
catching up, their relative success depended very critically on combinations of 
variables that determined the level of effort in the catching-up exercise. 
 
What Went Wrong with India’s Early Learning Strategies  
The complexity of the relationships between policy-targeted variables like financing 
instruments and governance agencies and hard-to-change variables like the political 
settlement can explain why plausible strategies of learning often failed. India’s 
attempt to construct effective institutions and governance agencies for driving its 
catching-up strategy in the 1950s and 1960s can be examined using this framework. 
With the benefit of hindsight and an analytical framework that looks at the 
implications for the enforcement of effort, it appears that the firm structure and 
political settlement that India inherited from the British period made it very unlikely 
that there would be high levels of effort in the planning strategy that allocated large 
implicit rents to big business houses. The strategy was very successful in triggering 
horizontal growth and the expansion of capacity, but the ability of firms to easily 
purchase protection made the task of enforcement agencies virtually impossible. 
Indeed, the political process was triggered to set up agencies that had limited 
capacities to monitor and enforce discipline.  
 
An intriguing question is whether India (and other South Asian countries) could have 
done significantly better had they followed a different approach for identifying and 
addressing the market failures that affected their learning. We suggested a number of 
alternatives earlier and these suggestions can now be rephrased. India and Pakistan (of 
which Bangladesh was a part at that time) attempted ambitious ‘East Asian’ industrial 
policies but without the political settlements that would allow effective compulsions 
for high levels of effort. Large, relatively well-connected firms benefited from 
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different types of ‘learning rents’ but managed to buy themselves sufficient protection 
from different factions to prevent threats of subsidy withdrawal to be credible. The 
result was significant industrialization but relatively slow progress towards global 
competitiveness levels (Khan 2000b).  
 
Figure 5 suggests that there could have been two types of responses to this problem 
(apart from abandoning the strategy). The first and more ambitious response would 
have been to use policy to change aspects of the political settlement that were 
preventing the imposition of credible compulsions on the types of firms receiving 
external financing for learning. Clearly, the political settlement is difficult to change 
rapidly, though it is always changing endogenously. The relevant aspects of the 
political settlement that constrained growth could have been addressed if political 
entrepreneurs realized that seeking to accelerate growth would further their own 
interests or if political entrepreneurs within the dominant party could themselves have 
been more effectively controlled by the leadership. The distribution of power between 
the state and firms receiving assistance could then have been very different.  
 
Mrs. Gandhi’s disastrous attempt to refashion the Congress Party during the 
Emergency can be evaluated in this way. Clearly, the growing centrifugal tendencies 
within the party were absorbing rents and were making the implementation of any 
central policies more difficult. The Emergency attempted to by-pass the intermediate 
class leadership that controlled the factions within the party to create a presidential 
relationship between the prime minister and the electorate. If successful, the Congress 
would have been reconstructed as an effective dominant party and the leadership 
would have been able to enforce discipline on the political entrepreneurs within the 
party. The attempt failed because in fact the strength of the political organizations that 
Mrs. Gandhi attempted to by-pass was far too great to be suppressed in this way. 
Simultaneous attempts by Bhutto and Mujib to impose their authority over their own 
parties resulted in similar concerted opposition. It is perhaps not an accident that all 
three leaders died violent deaths.  
 
Of course, Mrs. Gandhi was not necessarily attempting this change just to enable a 
better implementation of industrial policy. But all these leaders were responding to 
the fact that not only was organizational power fragmented in their countries, the 
fragmentation and intensity of competition between political factions was increasing 
in the 1960s and 1970s. All policies and institutions that required strong formal 
enforcement faced serious challenges as a result, and industrial policy was simply one 
of the most important policies to be affected. We also know that the political and 
bureaucratic leadership in charge of industrial policy did understand in general terms 
that there had been a significant failure of disciplining. For instance, the Dutt 
Committee in India (Government of India 1969) clearly recognized that licensing was 
primarily helping a small group of very large firms who were difficult to discipline. 
But the politics of responding to this effectively and constructively was not simple.  
 
Before the Emergency was attempted, Indira Gandhi also attempted to rein in the big 
business houses directly using the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act 
(MRTP) of 1969 which set asset limits on the asset holdings of large business houses 
which had accumulated significant concentrations of wealth under the licensing 
regime. The new act was largely punitive, and had little effect on actual levels of 
concentration. It had little effect because it did not seek to address the fragmentation 
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of power across political organizations and factions within the Congress that was the 
source of the problem. The result was that MRTP was no more enforceable than the 
licensing system had been.  
 
A second and less ambitious response might have been more effective, given the 
difficulty of changing relevant aspects of political settlements in the short term. This 
would be to address a combination of the lower level policy variables in Figure 5, 
such as the types of firms addressed by learning strategies, the financing instruments 
used, and the capabilities of the governance agencies enforcing these financing 
arrangements. From our earlier discussion, one response may have been to focus the 
industrial policy effort in sectors and technologies where the potential number of 
beneficiary firms was larger and their sizes smaller. These firms may have been less 
able to politically subvert attempts to impose competitiveness conditions on them. 
Simpler financing instruments that provided time bound protection in some sectors, or 
start-up assistance for high technology small firms may have created credible 
compulsions for productivity growth while providing enough external financing to 
enable entry into products and technologies that may otherwise not have taken off.  
 
We will see later that the design of the financing instrument in the pharmaceutical 
industry in India enabled it to achieve much better results even in the context of a 
competitive clientelist polity. One implication of our analysis is that the scope of an 
effective learning strategy in these countries should have been narrower and limited to 
a smaller set of firms and technologies. Nevertheless, a more effective policy may in 
fact have had a much broader impact than a broad-based policy that was in large part 
ineffective in achieving sustained competitiveness in the sectors supported.  
 
Positive Legacies: The Possibility of ‘Alpha’ and ‘Beta’ Strategies   
Despite the overall problems with the early industrial policies and their eventual 
abandonment in India, even the limited experience of learning was actually very 
useful for them in supporting pockets of growth in the subsequent period. While the 
conditions for enforcing high levels of effort were not fully present when they 
attempted ambitious learning strategies in the 1960s and 1970s, the attempt to absorb 
new technologies and move up the value chain was not entirely wasted. An extremely 
important characteristic of success with market-driven and competence-led growth in 
the 1980s and 1990s was that the enterprises that drove growth in the latter period had 
acquired many critical technological and entrepreneurial capabilities as a direct 
consequence of their learning-by-doing in the previous period. Our case studies show 
that earlier periods of technology acquisition created the technological capabilities 
that were essential for the subsequent market success of critical sectors. Documenting 
these cases is important for understanding the importance of designing technology 
and learning policies better in the future.  
 
The growth takeoff of the 1980s was based on technological capabilities developed 
during the ‘ambitious’ period of industrial policy. Given the overall poor performance 
of these industrial policies this appears to be something of a paradox. In fact this 
observation can be explained in terms of our basic propositions of tacit knowledge 
and learning-by-doing. Technological learning and capability development is 
‘localized’ around specific technologies and qualities where learning was focused. 
The policies of building technological capabilities at ‘higher qualities’ may not have 
resulted in a general improvement in technological capabilities across the country, but 
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they raised capabilities in the technologies where success was achieved. 
Consequently, even if a particular technology did not achieve global competitiveness 
during the policy period, in many cases the policies significantly increased 
technological capabilities in the vicinity of the technologies that were attempted.  
 
 
Figure 6 Liberalization Responses: ‘Alpha’ and ‘Beta’ Strategies in India 
 
Figure 6 shows a developing country with initially limited technological capabilities, 
shown by its initially limited capability of producing any but the lowest quality of a 
particular product. Without learning policies, it could only produce the lowest quality 
Q1, at point V. Technology policies allow it to begin production of a significantly 
higher quality product Q3. Its initial competitiveness in the production of Q3 is only at 
level X, which is considerably below the global competitiveness level of Y. However, 
loss-financing allows it to commence learning-by-doing and technological capability 
building. But in this case there is a failure to ensure high levels of effort and this 
prevents global competitiveness being rapidly attained. The underlying 
competitiveness only improves to point A, at which point the technology policies are 
abandoned, which means that the loss-financing through existing financing 
instruments dries up.  
 
The likely response of firms at this stage is the interesting question. The simplest 
possibility is that the firms become bankrupt and disappear. But this is not the only 
possibility. The point is that despite the apparent ‘failure’ of the policy on the whole, 
technological capabilities in the vicinity of the products that were produced have 
nevertheless improved well beyond what they may have in the absence of the 
attempted strategy. The precise way in which underlying competences changed is 




Firms that have only reached a true level of competitiveness at level A when 
producing quality Q3 are still not at a globally competitive level. If the external 
financing sustaining them did not come to an abrupt end, and they had time to adjust, 
they could respond in two different ways to achieve global competitiveness. First, if A 
was close to the global competitiveness frontier, one strategy would be to finance the 
rest of the required learning using alternative sources of financing. These could be in-
house or private external financing. In India businesses were also able to directly 
negotiate support using their political and bureaucratic links as we discussed earlier.  
 
In the past, key stakeholders within the firm had limited compulsions to increase their 
productivity to achieve global competitiveness. But with the abandonment of 
institutionalized financing strategies (licensing), more credible compulsions emerged 
and eventual bankruptcy became a real possibility. At the same time, opportunities 
simultaneously opened up for private financing, technical tie-ups with foreign firms 
and political contacts continued to provide sector or firm based support for politically 
important businesses. The critical feature of these new forms of financing was that 
they did not come with a high likelihood of being sustained over the long term. 
Businesses therefore had much stronger incentives to use the opportunity to achieve 
competitiveness and critically, some of these businesses were now close enough to 
the global competitiveness frontier for this to be a feasible learning project.  
 
We refer to the strategy of a second phase of financing and learning to achieve 
competitiveness at the initial level of quality as the α-strategy in Figure 6. It is shown 
by the possibility of an upward move of the firm from A to Y, where it finally 
achieves global competitiveness in the production of quality Q3. This strategy is likely 
to be rare except in the case of technologies and qualities that were relatively simple 
to start with, or in the case of a few firms that had already achieved significant 
learning in the past and were already relatively close to the global frontier. However, 
we do find some examples of this type of strategy in India, where a number of large, 
high competence firms did come close to the global competitiveness frontier in 
sectors like automobiles and iron and steel.  
 
A second type of strategy may be the more common response for firms whose 
technological capabilities increased under industrial policy but not quite to the level of 
global competitiveness. If A is still far from the global competitiveness level, or if the 
firms lack sufficient internal capabilities to risk the rest of the journey using their own 
collateral or financing, the strategy of moving to Y may be ruled out. The judgement 
here would be that the required period of learning was still too long or too 
unpredictable for the financing for the strategy to be viable. However, even in this 
case, improvements in technological capability in the vicinity of supported 
technologies may have been sufficient to enable these firms to seek global 
competitiveness in products of a somewhat lower quality where their existing 
capabilities would be sufficient to achieve global competitiveness. In some cases 
these products may be related to the products they were initially producing, but in 
other cases they may be unrelated products or services, but of lower value-added than 
the ones initially attempted.  
 
We describe this as the β-strategy. In Figure 6 this is shown by the move from point A 
to point B where the firm is already competitive using its existing technological 
capabilities. The quality of product it now produces at Q2 may be lower than the 
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quality Q3 that it was initially trying to produce. But Q2 may still be significantly 
more sophisticated and more value-adding than the products in the vicinity of Q1 that 
it may have been producing in the absence of any history of industrial policy. The 
critical feature of the β-strategy is that much more limited financing or perhaps no 
financing is required to achieve global competitiveness because the capabilities that 
had already been acquired are sufficient for production at the lower quality.  
 
An example of a β-strategy was the re-deployment of technically skilled personnel 
(whose training in fields like engineering and science was subsidized by the Indian 
government as part of its industrial policy) into the IT services sector. Technical 
training was an important mechanism through which public financing had been 
targeted to serve industrial catching up. However, the slow progress of capability 
development in industry meant that many of the individuals leaving technical colleges 
were not assured reasonable employment. With the abandonment of industrial policy, 
their employment prospects became worse because the broad-based industrial takeoff 
that had been planned had not materialized. The redeployment of significant numbers 
of graduates from technical universities and colleges into the newly emerging IT-
based service sectors provided globally competitive employment opportunities for 
large numbers of people, and employment growth was therefore rapid. The bulk of 
India’s global services employment has so far been in the relatively lower value-
adding business outsourcing and back office segments, but it has nevertheless been a 
significant source of growth in the period after liberalization (Panagariya 2005b). The 
important point is that the capabilities that served the growth of this service sector 
would probably not have existed at all in the absence of a prior history of financing 
capability development for industrialization. Another example of a β-strategy is the 
response of sections of the Indian pharmaceutical sector after India signed on to 
protect TRIPS-compliant intellectual property rights. The learning strategy that these 
pharmaceutical firms had been following had to be abandoned and they converted 
themselves into lower value-adding contract producers for multinational 
pharmaceutical companies.   
 
If India’s success in market competition was based on the development of capabilities 
in a few pockets, this has obvious implications for strategies of sustaining this growth 
and spreading it to more sectors to include more people in the benefits of participating 
in globalization. In the next sections we look at two case studies, automobiles and 
pharmaceuticals, to demonstrate the ways in which global competitiveness emerged in 
a few sectors. These cases illustrate the general arguments made so far. 
 
7. Capability Development in Critical Sectors: Automobiles and Pharmaceuticals 
India presents a paradox in that it has some high capability firms particularly in 
manufacturing, and yet it has an unusually small industrial sector and low overall 
manufacturing growth. Some of its leading manufacturing firms have followed what 
we described as α-strategies in the period after 1980, achieving global 
competitiveness in a small number of areas. Yet large swathes of the economy remain 
at very low levels of technological capability and the share of manufacturing in the 
economy is much lower than we might expect. Figure 6 is directly relevant for 
understanding the Indian case. The long period of industrial policy in India prior to 
the 1980s created strong capabilities but in a narrow range of technologies. The 
support and protection provided by the licensing system was in theory broadly 
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allocated but in practice a relatively small number of business houses and regions got 
the lion’s share of the allocations. Moreover, in many cases the effort allocated to 
learning was so low that enterprises remained too far behind the global 
competitiveness frontier. Nevertheless, a few sectors did achieve substantial 
experience and built up a network of technical and managerial expertise. The opening 
up that gradually happened during the 1980s and beyond led to both α and β-strategy 
responses in these relatively high-capability sectors.  
 
In an Asian Development Bank estimation of what the share of manufacturing in GDP 
was expected in Asian economies in 2000, given their populations, trade openness and 
per capita incomes, India comes out as a significant outlier in Asia with 
manufacturing well below its expected share. Most Asian countries have a 
manufacturing share that is equal to or higher than that predicted by the average 
international pattern. India’s manufacturing was 15.9 per cent of GDP in 2000, around 
4 percentage points below its predicted share of 19.6 per cent. China with a 
manufacturing share of 34.5 per cent was well above its predicted 27.3 per cent. But 
much of Asia was also equal to or above their predicted share. Thailand’s 33.6 per 
cent was around 10 points higher than its predicted 23.9 per cent. Bangladesh with 
15.2 per cent was slightly higher than its predicted 13.5 per cent (ADB 2007b: 294).  
 
Manufacturing is important because it describes a level of capability that many people 
in poor countries can hope to attain (as members of the workforce) to participate in a 
global economy. Even the lowest capability requirements for globally marketed 
services like back-office work require a level of human capital that is not attainable in 
the medium term for the vast majority of the population in a developing country. 
Capability development in agriculture is a possibility in pockets, but the 
fragmentation of landholdings and the growing scarcity of water also makes 
agriculture-driven growth strategies less plausible in many regions within countries of 
the Indian subcontinent (though pockets of high capability agriculture are possible).  
 
The usual explanation for India’s sluggish performance in manufacturing and in 
industry generally is that inflexible labour markets, in particular, laws protecting 
employment, increased the cost of exit. In anticipation of future problems, firms 
apparently did not invest in labour-intensive manufacturing (Besley and Burgess 
2004; Panagariya 2004). In a further development of the argument, Rajan (2006) 
argues that because highly skilled workers were not as strongly protected as less 
skilled workers, Indian industry had a bias towards the employment of the former. 
This explains India’s strengths in sectors like pharmaceuticals and automobiles, and 
its weakness in textiles and garments. The policy implication is that to grow the 
manufacturing sector, labour laws have to be relaxed in terms of the protections 
offered to unskilled workers. There may be some truth to some of these arguments but 
it is questionable whether they can explain significant features of India’s performance.  
 
For one thing, it is questionable whether the types of entrepreneurs who may have 
operated labour-intensive industries like garments and textiles in India have ever been 
excessively constrained by the effective enforcement of any laws, labour or otherwise 
(Bhattacharjea 2006). The relevant thought experiment is the following: we have to 
imagine that there are many tens of millions of potential workers in India who could 
have been employed immediately in labour-intensive manufacturing industries but are 
not being employed because potential employers are worried that if they ever have to 
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lay them off, there may be costs involved. Put in this form, the labour flexibility 
argument appears less plausible. The real problem may be that given their present 
levels of productivity and absent tacit knowledge of factory production of any kind, 
tens of millions of Indian workers cannot be employed in manufacturing even at very 
low wages and even if they could be fired at a moment’s notice. Indeed, at the very 
lowest levels of quality, India may already be suffering from an early form of a 
middle income squeeze because it is unlikely to be able to compete with countries like 
Bangladesh for instance in many segments of the garments industry.  
 
The relevant comparison is with China where start-up manufacturers in broad swathes 
of intermediate technologies received significant implicit subsidies through an 
undervalued exchange rate, low real interest rates and a host of other hidden subsidies 
on infrastructure pricing, land pricing and so on. These subsidies provided the implicit 
loss-financing that enabled millions of rural Chinese workers to enter the world of 
manufacturing and engage in learning-by-doing that was disciplined by a number of 
factors including the compulsion to export. The specific features of Indian’s 
specialization can be explained by the targeting of its learning policies in the past. The 
firms that had the capabilities to engage in α and β-strategies after learning policies 
began to be abandoned in the 1980s were all in relatively high technology sectors 
because these were the sectors that licensing had supported. This, rather than the 
relative levels of protection of workers provides the more plausible explanation of the 
areas where Indian manufacturing and high technology services are currently doing 
well. Rajan’s claim that skilled middle class individuals are not specifically protected 
by labour laws may be true but workers in the automobile industry are no less 
protected than unskilled workers in textiles, and yet the auto industry took off in the 
1980s and textiles or garments did not experience a similar boom. The policy 
implications are significant. Greater flexibility of labour markets is unlikely to help 
India very much (though this is not necessarily an argument for retaining all types of 
regulations, some of which may indeed be marginally damaging). The policy priority 
must be to devise new strategies of learning aimed at intermediate technologies, 
together with the governance capabilities to implement them effectively.  
 
 ‘Alpha Strategies’ in the Automobile Sector  
One of India’s success stories in manufacturing was in automobiles. From a protected 
and apparently inefficient sector in the 1950s and 1960s making around 50,000 cars 
annually of indifferent quality, the sector produced 1.8 million cars in 2009, with 
exports of more than 330,000 cars, making India the fourth largest global exporter. 
The vehicle sector as a whole (including commercial vehicles and two-wheelers) 
employed more than 300,000 people. The broader sector including auto components, 
as well as related service sector activities of sales and servicing could employ as many 
as ten million people. While gradual liberalization has provided strong incentives for 
private capability development and foreign partnerships have brought in new 
technologies and designs, the success of the Indian automobile sector has been based 
on capabilities that were developed during the previous period of protection. 
Misunderstanding the interplay between liberalization incentives and ongoing support 
for capability development can result in inappropriate policy conclusions for this 
sector and others. When India started liberalizing its automobile sector, the latter 
already had significant capabilities as a result of years of protection. In addition, even 
during its ‘liberalization’, India continued to have protected internal markets that 
created strong incentives for foreign technology providers to enter, and India could 
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continue to use domestic content regulations on foreign investors who were attracted 
by its domestic market rents. The enforcement of domestic content requirements was 
also credible given the lack of political protection for foreign investors if they failed 
to achieve these requirements. This fortunate combination of implicit financing of 
learning and credible incentives and compulsions need to be looked at holistically to 
understand the subsequent success of the sector.  
 
One of the iconic symbols of India’s industrial policy was the sturdy but stolid 
Ambassador. The rapid displacement of this warhorse after liberalization and the 
appearance of more attractive and comfortable cars did a lot to support the view that 
protection protected inefficiency. The ‘Amby’ was based on the vintage Morris 
Oxford and refused to change its appearance over the decades. Its maker, Hindustan 
Motors was set up by B.M. Birla in the 1940s. A close supporter of the Congress 
Party, Birla was one of the nationalist industrialists behind the Bombay Plan that 
advocated state-supported capitalism. Perhaps because of his close links with the 
Congress, almost no other licenses were given out for passenger car production. The 
other early entrant in the 1940s was Premier Auto Ltd., which produced an equally 
invariant version of a Fiat called the Premier Padmini. Further supporting the case 
against protection is the observation that neither Hindustan Motors nor West Bengal 
(where the Ambassador was mainly produced) emerged as significant players in the 
new motor car industry. West Bengal’s failure in 2007 to provide land for Tata’s 
Nano project (Khan 2009a) put the state even further behind in the competition for a 
share of India’s automobile production.  
 
India’s new car industry is based around Indian companies, joint ventures and 
increasingly multinational manufactures like Tata, Mahindra and Mahindra and 
Maruti Suzuki, and more recently Ford, GM, Volkswagen, Nissan and Renault, with 
production mostly based in states in the west and south. The three leading states are 
Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu and Haryana. Maharashtra’s Chakan belt near Pune is 
emerging as India’s Detroit, with a cluster of plants that began with Tata Motors, 
Mahindra, Bajaj, Mercedes-Benz and General Motors. Maharashtra accounts for 
around forty per cent of India’s output of automobiles by value and a similar share of 
the total workforce. It produces around a third of India’s tractors, 70 per cent of 
medium and heavy trucks and 80 per cent of ‘multi utility vehicles’ or jeeps. 
 
Despite the new corporate players and regions that came to dominate the motor car 
industry, it would be misleading to conclude that previous policies had little to do 
with the emergence of the industry. The protection of the Ambassador was only a 
small part of the package of learning policies that underpinned the growth of 
capabilities on which the modern industry is based. Tata began producing trucks and 
commercial vehicles in 1954 with the collaboration of Daimler Benz of Germany. 
Mahindra and Mahindra produced jeeps and tractors from the 1940s. Both benefited 
significantly from protection and developed engineering and management capabilities 
that were indispensable for their entry into the car industry later. A wide range of 
engineering and automotive firms also acquired capabilities for production as a result 
of indigenization policies, including Bajaj which specialized in two-wheelers. The 
‘progressive manufacturing obligation’ announced in 1953 aimed to push 
indigenization and was successful in its own terms. By the 1970s, India had achieved 
the capability to produce 80 per cent of the vehicles it was producing indigenously, as 




Of course, many of the regulations of this period did not make sense. The reservation 
of a large part of the auto component industry for small scale producers since 1965 
slowed down the development of the component industry whose eventual 
achievement of efficiency was vital for the takeoff that happened later. The 
component industry suffered from low quality and productivity for a long time. But a 
political accident gave an unexpected boost to the development of the component 
industry. Indira Gandhi’s maverick son Sanjay, whose attraction to authoritarianism 
was often all too evident, took it into his head to produce an Indian version of the 
Fuehrer’s ‘people’s car’. Sanjay was attempting to attract the original people’s car-
makers, Volkswagen, to the project. Not surprisingly, he had little success in 
attracting Volkswagen whose managers were right to be sensitive about the 
implications. As it happened, Sanjay died in a plane crash in 1980 before any car was 
produced. The company was nationalized and became a public company to prevent 
Sanjay’s pet project being liquidated with its negative consequences for the image of 
the ruling family. The government began looking for a foreign partner for the project. 
A more direct business-government relationship guaranteeing political support for a 
project could not have been invented.  
 
Most of the global industry players at that time were not particularly attracted to the 
Indian market. But Osamu Suzuki, chairman and CEO of Suzuki, a relatively small 
player in the global market, began extensive discussions with the Indian government. 
He understood the political dynamics that made it likely that the government would 
give the project the support it needed to succeed. Suzuki made a good call because 
Maruti Udyog, as it was then called, received generous government assistance. This 
included getting land in Gurgaon near Delhi at government acquisition prices, 
favourable tariffs for the import of new manufacturing equipment, and fast-tracked 
import clearances in an economy that was still heavily protected. The Indian machine 
tool industry lobbied strongly to stop this, and lost. As a result, Suzuki enjoyed a 
massive package of benefits and the technology adoption that followed brought about 
a radical change in the component industry. It did not give in to government pressures 
for indigenization of parts that it wanted to import from Japan, but worked with 
suppliers to improve what it needed to make in India.  
 
Maruti’s success was rapid. In 1983 the first cars rolled out and soon captured fifty 
per cent of the domestic market by rapidly displacing Ambys and Padminis. Maruti 
retains its dominant market position even today. The Indian engineering base was 
strong enough for the rapid development of a strong component industry, and this had 
significant implications for the growth of the automobile industry as a whole. Maruti-
Suzuki itself followed the path of Japanese takeovers of successful joint ventures that 
Japanese auto giants also followed in Thailand. Suzuki initially held a mere 26 per 
cent stake in the project, but by 1987 it increased its stake to 40 per cent and by 1992 
to 50 per cent. In the late 1990s a bitter conflict emerged between Suzuki and the 
Indian government over the appointment of a managing director. The underlying 
conflict was about the pace of indigenization and in particular the production of gear 
boxes in India as opposed to Japan. Suzuki won in the end and became the majority 
shareholder. By 2007 the Indian government sold its holdings (though Indian financial 
institutions retain a minority holding). Thus, the most successful car maker in India so 
far is not Indian, though Suzuki achieved high levels of indigenization and ironically 
now makes more cars in India than in Japan. But the spur Suzuki provided to Indian 
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components producers soon allowed Indian brands to emerge since the secret of auto 
production is the quality of the components industry. 
 
The components industry was greatly assisted by a series of very illiberal domestic 
content policies that accompanied India’s liberalization. In the 1990s when India was 
opening up, it was still not constrained by WTO rules. One condition for inviting 
foreign investment in the automobile sector was a 70 per cent domestic content 
requirement in three years. These government policies indirectly gave significant 
financial support to the learning in domestic component manufacturing companies as 
foreign investors were forced to invest in the learning of these companies as the price 
for being able to capture their own rents in the protected domestic market. But this 
was a much better financing instrument for inducing learning because the incentives 
were right for both foreign and local companies for rapid learning to be transferred 
and achieved. The companies that came to invest were not just car-makers like 
Suzuki, but also global component suppliers who set up joint ventures with Indian 
component manufacturers. They too had to meet the domestic content requirements. 
Suzuki worked with them and with entirely domestic firms to collectively meet the 70 
per cent domestic content targets as well as maintaining the quality required to rapidly 
penetrate the domestic market. By the early 1990s Suzuki had captured 70 per cent of 
domestic passenger car sales. More joint ventures arrived. In the decade of the 1990s 
car production went up by a factor of 3.5. Of the eight leading firms driving this 
growth, six were joint ventures and accounted for 85 per cent of the output (Sutton 
undated). Yet the indigenization conditions meant that this was much more than 
assembly. By 2004, the local content of Indian-made cars ranged from 20 to 100 per 
cent, with the more popular makes in the domestic market bunched around the higher 
figure (Balakrishnan, et al. 2004: Table 2.5).  
 
Auto Components Producers 
The clearest evidence of α-strategies in the Indian auto sector comes from the auto 
components producers. By the end of the 1990s, the improvements in quality control 
in the auto components sector resulted in ten Indian auto companies winning the 
coveted Deming prize awarded by Japan to companies achieving high levels of 
quality. Nine of these companies were auto component producers. These awards are 
consistent with other observations of improvements in the quality of Indian 
component producers. For instance, Sutton finds that in terms of defect rates of 
component producers, Indian quality levels by the early 2000s were close to global 
levels and comparable to Chinese levels. In some areas Indian quality was higher than 
in China (Sutton undated).  
 
However, when the financial performance of the Deming companies are compared to 
other Indian component suppliers in the same sector, the surprising result is that the 
quality improving firms did not perform any better in terms of profitability 
(Balakrishnan, et al. 2007). This is a surprising observation because the general 
international evidence is that improvements in total quality management (TQM) leads 
to improvements in financial performance and profitability (Hendricks and Singhal 
1997).  The most likely explanation is that the winning firms were not significantly 
exceptional. There is likely to have been a general improvement in productivity and 
quality across much of the Indian auto component sector as Sutton’s benchmarking 
work also suggests. The lack of improvement in profitability suggests that 
productivity and quality improvements were achieved without price increases, or even 
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with price reductions, resulting in an improvement in the competitiveness ratio. 
Clearly, what was happening here is exactly a move towards the global 
competitiveness frontier by component producers that we described as an α-strategy 
in Figure 6. 
 
The possibility that Indian component producers were moving towards global 
competitiveness is also confirmed by the growing export success of many component 
producers. Many of the most successful component suppliers were joint ventures. Of 
the top ten component exporters in the early 2000s, six were joint ventures, and of the 
four domestic producers, three belonged to the same domestic group: TVS (Sutton 
undated). The performance of the Indian component producers is even more 
significant because comparisons with China show that they suffer on average a cost 
disadvantage of around 20 per cent due to higher costs of power, taxes, duties, labour 
benefits and so on (Balakrishnan, et al. 2007). Since there is no evidence that the 
underlying productivity of labour and input use is higher by that margin in India, the 
implication is that global competitiveness was achieved by Indian component 
producers by squeezing their margins, at least compared to China. Nevertheless, the 
quality improvements by the component producers allowed more and more foreign 
OEMs to enter the Indian market, and allowed Indian brands to consolidate. 
 
Mahindra and Mahindra: Frugal Engineering  
Mahindra and Mahindra was founded in 1945 by J.C. Mahindra, K.C. Mahindra and 
Ghulam Mohammed and was initially called Mahindra and Mohammed. Ghulam 
Mohammed moved to Pakistan after partition and became Pakistan’s first finance 
minister and one of the architects of its early industrial policy. Sales in 2009 were 
around US$3 billion and the firm is part of the bigger Mahindra and Mahindra Group. 
Since the 1940s, Mahindra and Mahindra’s focus was on agricultural vehicles like 
tractors and pick-ups. Through that it built significant technological capabilities, 
particularly in engine manufacturing. In the 1990s it was involved in a joint venture 
with Ford that introduced Mahindra and Mahindra to car production. The emergence 
of Mahindra and Mahindra as an Indian branded car manufacturer making passenger 
cars was significantly assisted by the emergence of a strong Indian components 
sector. Its production strategy was based on significant outsourcing. Other than 
engines, transmission and body skin, everything was outsourced. Even the engine 
head and block were bought in semi-finished.  
 
In 1998, the company took a strategic decision to walk away from its joint venture 
with Ford to design and produce a low-cost Indian MUV called the Scorpio (an MUV 
or multi-utility vehicle is somewhere between a car and an SUV). It had a limited 
budget of US$ 120 million to design and develop the production facilities. It 
succeeded because it used its already significant component producer base in 
innovative ways. It brought in its suppliers, defined the technological outcomes and 
cost targets, and then let the key suppliers develop the technology. The suppliers were 
mainly joint venture companies or foreign companies with Indian operations. In the 
end, production was outsourced to 110 suppliers, but though many were joint 
ventures, 98 per cent of the Scorpio was indigenous. A senior executive associated 
with the project said, ‘lots of costs get added to get the last two per cent of quality 
right. But if one sets out to make everything perfect the costs go up exponentially’. 
Mahindra aimed at reasonable quality keeping in mind the profile of the Indian 
customer. So while it made sure it exceeded the parameters for the engine, it 
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compromised on the noise levels. At the same time the company made sure that it had 
backup service plans for every area of weakness so that as soon as a customer 
complained the service team was ready with action. The effect was that the Scorpio 
entered the market at 11,000 dollars, around 60 per cent of the price expected by 
industry analysts (Sutton undated ). : 48-9
 
After an initially lukewarm reception, the Scorpio captured 50 per cent of the 
domestic utility vehicle market. The strategy followed by Mahindra and Mahindra in 
this case was a risky one, but a good example of what Carlos Ghosn, CEO of Nissan 
has described as ‘frugal engineering’. In the cheaper and smaller end of the vehicle 
market, this could be the standard pattern for the future. The company now has 
ambitious plans to enter the US market with a diesel engine. The US has the toughest 
emission standards, and Mahindra and Mahindra has developed an engine that meets 
this in collaboration with Bosch. The only other companies with a similar technology 
are Volkswagen-Audi and Mercedes Benz.  
 
The combination of private financing and state support, initially motivated by a 
political prestige issue in the case of Maruti and later in support of indigenization, 
collectively provided the additional financing for learning that took an already 
moderate-capability sector to the competitive frontier. The outcome was a rapid 
improvement in capabilities and the achievement of global competitiveness by 
domestic Indian producers, including Indian owned manufacturing plants in 
automobiles and components. These are clearly examples of α-strategies. The policy 
challenge is to understand the very specific and fortunate combination of initial 
capability developments and appropriate combinations of incentives and compulsions 
after ‘liberalization’ that allowed the α-strategies to emerge. 
 
Factors Supporting ‘Alpha Strategies’ in the Auto Sector  
A number of factors contributed to the high effort outcomes that led to the success of 
α-strategies in the automobile and components sectors. First, a new combination of 
financing instruments, governance mechanisms, firm structures and a somewhat 
different political settlement created credible compulsions for high effort in terms of 
eq. [11]. Secondly, the gap from the global frontier (shown by AY in Figure 6) was 
low enough in this sector for this level of effort to rapidly enable convergence to 
global competitiveness within the time frame that the loss-financing for doing this 
was available. In terms of eq. [10], the initial competitiveness gap, sQ, in 1980 was low 
enough, together with the government support that was made available in the form of 
direct and indirect assistance to different producers, to make the breakeven period, Bt, 
viable for private investors investing in learning and technology acquisition. To 
understand the positive effects on effort we have to look at the interdependent effects 
of a number of key variables affecting effort.  
 
First, by 1980 there were many firms in the engineering and automobile components 
sectors with reasonably high technological capabilities that were within striking 
distance of international competitiveness. These firms were the products of the more 
relaxed licensing period but their monopoly position in the domestic market had given 
them decades of learning-by-doing experience. They could hope to attain global 
competitiveness with relatively small additional investments in equipment and the 
associated learning-by-doing. This meant that the implicit sQ in eq. [10] was low. This 
matters because if the achievement of global competitiveness in the quality and the 
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product that is being attempted is not perceived to be feasible, private investments in 
effort will not be forthcoming.  
 
Secondly, the gap that did exist in 1980 could not have been covered in a day. A ‘big 
bang’ liberalization in 1980 may have meant the end of the indigenous Indian 
automobile industry. Instead, government support during the opening up period 
implicitly provided financing instruments (FI in eq. [11]) and this further reduced the 
private financing that was required to make the transition to the frontier. For small 
global players like Suzuki, the continued protection of the domestic market provided 
enough rents for them to be interested in making investments including in learning. 
These rents were probably a more important incentive for the producers who first 
came in, like Suzuki, than the possibility that India may become a global platform for 
production in the future. The rents made it worthwhile for Suzuki to invest in 
learning-by-doing and also to work with domestic component suppliers to help them 
raise productivity and quality to meet domestic content requirements. The latter was a 
mechanism for indirectly financing the learning of domestic component producers 
because Suzuki had to pass on some of their rents to improve the capabilities of 
domestic component producers instead of importing the required components from 
Japan. The pace of opening up was also very important. Liberalization can only 
induce high levels of effort if the pace of liberalization is consistent with pace at 
which protected producers can raise their productivity. Not only was the capability 
gap small, with additional public support being provided, and the pace of 
‘liberalization’ was very gradual.  
 
Thirdly, the relevant governance agencies, GA, created credible incentives for 
investing in learning in order to retain these rents. The most important was the 
credible enforcement of domestic content rules that forced foreign investors to work 
at technology transfer and therefore learning, as opposed to simply assembling knock-
down kits, which may have been easier. The domestic content rules imposed costs on 
foreign investors but they were willing to bear these costs because the government 
was passing on bigger rents to them through its protected markets and subsidized land 
and other inputs. Without these rents, the multinationals may not have been interested 
in producing to meet domestic content requirements. But equally, creating the rents 
without the capability to enforce content rules may also have been a waste for the 
country. Again, the interdependence of these variables was important and points to the 
possibility of creating incentives and compulsions for multinationals that result in 
accelerated technology transfer.  
 
Fourth, changes in the political settlement, PS, within India allowed the leadership to 
offer targeted support to specific firms like Maruti rapidly and using new instruments 
outside the planning and licensing ones. The possibility of doing this without being 
blocked by anti-business interests or by local big business competitors of Maruti 
operating through political factions within Congress had improved because the greater 
fragmentation of the party paradoxically allowed the political leadership greater 
freedom of action on an ad hoc basis. The political competition and fragmentation 
also provided an implicit signal to the firms receiving support that they could not rely 
on this support forever and it was in their interest to put in high levels of effort under 
these circumstances. The enforcement of domestic content conditions for Suzuki and 
other foreign investors was also credible because foreign investors had no connections 
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with domestic political leaders and factions that could possibly be used to block 
enforcement if they failed domestic content tests.  
 
Finally, the firm structure, FS, was also fortuitous. The old established players like 
Birla had been sidelined by Suzuki, who gained access to government support for 
very accidental reasons. Suzuki in turn worked with smaller component firms and 
newly established joint ventures that did not have the political connections that could 
help them to influence rent allocation or to ensure that their rents could be protected 
by changing the terms for Suzuki. The credibility of enforcement both by public 
governance agencies against Suzuki and by Suzuki on its component suppliers was 
assisted by this firm structure, as it was by the macro political changes in the political 
settlement.  
 
By putting the evolution of the auto industry in the context of our interactive variables 
determining effort (Figure 5) we can see that the outcome was plausibly related to a 
fortunate configuration that is more complex than may appear at first sight. Clearly, 
this favourable combination of incentives and compulsions would not be easy to 
replicate in policy terms. But equally, to believe that the auto takeoff happened just 
because of ‘liberalization’ is also wrong. Our analysis can explain why the results in 
the auto sector were not replicated all across India’s manufacturing. It also explains 
why liberalization had very different effects in different countries, and indeed in 
different sectors within India. Finally, it suggests that the success of some sectors may 
have more to do with their initial endowments of capabilities and public support for 
further capability development than the relative flexibility of their labour markets. 
The latter played a very limited role in explaining the success of this sector according 
to industry insiders. The implication for policy is obviously to focus on the difficult 
task of creating incentives and compulsions for capability development in other 
sectors, and indeed for assisting further capability development in the Indian auto 
sector over time.  
 
Pharmaceuticals: Catching Up by Capturing Technology Rents 
Pharmaceuticals are the other big success story in India’s manufacturing sector. 
Again, this is by no means a simple liberalization story but rather one of capability 
development, in this case through a financing instrument that allowed successful 
Indian pharmaceutical companies to ‘capture’ some of the technology rents of 
multinationals. By de-recognizing product patents and only recognizing process 
patents, the Indian state allowed Indian pharmaceutical companies to produce 
molecules that had been patented in advanced countries, as long as Indian companies 
used a different process. This allowed Indian companies to finance a significant spurt 
of learning by capturing some of the intellectual property rents of global 
pharmaceutical multinationals between 1970 and 2005. Thus, by taking on the 
intellectual property rights of international multinationals, the Indian state provided 
very specific and targeted assistance to the Indian pharmaceutical sector. The key 
phase of capability development in the Indian pharmaceutical sector happened in the 
1980s based on the Indian patent law of 1970 that effectively allowed Indian 
companies to capture technology rents if they could rapidly learn process and 
production technologies. The opportunities for rent-capture through successful reverse 
engineering created strong incentives and compulsions for a dramatic spurt of 
learning. The capabilities developed during that period produced the modern Indian 




In 2008, the Indian pharmaceutical sector had 20,000 licensed companies employing 
around 500,000 people. Bulk drugs account for close to 25 per cent of the sector and 
formulations the rest. Between 1996 and 2006 sales of pharmaceuticals grew at 
around 9 per cent per annum in nominal terms, higher than the global average, but 
lower than in China and Malaysia. Exports have grown even more rapidly in the last 
two decades, with 22 per cent export growth in 2006. In 2007, 43 per cent of revenues 
came from exports. However, the export sector is concentrated in a few firms. Only 
60 production locations are certified by the World Health Organization as compliant 
with the standards of the US Food and Drugs Administration (FDA). This is still the 
largest number in a single country outside the US, but it gives an idea of the 
concentration of quality in a small number of firms. Of the top six companies in the 
Indian pharmaceutical sector, three are Indian: Cipla, Sun Pharmaceuticals and 
Piramal. The other three are GlaxoSmithKline, Ranbaxy which was bought by the 
Japanese company Daiichi in 2008 from its Indian owners and Abbott, which became 
the market leader after buying Piramal Healthcare Solutions (the generics 
manufacturing part of Piramal’s business) in 2010. Despite rapid growth, India is 
projected to lose market share in Asia to China which is likely to establish its position 
as the biggest player in the Asian pharmaceuticals market (Perlitz 2008).  
 
The Indian states gaining most from the reverse engineering phase of pharmaceutical 
development after 1970 were mostly in the west and the south. This reflected the 
strengths of southern universities and the agglomeration advantages that Mumbai had 
already acquired by the 1980s for attracting high quality human capital. Despite 
competition from other states, towards the end of the 2000s, Maharashtra accounted 
for 40 per cent of the pharmaceutical turnover in India and 11 per cent of the total 
value of formulations in the industry. The Maharashtrian bulk drugs industries are 
clustered around Mumbai, Pune, Tarapur and Aurangabad, and the formulations 
industry is clustered around Mumbai and Pune. Mumbai and Aurangabad are also 
centres of pharmaceutical R&D. West Bengal lost out in this race despite having some 
of the earliest pharmaceutical companies. One of India’s pioneering pharmaceutical 
investments was Bengal Chemicals, set up in 1930 by the visionary scientist Prafulla 
Chandra Roy. But it ran into difficulties before the opportunities created by the 1970 
patent laws could be realized and it did not participate in the reverse engineering 
phase. By the 1970s Bengal Chemicals had become a loss-making enterprise and it 
was nationalized in 1980. It slowly moved down the value chain, and ended up 
producing veterinary formulations.  
 
India’a pharmaceutical sector had its beginning in 1954 when the Indian government 
set up the Hindustan Antibiotic Ltd. in the public sector, with technical assistance 
from the World Health Organization and UNICEF (the UN’s children’s fund). A few 
years later the government set up the Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (IDPL) 
with Soviet assistance. IDPL was the cradle for many of the future leaders of the 
Indian pharmaceutical industry, including K. Anji Reddy, the founder of Dr. Reddy’s 
Laboratories (DRL), a major player in the contemporary Indian pharmaceutical 
industry. Indian universities and technical colleges contributed strongly to the creation 
of formal capabilities. The investment in top-end education by the state throughout 
the 1950s and 1960s paid dividends in the form of large numbers of chemists and 
biologists leaving university every year. Currently, Indian universities and higher 
education institutions produce more than 100,000 chemists and biologists annually. 
87 
 
Nevertheless, till the late 1960s multinational companies still controlled 68 per cent of 
the pharmaceutical market in India.  
 
The shift in the fortunes of the pharmaceutical industry came with the passing of the 
1970 Patent Act. This allowed Indian pharmaceutical companies to break into the 
(Schumpeterian) technology rents of multinational pharmaceutical companies by 
allowing and indeed encouraging reverse engineering of known molecules. The Patent 
Act of 1970 ended the multinational monopoly in the Indian market by abolishing 
product patents and only recognizing process patents and that also for a period of 
seven years. By allowing Indian pharmaceutical companies to innovate new processes 
for making known molecules, it effectively allowed Indian companies to legally 
produce any known molecules as long as they could develop a different 
manufacturing process. Alternatively, the Indian company could wait for seven years 
till the process patent expired, and then use reverse engineering to work out how to 
make that molecule.  
 
Effectively, the Indian law invited Indian pharmaceutical companies to try and 
capture the Schumpeterian technology rents of their advanced country competitors. 
The price of a pharmaceutical product under patent consists mostly of an arbitrarily 
large technology rent whose magnitude depends on the strength of protection of 
intellectual property rights and the demand for the formulation (Khan 2000a). By 
allowing Indian companies to figure out a way to produce the molecule at cost, the 
law effectively granted them a share of these Schumpeterian rents if they were 
successful. Thus by accident or design, the 1970 Act implicitly created a new type of 
‘financing instrument’ that could finance the learning of pharmaceutical processes. As 
success guaranteed significant rents to any Indian pharmaceutical company that 
succeeded in innovating a new process or that cracked an out-of-patent process using 
reverse engineering, the pharmaceutical companies found it easy to raise money to 
finance their learning. Fortunately for the Indian pharmaceutical industry, the design 
of this instrument and the governance rules that allocated it turned out to be very 
effective for creating incentives and compulsions for high levels of effort in capability 
development.  
 
First, the implicit governance agency allocating the rent was simply the enforcement 
agencies of the Indian government administering the Patent Act. The legal cover that 
the Indian state provided to its pharmaceutical companies allowed them to capture 
significant rents directly through a market process if they succeeded in developing 
their capability to manufacture the molecule. The critical feature of this financing 
instrument was that only successful capability development was rewarded ex post. But 
because large returns were promised if the development was successful, companies 
that had some track record and a positive evaluation of their own capabilities to take 
the risk could raise large amounts of money in capital markets on relatively 
favourable terms. Only companies that succeeded in developing manufacturing 
processes and therefore acquiring the tacit knowledge involved in process 
technologies could capture these rents. There was no difficulty in allocating the 
reward accurately because the rents could only be captured by successful firms. 
Nevertheless, the promise of the rent could be converted into ex ante financing for 
learning because the pharmaceutical companies could raise money to support their 
learning based on the enforcement of the Patent Act. The design of this financing 
instrument was fortuitous but it created very strong incentives for firms to put in high 
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levels of effort in developing their capabilities. The firm would already have 
borrowed or put in its own finances ex ante to finance the learning process and it 
could only recover its investments if it was successful. These contingent rewards 
meant the firm had no incentive to go easy on its effort. It helped that pharmaceutical 
companies were capital and skill intensive so the learning process did not entail 
managing factories with large numbers of workers where learning success is more 
difficult to predict. With scientists, technicians and other skilled personnel, incentives 
can be more easily aligned with the firm by sharing rewards, and effort could be very 
high given the financing instruments provided by the Patent Act.  
 
For many of the chemist-entrepreneurs who had already emerged in India by that 
time, capability development became a viable risk to take. Here again was a sector 
where the gap between capabilities developed in the past through formal education 
and previous pharmaceutical manufacturing experience placed many firms and 
chemists close to the capabilities required for global competitiveness in process 
innovation and the manufacturing of molecules (as opposed to the assembly of 
pharmaceutical products with imported molecules). The knowledge gap that had to be 
traversed, described as sQ, in eq. [10] was therefore low in this sector for the 
manufacture of fairly sophisticated molecules. This was largely because of public 
sector investments in pharmaceutical companies and in universities in the previous 
period. The best chemist-entrepreneurs in the country could reasonably believe that 
they would be able to crack the capability development problem with some 
investment in learning and this would be worthwhile given the large potential 
rewards. The only element of the political settlement that mattered is that it should 
allow the state to enforce the Patent Act in the intended way. There were no powerful 
Indian interests that wanted to block or distort the application of the Patent Act in 
significant ways using political access or power and so in the existing political 
settlement the Act was effectively enforceable. Its enforcement in turn generated the 
rents for successful developers. However, India as a whole was relatively weak 
compared to the home countries of the multinational companies whose rents were 
being challenged. The strategy began to be undermined when these countries began to 
put increasing pressure on India to change its Patent Act.  
 
An even more dynamic aspect of this method of financing capability development 
was that the successful company then had very significant income streams coming in 
precisely because they were able to capture a part of the global technology rents 
associated with that product. These significant income streams coming into the most 
capable companies had a further effect in spurring more than just the development of 
reverse engineering capabilities. It allowed the development of genuine R&D and 
product development capabilities. The technology rents thus not only paid for the 
initial investments in learning, but also financed subsequent rounds of both learning 
and true innovation in a number of dynamic and rapidly growing companies. 
 
Capability development using this financing mechanism was extremely rapid. 
Companies like Ranbaxy, Sun Pharma, Cipla, Piramal, DRL and others grew rapidly 
as a result of this incentive structure. Initially the sights of Indian pharmaceutical 
companies were set on their domestic market. By 2004 the share of foreign players in 
India had come down to 23 per cent. But in 2001 the global consequences of India’s 
catching up became obvious when Cipla, the country’s second largest 
pharmaceuticals company at that time offered an AIDS drug to African countries for 
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US$300 when the global price of the drug was US$12,000. Some Indian companies 
also began to develop new products through their own R&D. They planned to achieve 
new drug discoveries and in a few cases came close. The big players like Ranbaxy, 
Sun and DRL had new molecules in the pipeline with R&D financed by their cash 
flows from their technology rents.  
 
Not surprisingly, US pharmaceutical companies soon went all out to enforce the 
protection of their technology rents by lobbying the US to focus on IPRs in the 
context of global trade negotiations. US patent protection of pharmaceutical products 
may well be excessive not only from the point of view of global development but also 
for sustaining a high level of innovation in the US (Stiglitz 2007: 103-32). From this 
perspective, the legalized Indian capture of a small part of global pharmaceutical 
technology rents using its 1970 Act may actually have been a global good. Revisiting 
TRIPS may be difficult but it is a vital global policy issue for the years ahead.  
 
This learning strategy for capability development was fundamentally transformed by 
WTO rules, under which India had to pass its Patent Amendment Act of 2005. Under 
tremendous pressure from the US, India was persuaded to recognize patent protection 
in TRIPS compliant ways. The new Indian act of 2005 recognizes a twenty year 
period of protection of patents, following US patent law. There are a few loopholes 
for the time being because this applies only to drugs patented after 1995. On the other 
hand, there are likely to be serious problems in the future over the possibility of ‘ever-
greening’ whereby a multinational patent holder can re-apply for a patent after twenty 
years on a marginally modified molecule, or on the basis of some new application of 
an old molecule.  
 
The result of the 2005 Act has already been a series of fundamental changes in 
strategies of indigenous capability development in India’s pharmaceutical sector. In 
particular, the change in the IPR environment dramatically altered the projected cash 
flows of the leading pharmaceutical companies. As the captured technology rents 
dried up, the financing of capability development and investments to make new 
discoveries also slowed down significantly. It is possible to argue that the 1970 Act 
allowed Indian pharmaceutical companies to eat into too many of the technology rents 
of the advanced country pharmaceutical giants. But it is equally possible to argue that 
a twenty year patent law and possibilities of ever-greening create a system of 
technology rents that damage or block opportunities for capability development in 
developing countries and may even slow down innovation in advanced countries.  
 
The rapid catching up in the 1980s and 1990s in the Indian pharmaceutical sector is 
bound to slow down without the support for financing learning. The change in the 
Patent Act has put an end to the implicit financing coming from the ability to capture 
a share of global technology rents. New entrants in the pharmaceutical sector within 
India will find it very difficult to finance their capability development in the future. 
Existing Indian pharmaceutical companies will also have to change strategies to 
comply with a strict patent regime. The most important strategic response that is 
already observed is a shift of focus of Indian pharmaceutical companies towards 
lower value-adding contract manufacturing for foreign multinationals. This can be 
described as the adoption of β-strategies by most Indian pharmaceutical companies. If 
this consolidates as the new dominant strategy, India is also likely to face an ‘inverse-
U shaped squeeze’ in this sector in the years to come (Khan 2009b). New lower cost 
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entrants from countries where wage costs are even lower can begin to threaten 
contract manufacturing at lower quality levels, while movements into higher value 
addition based on knowing process technologies may be constrained unless new 
financing instruments can be devised to keep on acquiring the capabilities at that 
level.  
 
TRIPS-Induced ‘Beta Strategies’ 
The 2005 Act hit Indian pharmaceutical companies hardest if they had significant 
R&D in the pipeline because their expectations of rent-based cash flows to finance 
this research suddenly dried up. A number of responses followed, including selling 
out, shifting focus to contract production and research, separating their R&D activities 
from the more mundane generics production and seeking venture funding for the 
former. But overall it is likely that the dominant response for many Indian 
pharmaceutical firms will be to focus on what has come to be described as Contract 
Research and Manufacturing Services (or CRAMS). This is an arrangement where 
multinationals outsource aspects of manufacturing and even research to companies in 
developing countries like India, but they continue to own the knowledge (hence the 
term contract research). The broader research component could also include the 
conduct of trials, which are an extremely expensive part of overall drug development 
if conducted in an advanced country. But trials could be much cheaper and bigger in 
scale if conducted in a developing country like India. Examples of each of these 
responses can already be found. 
 
The first response, selling out, is obviously the most dramatic. In 2007 US-based 
Mylan bought out Matrix Laboratories, one of the largest Indian manufacturers of 
antiretroviral drugs for developing country markets. But it was the late 2008 sale of 
Ranbaxy to Daiichi that stunned most Indians. Ranbaxy was a trailblazing 
pharmaceutical company and had several promising products in the R&D pipeline. 
But its owners felt they could not finance these any more. In 2010 Abbott purchased 
Piramal’s generic drug production outfit, Piramal Healthcare Solutions. The deal 
made Abbott the dominant company in the Indian market.  
 
The second and more common response has been to focus on contract manufacturing 
for foreign multinationals. Contract production of drugs implies the payment of 
significant license fees to the patent owner or it implies producing the drug for the 
patent owner on a cost-plus basis. In 2010 Piramal sold out its massive generics 
business to Abbott given the reduced income streams that are likely in the future as 
molecules remain patent protected for longer. Piramal’s strategy was to focus on 
contract research and manufacturing in the remainder of its business. Either way, the 
Indian company can expect significantly lower income streams in the future compared 
to the past. Contract research is equally unlikely to result in broad-based capability 
development. Multinational pharmaceutical companies are likely to take good care 
that the technology is controlled and owned by them. In areas like biotechnology 
where process knowledge is vital, contract research is even less likely. However, 
some areas of labour-intensive and repetitive research activity may well be outsourced 
to countries like India. Another area that broadly comes under research is conducting 
trials. These are expensive in advanced countries and India is likely to become an 




These types of strategic responses can be described as β-strategies. Contract 
manufacture in particular is relatively simple given the technological capabilities that 
the major Indian pharmaceutical companies have already demonstrated. Examples of 
these types of contracts include Aurobindo Pharma which has a licensing agreement 
with Pfizer to manufacture 60 generic drugs for distribution to other markets. Dr. 
Reddy’s Laboratories entered a similar agreement with GSK to produce around 100 
branded drugs for global distribution. As a low cost venue for manufacturing licensed 
drugs, the Indian pharmaceutical sector could see significant growth. But Indian 
pharmaceutical companies may also start looking for even cheaper venues for 
assembling the more basic formulations. The most important consequence of the 
contracting route is that while Indian pharmaceuticals will be able to survive using 
this strategy, the revenue stream for financing significant in-house product 
development is unlikely to be assured through this route. 
 
A third response is more ambitious and involves separating the generics 
manufacturing part of the business from the ongoing R&D in product development. 
This is now necessary given the more constrained cash flows from the generics 
business and the risks and cash requirements of investing in product development. A 
number of the big Indian players have spun off R&D ventures out of their main 
business and looked for venture capital to finance the development work. In other 
words, the cash flow of the generics can no longer sustain investments in high level 
capability development and R&D, and one way of recognizing that is to separate the 
two businesses. Examples include Sun Pharma, which created the Sun Pharma 
Advanced Research Company (SPARC) in 2007 to do product development 
separately, to be financed by risk-tolerant venture capitalist investors. Glenmark and 
DRL provide other examples of this strategy. However, venture capital groups 
operating in developing countries, like ICICI Ventures are criticized by industry 
insiders for investing only when revenue streams are assured, cashing in on growth, 
not aiding growth.  
 
The probability of relatively small R&D operations funded by venture capital leading 
to major breakthroughs is relatively small. It is more likely in the specialized field of 
bio-technology rather than in pharmaceuticals proper. This is because bio-technology 
is more about process knowledge and relatively small laboratories can keep on 
attacking a problem with a reasonable chance of eventual success. Innovative and 
relatively small firms like Bharat Biotech, founded in 1996 may therefore do 
relatively better in the new environment. It was privately held and had 450 employees 
but worked on innovative ideas on vaccines like the Rotavirus vaccine with grants 
from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, and malaria vaccines.  
 
Thus, while pockets of high-capability research continue to find funding for their 
R&D, one consequence of TRIPS was to sever the internal financing that was driving 
α-strategies in the broad-based pharmaceuticals sector. While these changes are 
relatively recent, industry insiders think that the future trajectory of the sector will be 
driven to a much greater extent by contract production (the β-strategy in this case) 
with isolated pockets of high-end research. The latter is also likely to be contract 
research, financed by multinationals or other financiers in more advanced countries. 
The calculations of multinational investors to minimize their costs of research and 
development globally may not always coincide with that of individual countries 




The capabilities to manufacture drugs under contract are capabilities that were 
themselves developed over the medium term in most cases. Other even lower cost 
countries are likely to enter over the next decade, and Indian pharmaceutical 
companies may themselves be induced to relocate some of the assembly operations to 
cheaper locations. Unless the higher end capability development is proceeding at an 
equivalent pace, growth within India in this sector may eventually be squeezed.  
 
While the pharmaceutical sector is a relatively advanced one in India, its experience 
demonstrates very general problems facing catching up in developing countries. The 
emergence of an appropriate financing instrument was critical for the acceleration of 
capability development in the sector. Equally, the clawing back of technology rents by 
global multinationals under TRIPS has had equally serious implications for long-term 
capability development. Moreover, the pharmaceutical sector is not just a sector that 
is of interest for its export earnings potential. In a poor country it can potentially play 
an important role in human development if it acquires the capability to develop cheap 
high quality drugs required by the poor. The constraints set on the development of 
technological capabilities in the pharmaceutical industry in countries like India is 
therefore of even broader relevance. Both the auto and the pharmaceutical sector 
demonstrate very clearly the vital role played by the capability development strategies 
of the past. In both cases additional and sector-specific support strategies operated in 
the 1980s, creating additional financing for learning. In both cases the incentives and 
compulsions associated with these additional financing instruments were fortuitously 
just right for inducing very high levels of effort in absorbing technologies and 
building capabilities. Describing these successes simply as the results of liberalization 
does not capture very significant aspects of the historical reality. Nor does it provide 
policy-makers with the understanding to locate and address the most significant 
market failures that constrain broad based capability development in India.  
 
8. Key Conclusions 
The focus of our analysis has been on the processes of capability development. India’s 
growth has been driven by capability development to a large extent and it has 
achieved significant successes in its capability development strategies both in the 
‘planning’ period between 1947 and the late-1970s and in the more open economy 
that emerged in the period after 1980. The contribution of our analysis has been to 
demonstrate that the liberal analytical frame that distinguishes these periods in terms 
of ‘planning’ and ‘liberalization’ misses some of the most important processes driving 
capability development in the two periods and also misses the critical role of political 
economy in explaining the implementation and enforcement of different policy 
instruments in the two periods. The analytical frame of political settlements provides 
an alternative for looking at these processes and shows that both periods contributed 
to capability development in different ways. 
 
In particular, our analysis deepens the insight that the success of the second period, 
concentrated as it was on particular sectors and regions, cannot be understood and 
would not have happened, without the capability development that happened in the 
first. It also provides an analytical framework and case study evidence to show that 
even the successes of the second, more liberal period, were based on strong business-
government relationships and implicit financing of different types that allowed a 
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further stage of capability development. Sectors close to the frontier used either alpha 
or beta-strategies to reach the competitive frontier in the vicinity of their already 
existing capabilities. However, this strategy of capability development, focusing only 
on sectors close to the frontier, had implications in terms of job creation, spreading 
the benefits of growth to new population segments and across regions.  
 
We also referred to a significant emergent problem with the new political settlement 
as it has developed in India. The break-up of the inclusive dominant party system by 
the late-1970s resulted in the strengthening of new ad hoc business-politics links, 
linking particular businesses and political leaders. This allowed the creation of 
specific support instruments for particular sectors. In a context where a number of 
Indian manufacturing and technology sectors were close to the global frontier, as they 
were in the late-1970s and 1980s, the possibility of using business-government links 
the reach the frontier and generate large revenues created strong incentives for politics 
to be used to support upgrading strategies. The rewards from this were large enough 
given the closeness to the frontier in some areas for both businesses and politicians to 
see the benefits of supporting learning in this way. The rewards were relatively quick 
and significant alpha and beta-strategies emerged as a result. 
 
A number of things have changed since then, making business-politics links more 
problematic. First, the international institutional structure has dramatically changed. 
The emergence of the WTO, for instance, precludes domestic content requirements 
being specified by governments. Foreign investors cannot any more be offered rents 
contingent on their willingness to transfer know-how to local producers. The 
emergence of TRIPS-compliance as part of the international trading architecture also 
makes the types of rent-capture strategies that drove growth in India’s pharmaceutical 
industry impossible. Both the types of support that can be offered and the conditions 
that can be set have therefore become more constrained. Secondly, the very success of 
the sectors that were close to the frontier means that there are no longer a large 
number of sectors that are close to the frontier. Business-politics links in this context 
become much more problematic. As these alliances no longer have any easy 
technology acquisition strategies to exploit there is a tendency to move into 
unproductive rent capture. It is not surprising that we see a growing phenomenon of 
unproductive rent creation and rent-sharing strategies emerging between big business 
and their political allies. Politicians still need significant off-budget financing, but 
they are increasingly generated in deals that are unproductive in terms of adding to net 
social benefit. Examples of such deals in recent Indian media reports include price 
fixing deals for gas and other natural resources, land acquisition deals, deals 
allocating mining rights or allowing illegal mining to take place, or deals that allocate 
the telecommunications spectrum in non-transparent ways. As the details of what 
actually happened in these deals are not publicly available we have not described 
them in any detail, but these are the types of deals that have raised political questions 
and concerned the Indian media in 2010 and 2011. The result has been a growing 
restiveness in the broader population and demands for more redistribution to the poor. 
Anna Hazare’s anti-corruption movement is a direct result of these trends. India’s 
political establishment does not yet appear to have a developmental strategy that 
meets the twin requirements of economic development and political acceptability. In 
2011, it was faltering on both. The analysis of political settlements and economic 
capability development provides a methodology for conducting a broader discussion 
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